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ABSTRACT
A confluence of factors has sparked a sustained, public preoccupation with
conversation. Brewing since the fifteenth century and overtly public since the middle of
the nineteenth century, the explosion of public models of conversation that emerged in
the European and American rhetorical traditions is significant—without precedent—in
the history of rhetoric. This interest in conversation is so pronounced as to penetrate not
just public speaking practices, but subtler interpretations of law, philosophy, commerce,
and government. I identify this as the conversational turn. The extent to which this
saturation was truly conversational is the subject of much debate. However, the contours
of this debate are little understood. This is both a historical and theoretical problem.
While the art of face-to-face conversation is said to be either irrevocably in decline or in
desperate need of reclaiming, practically every modern communication invention has
conspired to make the rhetorical metaphor and structure of conversation not just possible
in public life, but desired and expected. In an effort to understand how and why the
public conversational dynamic rose to prominence in the way that it did, this study brings
together underlying social and political dynamics that animate the conversational turn,
particularly as they developed in the United States. By doing so, this project recasts the
dominant narrative about the public shift away from oratory and toward conversation in
contemporary, democratic societies.
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CHAPTER 1
THE CONVERSATIONAL TURN
IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE
“In America during these same years conversation could never be contained in the salons of one
class…it proliferated through many levels of society in a democratic diversity of forms…the
public seemed especially keen to see the character of important personalities expressed ‘live’ in
the give-and-take of supposedly spontaneous conversation.”
-Peter Gibian, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Culture of Conversation, 2001
“Not all discussions —or conversations—lead to wisdom: but wisdom is more likely to come from
people who engage in true conversation than those who do not.”
-Egbert S. Oliver, “Who’s For Conversation?” 1958
“Reading and Public Address are but modified forms of Conversation and are so closely allied to
it that excellence in Conversation will secure excellence in Reading and Public Address.”
-Jacob Shoemaker, Practical Elocution, 1883

A confluence of factors has sparked a sustained, public preoccupation with
conversation. Brewing since the fifteenth century and overtly public since the middle of
the nineteenth century, the explosion of public models of conversation that emerged in
the European and American rhetorical traditions is significant—without precedent—in
the history of rhetoric. This interest in conversation is so pronounced as to penetrate not
just public speaking practices, but subtler interpretations of law, philosophy, commerce,
and government. I identify this as the conversational turn.
The extent to which this saturation was truly conversational is the subject of much
debate. However, the contours of this debate are little understood. This is both a historical

1

and theoretical problem. As a matter of historical method, conversational models and
dialogues have variously been rejected, extolled, and overlooked as relevant to
contemporary public communication. While some sort of divergence is to be expected,
what has been lacking in contemporary views of rhetoric is a general theory for including
one interpretation of conversation alongside (or to exclusion of) another. Where for some
the traditionally private genre of conversation is antithetical to the more agonistic rhetoric
necessitated by a democratic public, for others, in particular proponents of deliberative
democracy and the humanistic metaphor of conversation, the selfsame “branch of
rhetoric” (i.e., conversation) is upheld as “the preferred model of political
communication,” and, indeed, for all of rhetoric.1
Meanwhile, what Peter Burke and Peter Gibian theorize in their separate studies
as the “poles” of conversation have almost completely disappeared from contemporary
analyses of the genre.2 In his expansive social history of language and conversation,
Burke explains that tensions in conversational dynamics and performance, though
necessary for developing a general theory, are continually ignored. He writes: “a truly
general theory of conversation should discuss the tension and the balance between the
competitive and cooperative principles, between equality and hierarchy, between
inclusion and exclusion, and between spontaneity and study, rather than placing all the

1

Cicero refers to conversation as branch of rhetoric in Book I of De Officiis (On Duties) (1913). In
“Political Oratory and Conversation: Cicero versus Deliberative Democracy,” Political Theory 27 (1999):
39-64, Peter Remer summarizes the literature on deliberative democracy as “the preferred model of
political communication” (39). For more on how the conversational style is antithetical to eloquence see
Lee Cerling, “The Fate of Eloquence in American Higher Education, 1892-1925” PhD diss., (University of
Iowa, 1995), 31.
2

For more on the landscape of conversation in American literary and cultural history and the “poles” of
conversation see especially Peter Gibian, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Culture of Conversation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1 and 215-289.
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weight on the first item in each of these pairs.” 3 However, despite featuring prominently
in Classical dialogues and Renaissance courtesy manuals, and despite their promise to
enrich our views of what contemporary conversational dynamics can “do,” the poles of
conversation continue to receive scant attention.
This unevenness in historical approaches to conversation is compounded by the
fact that the period that first codified conversation as an important rhetorical genre—the
Renaissance—is rarely considered alongside contemporary, democratic iterations of
conversation. In particular, feminist histories and theories of rhetoric, once sequestered
by design, are still mostly studied, not just independently of rhetoric in general, but in
opposition to it. The result is that conversational dynamics, while continually being
adapted to the meet the problems of the day, have suffered from an even more polarized
relationship to history than oratory. So many “multiple and separate rhetorics” have been
developed and splintered within the fifteenth and twenty-first centuries that any
continuity that does exist between them goes mostly undetected.4 Historians covering the
more recent nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries, meanwhile, often do
observe but then quickly reject newer varieties of public conversational iterations, since
they are so clearly a deviation from “true” conversation.5

3

Peter Burke, The Art of Conversation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 92.

4

James Berlin, “Revisionary History: The Dialectical Method” in Rethinking the History of Rhetoric, ed.
Takis Poulakos (Boulder: West View, 1993): 135-152. Also see Jane Donawerth’s “Introduction: Adding
Women’s Rhetorical Theory to the Conversation” in Jane Donawerth, Conversational Rhetoric: The Rise
and Fall of a Women’s Tradition, 1600-1900 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012), 1-16.
One of the most promising and sustained efforts to bring together the intellectual history of conversation as
it relates to rhetoric and oratory can be found in David Randall’s The Concept of Conversation.
5

See especially Chapter 9 in Stephen Miller’s Conversation: A History of A Declining Art (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2006), 264-290; Donawerth (2012); and David Simpson, “The Cult of
‘Conversation,’” Raritan 16.4 (1997): 75-85.
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This impasse—together with the lack of connections between periods that it
encourages—tends to obscure a second and related theoretical problem: public
adaptations of conversation, when they do receive sustained critical attention, are often
theorized as if they could actually replicate the ideal promised in the art of conversation.
This study does not dispute the view that conversation among friends is among the
sweetest things in life.6 However, it rejects the notion that the ideal of conversation,
which, at its best, carries with it a promise of something bordering on religious
experience, is the appropriate place to base a theory for the variously makeshift and
highly orchestrated models of “conversation” we see so much today. The goal of this
project is nevertheless constructive. In contrast to the bulk of contemporary criticism of
conversation, I use this assumption of difference not as an end for criticism on the current
state of rhetoric, conversation, or contemporary political communication but rather as a
starting point for understanding the practices and contexts leading up to and following the
public conversational turn. The ultimate aim of this project is not to outline another
decline thesis, but rather to explain the resourcefulness—and rhetorical significance—of
the public conversational dynamic.
Building on existing histories and critical vignettes of conversation, and drawing
upon the rhetorical tradition as a theoretical basis for understanding the range and poles
of the genre (which I detail in the next chapter), I argue that the proper place on which to
base a theory and history of public conversation is not in ideals of rationality, equality, or
unadulterated sociability but rather in observable, public practices. Tracking the method
6

For more on this view see especially Madeleine De Scudéry, “Of Conversation,” in The Rhetorical
Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, ed. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (Boston:
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), 767 and Michel De Montaigne, “Of the art of discussion,” in Michel de
Montaigne: The Complete Works, trans. Donald M. Frame (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 855.
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of Norbert Elias, who in the The Civilizing Process sets out to sketch a process by
showing “the movement itself, or at least large segments of it, as a whole, as if speeded
up,” in this study I seek to illustrate more durable iterations of public conversation in the
context of law, government, culture, and style.7 Following key moments and debates in
the rhetorical tradition (Chapter Two), a formalized eighteenth-century impetus for
conversation (Chapter Three), together with nineteenth (Chapter Four), twentieth, and
twenty-first century (Chapter Five) rehearsals of the genre, I set out to uncover
motivations and functions of the public conversational dynamic that distinguish it from
the conversational ideal. In the end, I conclude that, however close or far the public
conversational model may come to the democratic and philosophical ideals that inspire it,
it is an important compensatory strategy that helps to make possible common life.

Competing Ends of Conversation: Candidate Trump and President Obama
The scope of the conversational turn is vast and full of contradictions. By way of
introduction, consider two sets of contemporary “conversations,” both of which were
delivered in Iowa in the summer of 2015. The first, an interview of then presidential
candidate Donald Trump conducted by Republican pollster Frank Luntz, took place on
July 18, 2015 at the Family Leadership Summit in Ames. The second, which was
recorded on September 14, 2015 at the State Library of Iowa in Des Moines and
published the following month in The New York Review of Books, was entitled “President
Obama & Marilynne Robinson: A Conversation in Iowa.” Both performances were
oriented toward the 2016 presidential election and included thoughts on the current
political climate and visions for the future. Highlighting the ubiquity of the genre, both of
7

Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing, 2010) 71.
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the conversations also consisted of two people (typically an interviewer and an
interviewee), sitting down, partially facing each other, with some sort of mug or cup next
to them.
The first exchange, between Trump and Luntz, took place at a conservative
summit on a stage in front of a live audience. It was also being recorded for a televised
audience. (C-SPAN, the public service station dedicated to public affairs programming,
aired a live performance of the talk. All of the texts I cite in the following section are
pulled from transcripts or archived videos from C-PSAN.) Although the discussion would
be most talked about because of Trump’s inflammatory comments about Senator John
McCain (“He’s a war hero because he was captured. I like people that weren’t captured,
OK? I hate to tell you.”), the most relevant feature here is its demonstration of
conversation in the context of a populist style of politics.
Following two questions involving the audience, Luntz opened the
conversational interview by introducing the subject of education and its relationship to
jobs. In theory, the exchange might have provided an opportunity for some of the
compensatory strategies for conversation that I detail in Chapter Four: compression,
discovery, cultural mediation, and cultural reform. Historically, at least, the United
States’ famous (and partial) quest for “education for all” was, I would argue, a direct
expression of the search for these potentially corrective qualities of conversation in public
life. However, in practice, these strategies can be used for all kinds of autocratic ends.
Witness, for example, how Trump obfuscates the substance of the question (i.e.,
education on a national scale) and instead maneuvers away from complicated
technicalities and toward frank (and only frank) speech.

6

Luntz:
So, I need to ask you. The most important attribute of a successful workforce is
their education and training. There is a major issue out there, and I know how
focused you are on getting the best employees. Common Core has been very
controversial. The president has had to step back on it. What should the next
president do with Common Core and with education, so that you can hire the
employees you want to hire?
Trump:
A great question. Common Core has to be ended. It is a disaster. It’s a way of…
(Applause)
It’s a way of taking care of the people in Washington that frankly, I don’t even
think they give a damn about education, half of them. And I am sure some of
them maybe do.
Luntz:
Do you want to use that word in this forum?
Trump:
I will, I will. Because people want to hear the truth, Frank. I watch you all the
time; they want to hear the truth.
(Applause)
I mean, exactly what Frank said is what is wrong with our country. We are so
politically correct that we cannot move anymore.
You know? And Frank, and Frank…

7

Wait a minute, wait a minute, [Luntz interjects] because politically correct is
political… [Trump] We have to be able to express ourselves.
Luntz:
But don’t we go too far?
Trump:
Too far?
Luntz:
Don’t you feel that you went too far in what you call [Trump interjects: Saying
the word damn?]…[Luntz] Mexicans coming across the border?
Trump:
Oh no, not at all. No, I’m very happy.
(Applause)
Well, let me tell you not at all. No, not at all.
(Applause)
Two things. I am so proud of the fact that I got dialogue started on illegal
immigration…

Remember how the original question put to Trump was about education? The
crowd apparently did not. They instead seemed to be really excited about his use of the
word “damn.” That Trump was clever enough to make a pun out of the commentators
name (Frank) only heightened that original blow. As I discuss later in this study, the
tactic of being “frank” goes back to at least Plato and has haunted democratic judgment
from the beginning. It introduces important questions related to style and content, and

8

how the two are strained in democratic settings. Political theorist Elizabeth Markovits
suggests in her study on frank speech, for example, that in the Gorgias Socrates is
“playing” with the ideal of frank speech (parrhesia) by “drawing on Athenian oratorical
traditions that seem to violate its dictates” and “calling attention to” frank speech as a
trope. “While Socrates remains committed to the idea of truth in speech,” writes
Markovits, “his practice highlights the difficulty and vulnerability of democratic
speech.”8
One of the vulnerabilities that Trump takes advantage of in his conversational
exchange with Luntz is the populist appeal of saying “out loud what people…are thinking
inside.”9 In contrast to career politicians who kowtow to the latest special interest group,
the implicit argument goes, Trump, by calling out metonymous “Washington,” is
claiming to represent the democratic sovereign writ large. His willingness to say out loud
what other people are thinking, in other words, represents the “rightful” source of
sovereignty (i.e., the people) rather than any “sectional interest.”10 This common
maneuver comes straight out of the populist playbook. As political theorist Margaret
Canovan outlines in one of her many works on the subject, “Populists love transparency
and distrust mystification; they denounce backroom deals, shady compromises,
complicated procedures, secret treaties, and technicalities that only experts can
understand.”11 Given the conversational interview’s obvious goal of accommodating

8

Elizabeth Markovits, The Politics of Sincerity: Frank Speech, Plato, and Democratic Judgment
(University Park, Penn State University Press, 2008), 4.
9

Jean-Marie Le Pen as quoted in Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of
Democracy,” Political Studies (1999), XLVII, 4.
10

Canovan, 1999, 4.

11

Canovan, 1999, 6.
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informal, impromptu speech, it is not surprising that populist appeals can flourish in this
genre and perhaps why Trump’s simplistic answers to complicated questions are met with
applause.
Beyond the particularities of Trump, however, is a structural issue that is
embedded into the democratic experiment. The chasm between complex issues, the
diffusion of knowledge, and the means to interpret and apply truths was a concern for
American citizenry from the beginning. In his 1796 Farewell Address George
Washington urged the promotion of “the general diffusion of knowledge” saying, “in
proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential
that public opinion should be enlightened.”12 For reasons that I will show in Chapters 3
and 4, conversation was publicly adapted in earnest in the United States (in the first half
of the nineteenth century especially) in the service of uniting these ends. Populism is but
one expression of it. That is why, when Trump says he is “so proud of the fact that I got
dialogue started on illegal immigration” it sounds indistinguishable from any other
contemporary speaker. The call for starting a “dialogue” or “conversation” on a topic is
heard so often as to have become a trope. Indeed, it is only recently that the existence of a
common language necessary for such a “conversation” has even come into question.13

12

George Washington. “Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School,
Lillian Goldman Law Library, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. For more on the
corresponding nature between government and knowledge, see Daniel Walker Howe’s fascinating account
of the American postal system in What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 225.
13

The conversation between President Obama and Marilynne Robinson, which I will preview in the
following section, identifies this lack of commonality as a stumbling block. For a non-academic analysis on
the cultural significance of the loss of a shared language and its associated loss of speech’s power, see
Vinson Cunningham’s article following the 2016 shooting of five police officers in Dallas, “Obama and the
Collapse of Our Common American Language,” New Yorker, July 13, 2016.
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What Trump’s answer on whether he went “too far” obscures, however, is that by
calling Mexicans “rapists” (which is what Luntz is referring to) Trump did not start a
metaphorical conversation so much as end one. And that, at least from a populist or
demagogue’s perspective, is precisely the point. As Canovan describes the appeal,
“populists claim that…complexity is a self-serving racket perpetuated by professional
politicians, and that the solutions to the problems ordinary people care about are
essentially simple.”14 Meanwhile, Jennifer Mercieca, a rhetorical scholar with a
forthcoming book on the demagoguery of Trump, identifies how Trump’s “lack of
specificity about how he would accomplish…goals is less relevant than his self-assured,
convincing rhetoric.”15 In this reading, the essence of the question—how to keep
American students globally competitive—was less important than the confidence with
which he projected his criticism of a controversial, top-down policy (“Common Core has
to be ended. It is a disaster.”) (“It’s a way of taking care of the people in Washington that
frankly, I don’t even think they give a damn about education, half of them.”)
While by many accounts Trump’s refusal to concede ground would be considered
antithetical to conversation (“Oh no, not at all. No, I’m very happy.), in the Trump
repertoire this maneuver is so consistent as to be considered further proof of his
authenticity. “Trump’s self-congratulating rhetoric makes him appear to be the epitome
of hubris, which, according to research, is often the least attractive quality of a potential
leader,” writes Mercieca.16 “However, Trump is so consistent in his hubris that it appears
14

Canovan, 1999, 6.

15

Jennifer Mercieca, “The Rhetorical Brilliance of Trump the Demagogue” The Conversation, December
11, 2015.
16

Mercieca, 2015. The research she references is Jeffrey C. Alexander’s The Performance of Politics:
Obama’s Victory and the Democratic Struggle for Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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authentic: his greatness is America’s greatness.” Mercieca’s insight regarding Trump’s
perceived authenticity may begin to explain why, at a summit with the mission of
“strengthening families, by inspiring Christ-like leadership in the home, the church, and
the government,” it was not the “homespun values of hard work, and honesty, and
humility”—something President Obama and Marilynn Robinson would soon discuss—
that would get a hearing, but rather hubris, “frankness,” and bluster.
The second conversation, between Obama and Robinson, could be considered a
response to the Iowa summit, since, on one level, it attempts to work as a corrective to the
fear and divisiveness that Trump’s rhetoric encourages. However, this is not to suggest
that the two conversations are opposites. I pair the two conversational interviews in Iowa
because they are neither wholly similar nor wholly dissimilar from one another. Both, for
instance, have what basically amounts to an interviewer and an interviewee (a scenario
that proponents of pure conversation would describe as disqualifying).17 Both engage in a
back and forth style of communication performed and recorded in front of a live or
anticipated audience. Because in both instances the back and forth contributes to and
changes the course of the conversation, they both might also be considered what Lindal
Buchanan theorizes as “collaborative” in their delivery.18 And finally, both are what
Carolyn Miller would describe as the same genre, or “recurring responses” to social
situations.19 Highlighting the recurring pattern of the conversational dynamic, the genre is

17

Stephen Miller, Conversation: A History of a Declining Art. Yale: Yale University Press, 2006, 14;
Egbert S. Oliver, “Who’s For Conversation?” Today’s Speech 6.2 (April 1958): 5-6.
18

Lindal Buchanan, Regendering Delivery: The Fifth Canon and Antebellum Women Rhetors (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 2005), 133, 134.
19

Carolyn Miller, “Genre as Social Action” Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984), 151.
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not merely a form, but rather a response or action that “‘fuses’ substantive, stylistic, and
situational characteristics.”20
Thus, while operating within the same genre, the two conversational interviews
can obviously highlight a range of motives, situations, and responses. In the case of
Obama and Robinson the premise of the conversation was entirely different. In contrast
to Luntz, who was at the summit to conduct a conversational interview with multiple
presidential candidates and, in the process, uncover details about their policy positions
and general attitudes surrounding their candidacies, Robinson was seated across the table
from Obama because, as an author he admired, she was “first in the queue” of people
with which he wanted to have an idea-based conversation.21 Much like nineteenth
conversational theorists Ralph Waldo Emerson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Margaret
Fuller, Obama described the conversation he proposed as “an experiment.”22 And, in the
same vein as Madeleine DeScudery, he hoped the range of the themes discussed would
be expansive, “easy and natural,” and “correct but not hypercorrect.”23 By way of
introducing the type of conversation he had in mind Obama said, “I’d like…just to have a
conversation with somebody who I enjoy and I’m interested in; to hear from them and
have a conversation with them about some of the broader cultural forces that shape our

20

Miller, 1984, 152.

21

President Barack Obama and Marilynne Robinson, “President Obama & Marilynne Robinson: A
Conversation in Iowa, The New York Review of Books, November 5, 2015.
22

Obama and Robinson, 2015. For more on the idea of conversation as a “magnetic experiment” see Ralph
Waldo Emerson’s, Society and Solitude.
23

De Scudéry, 2001, 761.
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democracy and shape our ideas, and shape how we feel about citizenship and the
direction the country should be going in.”24
Although there is a general sense of equality, friendship, and turn-taking between
Robinson and Obama that is mostly absent in the more journalistic setting of Luntz and
Trump, there are still unambiguous roles outside of the conversation that come into play.
As interviewer and sitting President of the United States, Obama’s role is clearly different
than Robinson’s, particularly at the start of the conversation. His efforts at informality
(“you got a fancy award at the White House”) (“you just kind of mash them all
together?”) (Does that sound, like, too stuffy?) contrast with her tone, which rarely strays
in its seriousness and earnestness (“I do, indeed.”) (“The word ‘cosmopolitan’ was never
applied.”) (“Well, I believe that people are images of God. There’s no alternative that is
theologically respectable to treating people in terms of that understanding. What can I
say? It seems to me as if democracy is the logical, the inevitable consequence of this kind
of religious humanism at its highest level. And it [applies] to everyone.”) With Obama,
one gets the impression that he is seeking to reorient the listener, and perhaps himself and
Robinson, away from his title as President and toward the idea-based dynamic that he is
hoping to create with Robinson. Robinson, meanwhile, is probably a little more wooden
than she might otherwise appear if the conversation were not also being recorded and
oriented for an audience (namely, the expected feature in The New York Times Review of
Books). There is a sense in which Robinson has something to prove (i.e., that her
contributions live up to Obama’s vision for her as an interlocutor) that seem to hamstring
the interplay between gravity and levity that true conversation ideally embodies.

24

Obama and Robinson, 2015.
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None of this, however, prevents either interlocutor from revealing maxims over
the course of the conversation that probably took years to get to. When Robinson
suggests, for example, “that the basis of democracy is the willingness to assume well
about other people,” it comes on the heels of delivering lectures, writing essays, and
having the topic (i.e., “the role that fear may be playing in our politics and our democracy
and our culture,” as Obama put it) “very much” on her mind for a long time.25
Meanwhile, when Obama says, “America is famously ahistorical. That’s one of our
strengths—we forget things” or “part of what makes America wonderful is we always
have this nagging dissatisfaction that spurs us on,” what he is showing, paradoxically, is
the kind of intimate knowledge of American history that takes years to distill.26 This
capacity to compress layers of knowledge is a feature of rather than a departure from
conversation, particularly conversation of the philosophical and intellectual variety.
Indeed, one of the markers of “good intellectual conversation,” writes Lawrence Buell, is
that it “tends to become a series of aphorisms.”27
Although the conversation between Obama and Robinson is atypical of what we
see in contemporary iterations of the genre (here, Trump and Obama are at opposite ends
of the spectrum) this basic difference between the distillation of ideas and the pursuit of
sound bites is an important one to observe, since the conversational style is consistently

25

Obama and Robinson, 2015.

26

President Barack Obama and Marilynne Robinson, “President Obama & Marilynne Robinson: A
Conversation—II,” The New York Review of Books, November 19, 2015.
27

Lawrence Buell, Literary Transcendentalism: Style and Vision in the American Renaissance (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1973), 96.
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faulted for promoting the latter at the expense of the former. 28 While not incorrect, this
common critique can (ironically) signify an unnecessarily reductive view of public
conversation. What the conversational model promotes is brevity. Whether or not a
speaker or writer conveys something profound or something vacuous generally has more
to do with substance than duration.29 Remember that one of America’s most important
speeches, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, was shorter in length than most of its
contemporaries, simpler in its purpose, and—while masterful in its mixing of high and
low styles—more plainspoken in its form. It lasted two minutes. And yet, when Robinson
evokes the Gettysburg Address in her conversation with Obama, she uses it to paint a
picture of something expansive: “I think that in our earlier history—the Gettysburg
Address or something—there was the conscious sense that democracy was an
achievement. It was not simply the most efficient modern system or something. It was
something that people collectively made and they understood that they held it together by
valuing it.”30
The President identifies one challenge in our democratic system (which, as I will
show in a later chapter, was actively mitigated both formally and informally at various
times throughout American history) as the capacity for having a common basis for
conversation. “Part of the challenge is—and I see this in our politics—is a common
conversation. It’s not so much, I think, that people don’t read at all; it’s that everybody is
28
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reading [in] their niche, and so often, at least in the media, they’re reading stuff that
reinforces their existing point of view. And so you don’t have the phenomenon of here’s
a set of great books that everybody is familiar with and everybody is talking about.”31
Obama’s assessment of our current rhetorical climate is reinforced by historians and
borne out by numerous quantitative studies.32 I do not dispute it. However, it also
threatens to return the conversational dynamic back into a static idea or a symbol rather
than, as Miller conceived genre, a dynamic response that “fuses substantive, stylistic, and
situational characteristics.”33
After all of that particularity in regards to conversational maneuverers and set
pieces, have we merely returned to the metaphor of conversation? And, if so, what to
make of the difference between the metaphor of conversation and democratic debate?
Near the conclusion of the two-part conversation published in The New York Times
Review of Books, it does not seem to be additional conversation in politics that Obama
and Robinson are after but rather democratic decision. Robison says, “I wish we could
have a normal politics where I disagree with people, they present their case, we take a
vote, and if I lose I say, yes, that’s democracy. I’m on the losing side of a meaningful
vote.” To which the President adds, “And I’ll try to make a better argument the next
time.” “Exactly,” says Robinson.34
31
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How Scholars Have Approached the Question
There is little debate among historians about the conversational turn. Scholars
widely acknowledge its impact. Still, there is no comprehensive study that seeks to
explain—across fields and epochs—the conversational dynamic as a contemporary,
inventive, and consequential rhetorical adaptation. Nor are there sustained attempts to
delineate the underlying assumptions that animate this modern, public phenomenon.
Instead, the literature on rhetorical conversation typically falls into one of five categories:
1) the humanistic metaphor of conversation; 2) conversation as a stylistic frame; 3) the
history of conversation; 4) analysis of how actual conversation “works” (including the
ways in which it can fail); and 5) communicative models for deliberation in a liberal
society. This last category, which is probably most common, can be further divided into
direct (face-to-face) and mediated (circulatory) approaches to deliberation. “People talk
to each other directly, or they read and watch the argument circulate through the modern
print and media culture,” writes the speech historian William Keith.35
Within this larger spectrum, there are two primary ways rhetorical scholars have
approached public models of conversation: historically and by genre. Of these, some of
the most helpful works for understanding the “conversational turn” open with the express
goal of rethinking our overemphasis—even fixation—on public models of conversation.36
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Thomas Farrell, for instance, in an effort to offer “something more powerful than a
metaphor for good reading,” valuably begins to fill in “the middle ground” between
rhetoric and conversation.37 His concern follows a long line of thinkers—from Richard
Rorty to Alasdair MacIntyre, Kenneth Burke, and H.G. Gadamer—who invoke
conversation as a “paradigm for humanistic inquiry.”38 However, he differs from these
authors in his willingness to imbed the “reflective capacity of rhetoric” in both the
“metaphor” of conversation (what Farrell calls “conversation as argument-constituted
communicative action”) and conversation “in general” (or, as he describes it, “the sloppy,
playful, give-and-take of ordinary life).”39 Farrell, in other words, “lumps” conversation
as metaphor and conversation as “the most generalized form of talk” in order to develop a
mechanism for examining the to and fro between rhetorical argument and spontaneous
conversation.40
However, he also places conversation at the opposite end of intentionality, which
is something Robert Branham and W. Barnett Pearce have identified, at least in most
public address, as a false model. The “conversational frame” in Branham and Pearce’s
view is not a reflection of actual spontaneity, but rather a studied, rhetorical choice. Mark
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Twain’s lectures and after-dinner speeches, for example, though taken to be extempore,
were in fact the product of carefully “rehearsed” and “calculated informalities.”41 In
contrast to Farrell, who views unrehearsed, dialogic conversation as something we “fall
into,” Branham and Pearce and Jamieson focus their analysis on the rhetorical power of
monologic simulations of conversation. 42 This is not to suggest, however, that hiding the
amount of forethought that goes into a performance is the only thing at stake in this
model or that the audience is somehow completely unaware of the dynamic in which they
participate. Quite the contrary, a recent dissertation on the “Common Style” in American
politics suggests that politicians’ unpretentious and seemingly unstudied way of speaking
is what “makes U.S. politics possible.”43 Where for Colene Lind the underlying question
is how to negotiate “the paradox of merit” (i.e., how political leaders can be exceptional
while also appearing ordinary), for Branham and Pearce the question has to do with the
broader alignment of power among speaker, audiences, and observers. Examining
varying degrees of implied inclusivity, Branham and Pearce conclude that, “the broadly
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inclusive conversational frame, with all its intimations of intimacy and identification,
generally conceals rather than reinforces power.”44
Both the “conversational frame” that Branham and Pearce outline and the
“common style” that Lind describes are important to this study for the way in which they
link style with ideological, democratic, and ostensibly egalitarian ideals of public
conversation. Also important to the backdrop of this study is Stephen Lucas’s brief but
insightful article, “From Oratory to Public Speaking.” In it, Lucas recognizes the longstanding arc of public conversational styles and its relationship to broader cultural and
political forces at work. He writes, “[E]ven before the end of the nineteenth century, both
the nature of public speech and the perception of the speaker had departed from the
neoclassical model of oratory. As the patrician world that undergirded the model
succumbed to an increasingly democratic and industrialized society, the older traditions
of civic rhetoric began to give way as well. Language became more colloquial and speech
delivery became more conversational.”45 This attention to broad contributing factors is
especially noteworthy because Lucas’s article is primarily devoted to a synopsis of
changes to public speaking in the twentieth-century. As such, he discusses the
technologies that revolutionized public speaking at the time, including the microphone,
radio, and television. However, unlike other relevant studies, which are primarily
organized around a single issue (for example, media influences: Kathleen Hall Jamieson,
1988; Neil Postman, 1985; Marshall McLuhan, 1964; or democratic education: Frederick
Antczak, 1985; William Keith, 2007; Robert Connors, 1997), Lucas applies a bird’s-eye
44
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view that makes room for twentieth-century transformations turning on business,
economics, and presidential power.
Building on the methods and insight provided by Lind, Branham and Pearce, and
Lucas, this project takes an interest in social, cultural, and political foundations that
impact what the conversational dynamic conceals, but also what it reveals. That is, while
Lind and Branham and Pearce usefully explain why, considered within the context of
politics and general power structures, a rhetor might deploy this model, we are still left to
wonder about its role—and persistent appeal—not only as a monologic frame, but also as
a mutually constructed social and political dynamic. And while Lucas makes a strong
case for how audiences became “predisposed to the conversational mode” during the
twentieth century, we are still left to wonder how this dynamic took shape and to what
extent earlier contributing factors still impact American rhetorical culture today.46 This
requires a closer look at history. Before looking back, however, I will briefly turn to the
“crystallization” of the conversational mode.

The Ubiquity of Conversation
In contrast to the art of conversation, which was first codified in the Renaissance,
the modern conversational dynamic—a cumulative rhetorical style and metaphor that,
while borrowing from oratory and conversation, is really neither—rose to prominence as
a hybrid that, though “not an act of true conversation,” is admittedly everywhere.47
Although not the only dynamic in use (see Robert Hariman’s bureaucratic style and
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Aletha Staunton Hendrickson’s rhetoric of intimidation for relevant counterexamples), by
the twentieth century conversation would become the prevailing paradigm for all of
written and spoken discourse, serving as a model for academic writing, talk shows,
business, journalism, science—even understanding itself.48 This would hold true not just
in traditional rhetorical spheres (like deliberative politics), but also across a larger and
more general category of public life. Indeed, by the time of this writing (when the public
conversational dynamic appears to have perhaps exhausted its meaning), technologies
and theories designed to promote its practice have elevated the public ideal of
conversation into perhaps “the most overblown metaphor” of our time.49
“The word is all over the place,” said David Simpson about our “love affair” with
conversation: “What explains this desire to turn writing into speech, impossibly large and
complex groups into medium-size dinner parties?”50 What explains this desire, this study
suggests, is not the illusion that we are on equal footing but rather the “remarkable
agitation” and “constant tension” that comes from knowing we are not.51 This volatility
constrains what speakers and publics can do. Unlike a Roman or Athenian audience of
the Classical period, one cannot suppose that citizens of modern democracies read the
same books, share the same social class, or benefit from a single set of public values that
have been inculcated and reinforced across time. Writing in the mid eighteenth century,
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after the social splintering and concussive impact of division of labor was already felt,
Montesquieu observes this modern disadvantage when compared to the ancients: “In our
days we receive three different or contrary educations, namely, of our parents, of our
masters, and of the world. What we learn in the latter effaces all the ideas of the
former.”52 In contrast, “most of the ancient peoples lived in governments that had virtue
for their principle, and when that virtue was in full force, things were done in those
governments that we no longer see and that astonish our small souls.”53 In other words,
our education (broadly defined) does not afford the full vigor a unified ideal inspires.
In practical terms, this limits what a rhetor can do. Because rhetoric is a “social
invention” (as James Berlin puts it), arising of out a particular set of circumstances and
making “a peculiar kind of communication possible,” it also impacts the parameters for
action.54 If a person’s capacity to speak is already narrowed by cultural and intellectual
fragmentation, then it stands to reason that the reverse—what audiences seek—would be
as well. As Barnett Baskerville outlines in his inquiry of American attitudes toward
orators and oratory, “Where a certain kind of oratory is valued, it will flourish; when it
ceases to be valued, it will change or cease to exist. The value we assign to an activity is
likely to determine the quantity and quality of the product.”55 Baskerville’s suggestion
that a rhetor would frame and follow ideals is important to this study because it suggests
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that conversational rhetoric (like any other prominent style) is borne out of a compound
of dynamics that exceed the motivations or strategies of any one speaker. Indeed,
Jamieson observes that rhetorical conversation has replaced deliberative oratory as “the
norm.”56
Although the conversational model is most often studied qualitatively, its
prominence in American rhetorical culture is supported by quantitative studies as well.
Using computer-assisted content analysis to track inaugural addresses and annual
presidential messages from 1789 to 2000 (totaling 1.8 million words), Elvin Lim shows
that the rhetorical patterns in presidential speeches have become more conversational as
well as more assertive, more democratic, more anti-intellectual, and more abstract.57 He
defines conversational rhetoric as being more intimate, increasingly focused on the
trustworthiness of the speaker, and more anecdotal.58 Roderick Hart, using DICTION
software to analyze a large corpus of presidential speeches and press conference, finds a
similar proliferation of narrative and storytelling in a variety of modes of presidential
speeches. 59
It is not just in presidential rhetoric that the conversational dynamic is evident;
researchers observe the conversational mode in settings well beyond the rostrum. For
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example, Laura Krugman Ray describes Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan’s style as
“remarkably conversational,” both at her confirmation hearing and in her continued work
from the Bench.60 “Whether she is writing for the Court, concurring, or dissenting,
Kagan’s style is remarkably conversational,” observes Ray. “She employs a range of
rhetorical strategies to speak directly to the reader, suggesting that her enterprise is less
indoctrination than a more congenial mode of persuasion. Leavening her legal prose with
colloquial diction, she engages the reader in something approaching an informational, if
one-sided, chat.”61 The author also appeals to Kagan’s humor, a central part of
conversation that is too often overlooked in critiques of “ersatz” models. Ray opens with
this story: “When, in a lead-in to a question about an attempted terrorist attack, South
Carolina Republican Senator Lindsey Graham asked Kagan where she was on Christmas
Day, she famously replied, ‘You know, like all Jews, I was probably at a Chinese
Restaurant.’ Graham, presumably startled, was nonetheless appreciative, responding,
‘Great answer. Great answer,’ before returning to his serious theme.”62 The linguist
Deborah Tannen argues that humor such as the kind Kagan deployed in the exchange
with Graham “makes a person’s presence in a conversation more strongly felt than any
other sorts of contributions.”63 The fact that Ray places this anecdote in such a prominent
position suggests that was the case here.
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Yet despite this seemingly insatiable demand for conversation and scholarship
available to illuminate our understanding of its features, none of these isolated studies
have led to sustained critical attention of the conversational turn. In fact, the proliferation
of conversational modes and metaphors in contemporary practices has in some ways only
added to an already problematic object of study for the field of rhetoric. Depending on
how you define it, conversation initially appeared in ancient rhetoric and philosophical
treatises as dialectic, Platonic dialogue, and sermo. Together these “sibling modes” were
all considered both rivals and complementary species of rhetoric (which at the time
chiefly meant oratory).64 However, while conversation was envisioned to be
complementary to oratory, and while Cicero even envisioned conversation (sermo) as a
branch of rhetoric, the two types of speech were theorized in profoundly different ways.
As genres devoted to contrasting (public and private) spheres oratory and conversation
were basically considered opposites—oratory to the realm of public affairs (negotium)
and conversation to times of leisure (otium). To many historians of rhetoric this polarity
meant oratory and conversation were not only different, but also incommensurable.
This opposition naturally influences how researchers study and theorize
conversation as a cultural dynamic and, as Branham and Pearce have shown, rhetorical
tactic.65 Scholars emphasizing argumentation and political deliberation tend to dismiss its
social purpose, while those concerned with the purity of conversation foreclose the
possibility that there might be something telling in a model that, though clearly drawing
from the principles developed within the art of conversation, might also necessarily (and
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unapologetically) pivot away from it. Within the speech tradition—political oratory in
particular—patterns of critique focus on the ways conversational models fail to live up to
the ideal of rational, impersonal debate. Common criticisms about conversational appeals
in this view include: 1) that it emphasizes personality more than substance;66 2) that it
treats public problems with private models of intimacy and therapy rather than action or
changes in policy;67 3) that although it purports to be egalitarian, it is in reality more
exclusive than formal rhetoric and argumentation since, unlike voting or formal debates,
the rules for participating in “conversation” and the means by which decisions are
reached are implicit rather openly stated;68 and 4) with its emphasis on personal
experience and intention, that it is hostile to the commonplace tradition—by many
accounts the bedrock of classical education and the rhetorical tradition.69 If we are to
understand why, despite these shortcomings, practitioners, theorists, and teachers of
writing and speech would so openly promote conversation, then a closer look at the
circumstances preceding the “crystallization” of the conversational dynamic becomes

66

Antczak, 1985, 21; Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977), 221; and Jamieson, 1988, 240.
67

Dana Cloud, Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics: Rhetorics of Therapy. London:
SAGE Publications, 1998; Mari Boor Tonn, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public.”
Rhetoric and Public Affairs 8.3 (Fall 2005): 405-430; Sennett, 1977; Robert Hariman, Political Style: The
Artistry of Power (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), 135-136.
68

Jo Freeman, “The Tyranny of Structurelessness” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 17 (1972): 151-164.
Simpson, 1997; Gary Remer, “Genres of Political Speech: Oratory and Conversation, Today and in
Antiquity.” Language & Communication 28 (2008): 184.
69

Jamieson, 1988; Joseph Story, “‘The Characteristics of Our Age,’ Discourse Before the Phi Beta Kappa
of Harvard University 1826,” In American Eloquence: A Collection of Speeches and Addresses by the
Eminent Orators of America ed. Frank Moore. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1857, 424-437;
Richard M. Weaver, “The Spaciousness of Old Rhetoric” in The Ethics of Rhetoric (Davis: Hermagoras
Press, 1985), 164-185.

28

essential.70 As social historian of conversation Peter Burke aptly puts it, “there is an
enormous difference between the vague awareness of a problem and systematic research
into it.”71

The Making of a Hybrid Art
If we think back to President Obama’s comment in the opening set of Iowa
conversations about contemporary political challenges stemming from a lack of basis for
a “common conversation,” it become clearer why contextualizing the digital era within
the broader sweep of American history is so important. It is true that American political
parties are more polarized than previous periods, and that the explosion of 24 hour
network channels in the mid 1990s and the media decadence beginning in the first
decades of the twenty-first century appears to have directly contributed to it.72 It is also
true that other differences of which Americans were always keenly aware—income
inequality, for example—are greater now than they have been since the 1920s.73
However, we would also do well to remember that Americans have struggled with
creating a basis for common ground from the beginning.
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Overview of the Study
However revolutionary the digital age may be—and there is little question that the
changes have been dramatic and sweeping—these changes were not created out of an
entirely new configuration.74 Nor did they produce one. As Richard Sennett points out in
his writing on changes to the public domain, when critics speak of revolutions, they
“often suggest to the imagination of their readers that beforehand there was one society,
that during the revolution society stopped, and that afterward a new cycle began. This is a
view of human history based on the lifecycle of a moth.”75 According to Sennett, the
results of this are not simply a disconnect between periods, but also a failure to identify
current dilemmas. “The error is more than that of failing to see how one condition of life
blurs into another;” he writes; “it is a failure to understand both the reality of cultural
survival and the problems this legacy, like any inheritance, creates in a new
generation.”76 This study is thus meant to serve as a prehistory to a topic that, although
motivated by present rhetorical challenges, is delineated primarily through a closer look
at history.
In Chapter 2, I survey how conversation came to be viewed as simultaneously
hostile to and indispensible for public life. Rather than dismissing public conversational
rhetoric as altogether un-rhetorical and unprecedented, as contemporary studies with a
classical orientation are apt to do, I argue that hybrid models of conversation are in
important ways an extension of, rather than a departure from, the rhetorical tradition.
Building on David Randall’s (2018) provocative claim—that conversation superseded
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oratory in the Renaissance—I identify specific bases for judgment that the rhetorical
tradition already provides for the genre of conversation. This includes an initial survey of
style and a closer looker at the “poles” of conversation.
Chapter 3 examines the open-endedness and fixedness of American political
foundations and its influence on rhetorical culture. I detail how debates over the
Constitution set the stage for an enduring controversy that the conversational dynamic
was enlisted to mitigate. In particular, I consider how “We, the People”—with all its
political, legal, and rhetorical import—was both deliberately and extemporaneously
fashioned to bridge the contradictory nature of equality and non-equality in America.
Chapter 4 outlines some of the cultural topographies that animated public
conversation in nineteenth century United States. It is divided into three parts. In the first,
I focus on society and politics, highlighting the ways in which conversation was adapted
with the help of government and in response to sweeping societal changes. In section
two, I give special attention to the newspaper and its contributions to the reading public
as explained, in part, by the transmission and ritual views of communication. Section
three works to unite some of the conceptual and methodological problems that have kept
women’s contributions in the nineteenth century isolated from rhetoric “in general.” I use
Margaret Fuller as an example of how to bridge conversational practices and theories.
Taken together, I argue that the disjointedness of styles that was visibly introduced in the
nineteenth century (and still remains with us today) must be understood as an overall
trend in the history of rhetoric rather than a series of wholly unrelated expressions.
In Chapter 5, I turn to the question of style. Although verbal style has in the past
two decades enjoyed a modest revival of interest, I suggest it is especially important now,
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because it provides a uniquely stable unit of measurement. By looking at the different
materials of public conversation as indicative of something larger and broader than “just”
a technological medium (e.g. television) or “just” the ability of the speaker, we can begin
to articulate some of the deeper cultural implications that are bound up in the differences
between public and private conversational styles. Using twentieth and twenty-first
century examples as a way to ground my claims, I conclude this study by performing
three rhetorical analyses that highlight and explain the centrality of the conversational
dynamic in American public life.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RHETORICAL TRADITION AS A BASIS FOR A NEW THEORY OF
CONVERSATION
“Speech also has great power, and that in two areas: in oratory and conversation. Oratory
[contentio] should be employed for speeches in law-courts, to public assemblies or in the senate,
while conversation [sermo] should be found in social groups, in philosophical discussions and
among gatherings of friends—and it may also attend dinners!”
-Cicero, On Duties
“Bring several rhetoricians together, let their speeches contribute to the maturing of one another
by the give and take of question and answer, and you have the dialectic of the Platonic dialogue.”
-Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives

Even though rhetoric and artful conversation have always been connected and are
commonly theorized as collaborative arts that complement each other, their relationship
is not readily understood. Indeed, at times their correlation is denied. Many historians of
rhetoric suggest that privileging conversational models of public speaking over argumentbased, enthymematic oratory is a complete reversal of the classical model of rhetorical
practice and education.77 Conversely, and just as significant, argument is commonly
theorized as the “enemy of conversation.”78
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This ambivalence creates a curious tension in the literature on conversation. On
the one hand, the art of face-to-face conversation—epitomized as sociable talk without a
specific agenda—is said to be either irrevocably in decline or in desperate need of
reclaiming.79 On the other hand, practically every modern communication invention—
whether the nineteenth-century penny press, or twentieth-century radio, or the twentyfirst-century explosion of user-generated content—has conspired to make the rhetorical
structure of conversation (what Peter Gibian calls the “alternation between many
voices”) not just possible in public life, but desired and expected.80 Indeed, the urge to
simulate conversation is so pronounced that even “single-voiced” prose consistently
attempts to imitate conversational tone and style.
This change has not gone unnoticed by historians and communication scholars.
To give one relatively recent example, as part of the dialogic rhetorical structure, William
Keith lumps varieties of conversation into two sets: face-to-face and circulatory. “People
talk to each other directly, or they read or watch the arguments and ideas that circulate
Lee Cerling writes, for example, that the “aggressive promotion of the conversational style left little room
for a rhetorical style appropriate to public discourse” (1995, 195).
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through the modern print and media culture.”81 This description helpfully unites “actual”
and “metaphorical”—or even just delayed—conversations.82 Focused on organized
public forums in the early part of the twentieth century, this delineation also builds on
earlier studies concerned with the social nature and foundations of public life. Jürgen
Habermas’s seminal study, The Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere, is
probably the most influential of these inquiries, since, extending well beyond the
particularities of conversational and deliberative forums, it influences how we understand
the long-term relationship between a reading and conversant public.
In a more recent work, David Randall begins what he calls “the first part of a
yoked recasting of the history of rhetoric and Habermasian theory.”83 Although I only
discovered this book (published in Edinburgh in 2018 and forthcoming in the United
States in 2019) in what I thought was the last week of writing this dissertation, his study
fits squarely within the conceptual and historical impetus for this project. It also suggests
there is some momentum for examining conversation as it begins to, not just “take on
rhetorical features,” as Thomas Farrell puts it, but actually upstage oratory as the
predominant mode of persuasion.84
Randall provides a helpful path for understanding public conversation as a
rhetorical dynamic that is not purely deliberative. This requires a reorientation away from
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ideals and toward practices. Such a maneuver does not preclude us from envisioning
public rhetoric as it could be, but it does require us to start with things “as they are.”85
Focusing on the transformation of rhetoric between the Renaissance and the beginning of
the Enlightenment, he outlines a history of the emergence and increasing universalization
and democratization of conversation. To do this, Randall “reorganizes the history of
rhetoric along the broad lines of Jürgen Habermas’… historical analysis.” 86 However, he
importantly substitutes conversation “for quasi-Kantian reason in Habermas’ public
sphere.” 87 The difference between the conversation Randall is describing and the “quasiKantian reason” of Habermas’ deliberative model seems profound, touching not just later
interpretations of the public sphere (including the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentiethcentury rhetorical dynamics, all of which I visit in subsequent chapters), but also how
earlier depictions of conversation are understood. (Here, I am thinking in particular of
Cicero’s treatment of sermo.) Philosophies and histories of the newspaper also play a
part. For example, Randall locates the newspaper and its predecessor, the “news letter,”
as a key mode “by which conversation acquired the means to subsume oratory.”88
This claim—that conversation superseded oratory in the Renaissance—is
important, because it openly addresses a phenomenon (i.e., the conversational turn) that
up until now has only been obliquely examined. Whereas Habermas “argued that the
85
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printed newspaper provided the medium of rational discussion through which the public
sphere was constituted,” Randall asserts “the newspaper was a transformed descendant of
epistolary rhetoric rather than some coagulation in print of disembodied reason.”89
Epistolary theories arose sometime around the first century B.C. E. and, even
then, belonged to the genre of sermo (conversation).90 Boethius and other Christian
scholars cited and adapted Cicero’s theories of rhetoric throughout the Middle Ages,
when letter writing become a formal discipline of rhetoric.91 However, according to
Randall, it was around 1500 that the Renaissance humanist letter was fully inverted from
the classical conception of the private correspondence to an established genre with an
expressed interest—or rather, imperative—to engage in public affairs.92 By the 1620s and
1630s, at the peak of their commercial heyday, letters were not just being publicly
distributed, but fetching a noteworthy sum.93 The progression to a commercial use for
letter writing was at once gradual and sudden. Citing Thomas Wilson’s Arte of
Rhetorique (1553) and William Phiston’s The Welspring of Wittie Conceites (1584),
Randall first submits that both Tudor and Italian humanist “considered letters to fall
within rhetoric’s scope.”94 From there, he details how the letter was first “standardised
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and abstracted into a letter of pure news” while being passed on “from one person to
another with increasing frequency, such that it became less and less like that the
correspondent and the recipient of a news letter would know one another.”95 Eventually,
the correspondents of news simply became anonymous, with one of the few remnants of
this practice appearing in the designation foreign correspondent.96
The impact of the news letter was not just that it “embodied a familiar
conversation” or expanded the scope to a “universal and anonymous audience” but that it
so in, part, through style. “The newspaper, by way of the news letter, preserved aspects of
the style of familiar conversation,” writes Randall, “but, as it shifted in medium toward
print, transformed into a distinctly persuasive communication between anonymous
correspondents and anonymous recipients.”97 Like Keith’s assessment of the twentieth
century, the newspaper incorporated two modes of conversation. First, as a form of
conversation, the newspaper expanded the available subject matter so that it included all
public affairs. Second, the newspaper openly used the conversational style as a form of
persuasion.98 The prominence of style and subject matter are topics this chapter will soon
address.
Still left to account for is the question of how newer models of hybrid
conversations fit within, and would benefit from, earlier histories of conversation. Rather
than dismissing public conversational rhetoric as simultaneously un-rhetorical and
unprecedented, as contemporary studies with a classical orientation are apt to do, I argue
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that hybrid models of conversation are an extension of rather than a departure from the
rhetorical tradition. Like other rhetorical dynamics, conversation is notoriously
challenging to define since its nature is interconnected with use. However, in contrast to
other systematizations of eloquence in the rhetorical tradition, conversation is more
difficult to pin down, since, as Ronald Wardhaugh puts it, it is “the most generalized
form of talk.”99 While this definition provides a useful starting point for thinking about
the mundaneness that threatens the status of conversation—Mikhail Bakhtin points out in
reference to the Renaissance that “candor of speech” can sometimes even teeter towards
“cynicism”—it is necessarily incomplete when placed in a historical-rhetorical context.100
This chapter aims to identify grounds for a theory of conversation that are not
“revisionist” in intent but rather broader and further reaching. To use the language of
Wayne Rebhorn, I aim to “lump” rather than “split” the multiple iterations and practices
of conversation.101 Building on Randall’s claim—that conversation superseded oratory in
the Renaissance—I identify specific bases for judgment that the rhetorical tradition
already provides for the genre of conversation. This includes an initial survey of style
and a closer looker at the poles of conversation.
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Understanding Style as a Conceptual Link Between Rhetoric and Conversation
Style plays a unique role in understanding the link between rhetoric and
conversation since, unlike conversation—which was not codified until the Renaissance—
style was conceived as an integral part of rhetoric and included in its theories and
pedagogies from the beginning. Indeed, scholars point out that “in Western learning, style
has been included in the study of rhetoric for nearly three millennia.”102 However, while
historians of rhetoric have generally accepted that rhetoric’s long and winding history
contributes to a diversity of concurrent (and sometimes contradictory) meanings and uses,
the same privilege has not been granted to conversation. As a consequence, conversation
has not received the historical and theoretical allowances that would enable a robust
theory of rhetorical conversation to develop. A closer look at style bridges some of this
distance.
Like rhetoric generally, style’s fortunes have risen and fallen based on external
factors such as education, religion, and politics. However, beyond this general arc (with
which anyone working in the history of rhetoric is familiar) there is the more acutely felt
problem of style’s eternal relationship to appearances. Indeed, one cannot really advocate
for style’s implication in the other canons of rhetoric without embroiling oneself in one of
the most enduring debates in philosophy and rhetoric: whether or to what extent style (or
form) and content (or meaning) are inseparable.103 The question goes back to at least
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Plato, who in his famous dialogue, Gorgias, likens rhetoric to “cookery.”104 Rhetoric
insinuates herself into other branches, says Socrates in the Gorgias. She “pretends to be
that into which she has crept.”105
The challenge with this attack on appearances, however, is that one can escape it.
Any alleged alternative—say, frankness of speech—is itself a style. Indeed, the Rhetorica
ad Herennium includes frankness of speech in its list of figures of thought. As political
theorist Elizabeth Markovits details in her study on the politics of sincerity, frank speech
has been deployed as a rhetorical strategy since antiquity. Like Kenneth Cmiel, who
outlines the rise of plain speech in nineteenth-century United States, Markovits expresses
concern with how appeals to transparency are detrimental to public life for the way in
which they obscure the two measures by which the public should come to judgment: the
visible and the articulable. In her reading of Plato’s Gorgias, for instance, Markovits
suggests that Socrates is not simply attacking rhetoric. Rather, he is “playing” with the
ideal of frank speech (parrhesia) by “drawing on Athenian oratorical traditions that seem
to violate its dictates” and “calling attention to” frank speech as a trope.106 “While
Socrates remains committed to the idea of truth in speech,” writes Markovits, “his
practice highlights the difficulty and vulnerability of democratic speech.”107
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Early Imperial Roman attitudes toward style were much different. As Erica
Bexley details in her study on the performance of oratory in that period, persona theory,
which suggests “public self-display is the main and perhaps only mean’s of realizing
one’s identity,” figured heavily in this period (c. 31 B.C.E. - 100 C.E.).108 This was a
time when personhood was conceived by a performance-based model, elevating style
(which had already been codified as a formal part of rhetoric during the Hellenistic period
(c. 323 B.C.E. -31 C.E.)) to an even more prominent position.
Alongside rhetorical precepts, a concern for stylistics was also closely wedded to
the mastery of Latin and Greek. For example, Cicero opens On Duties with the
recommendation that his son Marcus acquire “equal command” of Latin and Greek, both
for “the study of philosophy” and also “the practice of oratory.”109 Classical training was
central to humanistic learning, not merely as a representation of scholastic philosophy—
although it was that—but also for the broader tradition that it embodied: “the weight of
past habits of thought,” as Peter Burke details it.110 Indeed, with respect to rhetoric, style
was vital. It was viewed (particularly in the Roman tradition) as the material through
which the entire rhetorical training was accomplished.
Chris Holcomb and Jimmie Killingsworth advance this architectonic view of
style, highlighting its importance, not just as a method for criticism or dramatization of
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the self, but for its role in the totality of composition and speech practices. In Performing
Prose they point out, for example, that classical rhetoricians “invested considerable
energy in cataloguing verbal devices they heard from both bema and rostrum, as well as
from poet and rhapsode. Their primary aim was not to generate a vocabulary for literary
analysis (although the terms they devised work well for such purposes). Rather, they
were assembling a repertoire, a collection of verbal moves orators could weave into their
choreographed productions.”111 Jeanne Fahnestock, who also draws from the classical
tradition, makes a more general remark about style’s predominant role in Rhetorical
Style: The Uses of Language in Persuasion, saying, “Of all the parts of rhetoric, style is
arguably the most implicated in the others, since linguistic choice is the point of
realization for the rhetorical precepts and theories belonging to other canons.”112
How did style move from such a prominent place in classical theories of rhetoric
to one that is now habitually avoided? Historically, the conjunction of two events—first,
the sixteenth century development of theories of rhetoric (chiefly Peter Ramus) that
separated style from invention—and, second, the gradual relegation of philosophy,
rhetoric, and the classics to single courses in the university as opposed to overarching
methods—dramatically changed how rhetorical style was understood.113 In the sixteenth
century, for example, despite the best efforts of Desiderius Erasmus’s On Copia (which
sought, through amplification, to further link style and content), Peter Ramus effectively
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destroyed style’s implication in the other canons by reducing rhetoric to style and
delivery only. Soon after, Omer Talon, a friend of Ramus, published two books on
rhetoric that advanced a weakened stylistic tradition of rhetoric that would dominate for
centuries to come. In this new scenario invention and arrangement were stripped from
rhetoric entirely, leaving only the so-called “flowers of rhetoric.”
According to Belgian philosopher and argumentation theorist Chaïm Perelman,
“the extraordinary influence of Ramus hindered, and to a large extent actually destroyed,
the tradition of ancient rhetoric that had been developed over the course of twenty
centuries and with which one associated the names of such writers as Aristotle, Cicero,
Quintilian, and St. Augustine.”114 Indeed, it was not until the 1960s, when, as Paul Butler
put it, the “rediscovered trove of classical rhetorical theory…was coming to light in
English departments,” that style would get a serious hearing.115
Commonly studied at the level of a sentence (and so distinguished from
arrangement, whose smallest metric is the paragraph), it was arguably not until Robert
Connors’s seminal essay “The Erasure of the Sentence,” that composition began serious
discussions “about the role of style in the discipline.”116 However, even into the twentyfirst century, the aesthetic capacities of rhetoric as a contemporary rationale or
methodology only received “scant attention from modern rhetoricians.”117 As Bradford
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Vivian put it, rhetoricians tend to “resign consideration of style largely to supposedly
regrettable episodes in the history of the discipline.”118
However, it is not simply disciplinary preferences that have hindered the
development of what Vivian calls as a “contemporary rationale and methodology for the
study of style.” The fourth canon is still suspect for reasons that harken back to Plato. In
Political Style: The Artistry of Power, Robert Hariman usefully lays out the problematic
of whether political style is “merely epiphenomenal” (and thus unimportant), or a threat
to modern democratic states (and thus dangerous).119 According to Hariman, the
suspicions against style as an analytical category for understanding social reality “are
both methodological and political”: on the one hand, there is the charge that we should be
paying attention to “more substantive determinants of political action;” on the other hand,
there is the claim that “scholarly appreciation of style encourages an ‘aesthetic politics’
conducive to fascism.”120 Although Hariman is working within a broader notion of style
(that is, as a way or manner of doing something), he still usefully lays out the problematic
of why the formal study of style cannot be both unimportant and dangerous. According to
Hariman, the formal study of style is not just important, but necessary for explaining and
defending against threats in the contemporary world. “The greater problem,” says
Hariman, “is not rewarding fascism but of recognizing how modern societies have
become unduly defenseless against aesthetic manipulation.”121 Indeed, it is worth noting
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that during the very period that twentieth-century Americans were most worried about
outright political propaganda they were increasingly being influenced by the emerging
and seemingly apolitical dynamic of conversation, a circumstance which I detail in
Chapter 5 of this study.
Currently style is enjoying a “modest revival.”122 However, much of it attention is
still coming from outside of rhetoric, composition or speech departments. “Despite the
rich and enduring legacy of rhetorical approaches to style,” observes Fahenstock, “many
if not most scholars who analyze language today do not in fact consciously draw on the
rhetorical tradition.”123 Paul Butler similarly outlines how it is that style simultaneously
experienced a submergence and re-emergence in composition studies. “Just as
composition has turned away from serious stylistic inquiry, other areas of society and
culture have often embraced style theory and practice with almost unprecedented
interest,” writes Butler.124 Thus, what was once part of a classical curriculum resurfaced,
not in rhetoric and composition classrooms, but in cultural studies, linguistics,
performance studies, and, perhaps most commonly, outside of the university curriculum
entirely.125
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Situating Style Within the Conversational Dynamic
While by now so commonplace as to be unnoticeable, the configuration of two
people sitting on a stage talking to each other in front of a live audience is a relatively
modern phenomenon. As an American practice, Peter Gibian identifies the midnineteenth century (America’s “Age of Conversation,” 1820-1850) as the period when
“the public seemed especially keen to see the character of important personalities
expressed ‘live’ in the give-and-take of supposedly spontaneous conversation.”126
Gibian’s remark on conversational performances is especially important because it is
directed to a verbal mode that—while as a metaphor is admittedly everywhere in the
literature on conversation—as an actual verbal practice in the nineteenth century has
“almost completely disappeared from our maps of American literary and cultural
history.”127
Gibian’s historical perspective is also noteworthy because it deepens our
understanding, not only of nineteenth-century American rhetorical practices, but also
contemporary ones. Rather than placing the majority of conversation’s diagnostic power
on technologies, as twentieth-century studies are apt to do, Gibian locates the genesis of
contemporary hybrid forms (e.g., talk show and talk radio) in nineteenth century social
conditions that emerged long before television or radio were ever invented. “As the
traditionally private mode of conversation begins in the mid-century to be developed for
public uses, becoming a form of mass entertainment, we can often feel we are observing
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the first steps of what will emerge a century later,” writes Gibian.128 By emphasizing
social rather than technological imperatives for conversation, Gibian enables a broader,
more durable, and less reactionary view of the genre to appear. He stresses, for example,
that the “widespread fascination with talk as the site for the most crucial revelations of
individual character” and “interpersonal dynamics,” was being explored not only in live
performances of conversation, but also in mid nineteenth-century trends in journalist
writing and popular literature.129
If we go back even further—and the argument of this chapter is that we must—we
find that the social arrangement on which public conversation is based is not only
historically motivated (as a cumulative rhetorical practice), but also conspicuously rooted
in intellectual thought. In the same way that the debates over the U.S. Constitution began
as open-ended deliberations that only later would solidify and set the future terms of
debate (see Chapter 3), ideas about conversation, friendship, equality, and inequality
were openly reconsidered and debated between roughly the mid fourteenth to mid
seventeenth centuries.
For example, in his history of the concept of conversation Randall claims that it
was only after friendship was reoriented away from reason and virtue (as it had been in
antiquity) and toward passion and intimacy (as it would be established by the
Renaissance) that women were taken to be even capable of friendship—and by
extension, conversation.130 This view, argues Randall, was first made possible by
128

Gibian, 2001, 35.

129

Gibian, 2001, 35.

130

David Randall The Concept of Conversation: From Cicero’s Sermo to the Grand Siècle’s Conversation
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018). Randall locates the Christian notion of amicitia as
extending between unequals made is easier for men and women to conceive of one another as friends (95).

48

Christian medieval thought, which emphasized the “inherently unequal friendship
between God and man.”131 Although initially metaphorical, the removal of equality as a
prerequisite for conversation opened up the physical scope of conversation, which was
progressively expanded by Renaissance humanists and early modern courtiers.132 “The
growing conception of conversation as possible between unequals—inherited from the
innovative medieval Christian conversation between God and man—most radically
altered conversation by making it a discourse which women could be conceived as
capable of partaking,” writes Randall.133
These claims, which Randall develops in what is perhaps the first history of early
modern conversation in English, invite closer consideration. However, for my purposes
here the main significance of Randall’s account is that the idea of mixed-sex
conversation provided a model for actual mixed-sex social settings.134 Furthermore, once
“opened up…to the whole world” and not just “members of the male elite” the
conversational dynamic would take on a public (and also political) character from which
it has yet to retreat.135 The implications of this expansion, in other words, were
momentous. Indeed, while stressing that the rise of conversation need not come “at the
expense of oratory,” he refers to the actual shift from oratory to conversation as “a
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revolutionary triumph.”136 “Not reason’s dialectic, not rhetoric’s orations, but only the
speech of conversation spoke to and with women—and so only in conversation did
mankind learn to speak to one another in all their individuality and variety. The
expansion of conversation to women made possible the first true universalisation of
speech.”137 The impact, according to Randall, was twofold: not only did conversation
acquire persuasive goals, but rhetoric became “conversationalised.”138
The era in which rhetoric became conversationalised—the Renaissance—was a
time when rhetoric was celebrated for its plasticity.139 No longer limited to forensic,
deliberative, and epideictic oratory, rhetoric in this period was thought to be nearly
everywhere and capable of doing almost anything: “Polymorphous and ubiquitous,
rhetoric could serve practically all individuals and fit practically all situations as it
blithely crossed long-established boundaries among disciplines, professions, and social
classes,” writes Wayne Rebhorn.140 Petrarch (1304-1374) had initially conceived of
conversation as a metaphor for framing the scholarly, across-time relationship between
proto-humanists and the ancients (Cicero, in particular). However, the concept of
conversation soon evolved into something that, although still regarded today as perhaps
the metaphor for knowledge, would stretch the bounds of communicative practice and
lived experience.
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Indeed, although by the twenty and twenty-first centuries actual conversation
would be the measure by which conversational rhetorics would be judged (and inevitably
fail), what some consider the “great innovation of Renaissance humanists” was precisely
their refusal to limit the applications of conversation to “actual and literary
conversations.”141 Expanding to an ever-greater range of public places and political topics
from which conversation was in the classical schema was largely excluded, by 1700
conversation was not only reimagined but essentially “replaced oratory as the default
mode of rhetoric.”142
This was no mere language game, either, explains Rebhorn. In the Renaissance
rhetoric (and thus conversation) was “a serious business” whose objective was “to affect
people’s basic beliefs and produce real action in the world.”143 The development of the
ideal courtier, for example, “took conversation from the leisurely retreat from the ancient
political world to the courtly heart of the Renaissance political world.”144 Even the
salons of polite society, which were hosted in drawing rooms and took place “under the
banner of amusement rather than authority,” had enough political import to variously
provoke exile and attract expertise.145 In her detailed history of the Paris salons, for
example, Bendetta Craveri tells how in 1629 Cardinal de Richelieu banished Mme des
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Logos for her salon’s open sympathy for Louis XIII’s rebellious brother.146 In the 1720s,
Montesquieu, whose work Spirit of the Laws was one of the central texts of eighteenth
century thought—and which openly influenced the very foundation of American
government (Chapter 3)—was active in the salons and clubs of Paris. He was a regular in
Mme. Lambert’s salon and also attended the Club l’Entresol, where participants were
invited based on particular expertise.147 Anne Cohler explains, “each session was
formally divided into a time for general discussion of government and international
events and a time when a paper was read and considered.”148 (This is a practice—an
earlier version of the academic talk or lecture—or a reformulation of the classical
symposium—that remains common across universities, governmental organizations, and
policy-oriented institutions today.)

Outlining a Method for Evaluating Conversation
In order to understand how conversation came to be so volatile—simultaneously
viewed as hostile to and indispensible for public life—a closer look at the poles of
conversation is needed. Although the concept of “poles of conversation” comes from
Peter Burke’s social history of conversation and Peter Gibian’s treatment of gravity and
levity in conversation, the method I use to uncover this multivalent character of
conversation appears in other histories.149 In his overview of rhetoric in the European
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tradition, for example, Thomas Conley makes use of “highly compressed references” to
perennial (and sometimes particular) rhetorical problems and responses.150 Equally
valuable, Richard Hofstadter (1962) uses a specific concept (i.e., anti-intellectualism) as a
way to shed light on broader aspects of society and culture.
In the next and final section of this chapter I will make use of both of these
movements to explain how conversation has at various points been adopted to rouse and
pacify each of the classical modes of persuasion. While the question of public and private
spheres remains a source of contention in the rhetorical tradition, it is important to
consider that neither the dialogic structure of conversation nor the semblance of
conversation intrinsically inhibits or promotes particular modes of proof. This is not to
say that rhetorical periods might not valorize one mode of persuasion over the other.
Clearly they do. Writing on the rhetoric of advocacy in Greece and Rome using
fragmentary speeches, George Kennedy observes, for example, that in Rome “the moral
and emotional factor is much fuller, and the logical element correspondingly less” than in
speeches coming out of Athens.151 While no doubt there are subtleties beyond this
framework, the overarching sensibilities are obvious enough for Kennedy to conclude
that “a Roman audience would have found naked logic, i.e., sophistry, as offensive as the
Greeks found it attractive.”152
The shift from overwhelmingly “private” to overwhelmingly “public” styles of
conversation provides another opportunity to explore this view. In its bluntest form the
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rhetorical chasm between the public and private spheres offers an additional (and by
some accounts primary) basis for explaining the conceptual and historical divide between
rhetoric and conversation. The arguments for this division and its relevance to rhetorical
culture are important, since they animate a central controversy to which this dissertation
is addressed: why is conversation simultaneously viewed as hostile to and indispensible
for public life? The problem with most readings of the public-private dichotomy is that
they tend to conclusively link the conversational mode with an overemphasis on personal
feelings and intentions—which can be damaging to public life153—when in fact there is
nothing about the genre that demands these elements. It is true, for instance, that
conversation thrives on spontaneity (a dynamic that produces an impression of sincerity,
and along with it, a sense of trust and the building of ethos.)154 Creating opportunities in
which spontaneity can be deployed or at least appear to be deployed is a common use of
the dynamic (see especially Chapter 4). However, this may not have anything to do with
personal feelings or intentions. Spontaneity can just as well be used to reveal strengths or
flaws in logic, as dialectic shows, or rhetorical deftness, as in Castiglione’s sprezzatura.
Writing during the Enlightenment, David Hume claimed that it was the separation
of the learned and conversible worlds—not conversation as such—that caused the genre
to become vacuous and detrimental to common life. “What possibility is there of finding
Topics of Conversation fit for the Entertainment of rational Creatures,” he wondered,
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“without having Recourse sometimes to History, Poetry, Politics, and the more obvious
Principles, at least, of Philosophy?”155 Although some political theorists, like Rousseau,
thought that “the more polite a society is, the more corrupt it is,” Hume took the opposite
position.156 Rather diminishing political life, he believed that sociability (and its chief
originator, conversation) did not merely influence but positively enhanced political
stability because it moderates the passions.157
Robert Hariman’s depiction of public and private life in “Cicero’s Republican
Style,” suggests that the poles were not viewed as “separate realms, but rather differences
phases” of a cohesive, civic-oriented life.158 The space for meditation that private life
affords regenerates and prepares the orator to move back into the exhausting and
exhilarating realm of performance.159 Although decorum—accommodating to
circumstance, as Gary Remer puts it, or finding “the available means,” to use Aristotle—
would encompass consideration of others and the situations they inhabit, in Cicero’s
letters the cardinal rule of decorum focused not on others, but on the self: “whatever else
decorum is, it is essentially balance in one’s entire way of life as well as in individual
actions.”160
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In contrast to Roman “phases” of public and private life, the category of
bourgeois society that Jürgen Habermas theorizes about in The Structural Transformation
of the Public Sphere didn’t work in direct service of politics, as Greek or Roman orators
did, but rather regulated state authority. The public that Habermas describes, in other
words, took place between the private realm and the state. This arrangement, according to
Habermas, was unlike any other. He calls it “peculiar and without historical
precedent.”161 Beyond the major differences between a classical rhetor and a new reading
class, Habermas’s public sphere was predicated on an entirely different political and
economic order than that of classical Greece.
Unlike the emerging political economy of the modern state, the Greek polis was
constituted in public debate and discussion, not state authority (which was grounded in
private law and carried out through bureaucracy and taxation).162 The Greek polis,
moreover, was “strictly separated” from the oikos (house or private sphere), whereas in
the modern state the public and private spheres were not altogether distinct.163 In contrast
to the Greeks, in the modern state the (private) household economy became publicly
relevant.164 Eventually the boundaries between public and private passed down by the
Greeks and the Romans were not just blurred, but “changed almost beyond recognition,”
as Hannah Arendt describes it.165
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The impact of this change was considerable, and is perhaps most conspicuously
detailed in The Human Condition. By the time of the Enlightenment, Arendt argues, the
primary aim of politics was no longer to serve as a platform for human excellence (“arête
as the Greeks, virtus as the Romans would have called it”), but rather to establish
security, in effect transforming communities “into societies of laborers and
jobholders.”166 Not surprisingly, the merging of public and private speaking practices—a
tendency, as I argue in this chapter, that was there all along—became more pronounced
during this period.
The salient point here, however, is that in Arendt’s view the public did not absorb
the intimate and private spheres. Instead, a new realm, what she calls “the social realm,”
developed and worked in the reverse order, absorbing and basically obliterating a truly
public sphere. She writes that the two conditions that comprise human plurality—action
and speech—were “banished into the sphere of the intimate and private,” and the
connection between public performance and excellence was dramatically weakened.167
Contrasting the classical separation between the public realm (which Arendt argues is
marked by freedom and permanence) and the private realm (which she says is concerned
with necessity and transitoriness), she critiques the social, which eclipses the two
classical spheres. Unlike the public (i.e., political) realm, the social emerges not as a
matter of public significance but as a way of organizing “the life process itself;” activities

166

Arendt, 1958, 49 and 46. For more on the introduction of a political economy see Rochelle Gurstein
The Repeal of Reticence: A History of America’s Cultural and Legal Struggles over Free Speech,
Obscenity, Sexual Liberation, and Modern Art. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996, pp. 13-19.
167

Arendt, 1958, 49; also see 175.

57

once connected with “sheer survival” were in the modern period “permitted to appear in
public.”168
Why is this important? Like Habermas, Arendt highlights the uniqueness of the
modern age. However, she arrives at a harsher assessment of the possibilities the new
period brought. She submits that the rise of the social not only obscures the public and
private but—through the dissolving of the proper functions of these two classical
categories—actually removes the appropriate platform for excellence. Excellence
requires the presence of others, says Arendt, “and this presence needs the formality of the
public, constituted by one’s peers, it cannot be the casual, familiar presence of one’s
equals or inferiors” (49).
Writing about roughly the same period, the coffeehouses and salons Habermas
describes undoubtedly operated on different terms than the public forum for excellence
that Arendt extols. Nevertheless, in Habermas’s estimation the critical reasoning of
private persons on public issues was able to accomplish something vitally important at
the time: political confrontation of church and state authorities. In contrast to the
individual distinction sought in the agonistic forum (which theorists such as Hannah
Arendt, Robert Connors, and Walter Ong advocate), these “ongoing” conversations and
discussions lacked both the formality and sanctity demanded by the classic portrayals of
conquest, excellence, and even critique. Once the “monopoly of interpretation” was
wrested away through public discussion, works of art, philosophy, and literature began to
lose “their aura of extraordinariness,” as Habermas describes it.169 This understanding,
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which positions inclusiveness and distinction at opposite poles, will prove a recurring
theme in the history of conversation and a source of contention in the case studies of this
project.

The Poles of Conversation
When Peter Burke talks about the “poles of conversation” he is referring to a
tension and balance between animating principles of conversation. These include equality
and hierarchy, inclusion and exclusion, competition and cooperation, and spontaneity and
study.170 From Stephen Miller’s history of conversation we can add real and ersatz and
feminine and masculine dynamics (also see Rebhorn, 1995). Peter Gibian (2001)
develops gravity and levity, while Benedetta Craveri’s (2005) history of the French
salons emphasizes seduction and aversion. These are just a few examples of the kind of
heuristics available to deepen our understanding of what the conversational dynamic
encompasses. However, it is also useful to think about the question in a more systematic
light. In the final pages of this chapter, I outline three of the key genres of conversation
that developed in antiquity. I do this with a view toward enhancing the available method
for spotting the poles of conversation.

Philosophical Dialogue
Plato’s dialogues are viewed as perhaps “the supreme example of the
conversational style.” 171 Even though the Greeks did not theorize conversation and were
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specifically oriented toward the public in their oratory, as a cultural, literary, and
philosophical practice, conversation figured prominently. It is telling, for example, that
the Symposium nonchalantly starts in the middle of things (“In fact, your question does
not find me unprepared.”) and ends with the three remaining interlocutors of the dialogue
drifting (or about to drift) off to sleep.172 What is more, the speeches are not too strident
in their presentation (“All right…Well, the speeches went something like this—) even
though they contain serious philosophical discussion, including a description of a
Platonic Form (Beauty). This is a dialogue where Aristophanes hiccups during a soaring
oration, where Alcibiades is plastered, and where flute-girls are sent away. It is also one
of Plato’s best-known and influential works. In the introduction to their translation
Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff submit that the Symposium is “less explicitly
dialectic than his other works,” may partly be the point.173 “That serious philosophy can
be done at the same time that entertaining, even comic events and conversations are
depicted is not only true but may actually be the message with which the Symposium
itself ends.”174 Practiced and reformulated in countless ways since the Greeks, dialogues
would continue to be defined by their open-endedness, inquiry into truth, and alternation
of voices.
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Dialectic
Dialectic, or the art of philosophical disputation, is a conversation among experts.
Although more formal and issue-oriented than true conversation, it is similar enough in
dialogic structure to be associated with it.175 Aristotle famously imagines rhetoric as an
antistrophos (or counterpart) to dialectic. Because rhetoric is popularly oriented its modes
of proof are different than dialectic’s: they include not only appeals to reason (logos), but
also to character (ethos) and emotion (pathos). George Kennedy puts the distinction this
way: “Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, not, as rhetoric does, by continuous
exposition. A dialectical argument does not contain the parts of a public address; there is
no introduction, narration, or epilogue, as in a speech—only proof. In dialectic only
logical argument is acceptable, whereas in rhetoric the impressions of character conveyed
by the speaker and the emotions awakened in the audience contribute to persuasion.”176
Cicero, meanwhile, distinguished dialectic from rhetoric by the subject matter to which it
was addressed: rhetoric attends to definite (or concrete) questions while dialectic
responds to indefinite (or abstract) ones.

Sermo
In classical Rome sermo was the genre of otium. Although some scholars
theorized that it could be applied to public affairs (In De Officiis, for example, Cicero
recounts that the conversational style of Caesar allowed him to defeat other advocates at
the bar) its starting point was leisure: social gatherings, informal discussions, and dinner
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with friends.177 Subjects that Cicero outlines as appropriate for conversation include
home, politics, practice of professions, and learning.178 The Romans were nothing if not
practical. In fact, given these two features—first, that Cicero theorized conversation
where others did not and, second, that he was writing in a culture that was less
speculative than the Greeks—one would think that Roman rhetorical theory would be
more appealing to modern rhetoricians. (Tocqueville, whose analysis of American
politics and society I will explore in the following chapter, emphasizes again and again
this utilitarian bent of Americans, saying “nothing is less suited to meditation than the
circumstances of democratic society.”)179 Conversation and utility are not the only areas
of commonality, either. Robert Cape, for example, points out that Roman women played
a prominent role in developing sermo, yet they continue to be underappreciated in
feministic histories. “Whereas Greece had social and legal codes that make it extremely
difficult to prove that women spoke in public, much less recover aspects of their public
speech, in Rome during the late republic and early empire respectable women were
ubiquitous in public and were legally allowed to deliver orations in court,” says Cape.180
He, like Thomas Conley before him, speculates that the “modern preoccupation with
things Greek probably obscures the fact that Roman rhetoric has probably contributed
more to the rhetorical tradition in the West.”181
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One example of this influence can be found in their treatment of the more fluid
boundaries between the public and private realm. Although the places for rhetoric were
still distinguished in Rome through otium (leisure) and negotium (public affairs),
eloquence was much more inclusive than the Greeks. Among other things, this meant that
the boundaries between conversation and public speech were more intertwined. Agnostic
contests, conversation (sermo), and speeches (oratio) were all considered under the
banner of eloquence.182 What is more, in contrast to Athens, where “public-speaking was
off-limits to respectable women,” Rome developed a conceptual place in which women
rhetoric had a part. 183 But it was not only the presence of women that can account for this
fluidity.
Michele Kennerly thinks that changing political climates played a part also. She
speculates that the shift from a slipping republic (during which Cicero wrote his
rhetorica) to a fallen state may account for the newfound relevance for sermo. During
this transitional period between a republic and empire, Cicero linked private conversation
(sermo) to political speech.184 In other words, at a time when opportunities for senatorial
speeches were in decline, Cicero conceived of a practical motivation for linking a
conservational style and philosophy. “The challenge for Cicero in De Officiis becomes
one of how to translate foundational Stoic philosophical tenets (such as the sovereign
importance of maintaining human fellowship) and typical philosophical stylistics (such as
conversing instead of competing) to rhetorical situations. Cicero not only parlays Stoic
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philosophical content into oratorical tone, he also tries to convince readers of the worth of
adopting that tone to one’s rhetorical repertoire and adding it to fit oratorical
occasions.”185 By doing so, he “publicizes the persuasive power of a conversational
manner, a communicative style consonant with Stoicism’s emphasis on human
togetherness,” says Kennerly.186
Cicero displays this same flexibility toward the poles of otium and negotium in his
development of the doctrine of styles. Even as he rehearses Hellenistic rhetoric’s three
varieties—plain, middle, and grand—he suggested that individual words could be used
appropriately in any context, including conversation: “The words used in conversation
are no different from those we use in more energetic speech, nor are they drawn from one
category for daily use, and form another for use on the stage and in other forms of
display. Rather, they lie within everyone’s reach, and when we have picked them up, we
form and shape them at will, like the most malleable wax. Accordingly, the way we speak
is sometimes grand, sometimes plain, and sometimes we hold to a middle course.”187
Like Aristotle before him and Quintilian after him, Cicero stresses the importance of
speaking naturally, saying that “in each of these three forms there should be a kind of
charming complexion, not as the result of rouge that has been laid on, but of blood that
flows through them.”188
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Conclusion
What are the consequences in the field of rhetoric for failing to account for the
conversational turn? Viewed from a historical perspective, there is some reason to believe
that the refusal to acknowledge the gradual overtaking of conversation as a synecdoche
for rhetoric has jeopardized the very discipline its defenders aim to protect. Randall, who
notably is not writing as an “insider” in the academic discipline of rhetoric, but rather as a
historian seeking to explain the importance of the history of conversation to the history of
rhetoric, argues that “to describe rhetoric as essentially oratory—to defend rhetoric as
essentially oratory—is to recapitulate the old arguments of philosophy against rhetoric,
and ultimately to endorse not only rhetoric’s historical declension narrative but also to
endorse the justification for its replacement. To describe rhetoric as oratory, no matter
with what fulsome intentions, is to anticipate its obsequies.”189
What is particularly noteworthy about Randall’s claim is that, to arrive at his
argument about conversation becoming the default mode of rhetoric by the end of the
seventeenth century, he places women’s speech at the center of this shift. Jane
Donawerth, who is writing as a historian of rhetoric, makes the same move in her history
of conversational rhetoric. However, she stops short of saying that conversation became
the model for all of rhetoric. Rather, she stresses that “for women, because of their
relative restriction of domestic roles, conversation rather than oratory becomes the model
for all public discourse.”190 In other words, conversation did not become a universal
rhetoric, but rather a domestic one. Similarly, when tackling the question of whether there
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is any connection between contemporary composition studies (which regularly offer
conversation as a model for discourse and a model for pedagogy) and the women’s
tradition of conversational rhetoric (whose arc she locates between 1600-1900)
Donawerth again demurs. The final sentence of her book reads: “While there is not a
direct link from the women’s tradition of rhetoric to these examples of contemporary
composition pedagogy, nevertheless, we can yet learn something about our own teaching
practices from a tradition that taught women how to enter the conversation.”191
It is tempting to simply disagree with Donawerth and say her assessment is
wrong. However, a closer review of her steps reveals something more telling, and thus
much more important. The argument she is making is an institutional one. When
Donawerth says there is “no direct link” between pedagogy and conversational rhetoric
what she means is that there is no direct link in the way it is taught and talked about in
rhetoric and composition departments. And she is correct about that. “The disappearance
of conversational rhetoric was a loss that recent developments in composition studies
make apparent. Rhetoric and composition theory would have benefited from a strand that
concentrated on dialogism, collaboration, and consensus during communication.
Twentieth-century rhetoricians missed an opportunity when they cast off elocution as
sentimental instead of incorporating the bodily language of emotions into public
speaking. And certainly, an art of listening might have developed into methods of
training conflict negotiations much sooner.”192 Here I would question the goal, even
possibility, for consensus to be expressed in conversation (unless by consensus she means
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identification and select areas of agreement) since, unlike pure dialectic (in which the
truth or falsity of a claim is exposed) there is no final “getting to the bottom of things.”
The end of public conversation, if we are to put it in those terms, is a moving target.
Indeed, not unlike the philosophical dialogues, which comprise one of the three earliest
models of conversation, there is reason to believe that “public conversations” are
necessarily open-ended and are more likely to be “adjourned rather than resolved.”193
(Even in the formal context of law and the courts, “consensus is not readily
discoverable,” a point John Hart Ely brings out in his seminal work on judicial review,
Democracy and Distrust.194 I detail some of the controversies surrounding this view in
Chapters 3 and 5 of this study.) Still, the core of what Donawerth is saying about the
ways in which rhetoric, composition, and communication departments have missed out
by failing to account for the conversational turn is key and should not go unnoticed.
Even as twentieth-century rhetoricians mostly failed to account for actual
performances of conversation, rhetoric—as a social and cultural practice of persuasion—
continued to proliferate, mix, and push the bounds of public conversation with little
concern for the side of an academic argument on which it landed: conversational
metaphors, conversational practices, or ersatz conversations. While formalists (of one
variety) watched in horror as publics indefatigably sullied the art of conversation, people
carried on altering the genre to suit their own ends. I do not disagree that there are
reasons for skepticism and alarm in American rhetorical culture, and that various versions
of conversational iterations have indeed contributed to it. However, as this study turns
from overarching patterns in Western European practices and theories of conversation to
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more contemporary hybrid ones, we will do well to remember that if our goal is to
understand American culture and language in use, identifying the ways at which
conversation fails to meet an allegedly universal standard is not only an inappropriate
method but also a self-defeating one.
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CHAPTER 3
GOVERNMENT: AN IMPETUS FOR CONVERSATION
IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE
“Each government, other than the despotisms, is a particular arrangement of equality and
inequality.”
-Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748)

“The United States Constitution can be regarded as a rhetorical text: one that establishes a set of
speakers, roles, topics, and occasions for speech. So understood, many of its ambiguities and
uncertainties become more comprehensible, for we can see the text as attempting to establish a
conversation of a certain kind and its ambiguities as ways of at once defining and leaving open the
topics of conversation.”
-James Boyd White, “Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law” (1985)

In Norms of Rhetorical Culture, which develops a theory on civic participation
and practical reasoning, Thomas Farrell calls rhetoric a “practiced imperfection”
motivated in part by the necessity to locate and explain a culture’s “identities,
accomplishments, and needs.”195 He argues that “shared understandings of a people” are
often expressed in foundational texts.196 Legal theorists, historians, political theorists,
and communication scholars writing about the Constitutional period all underscore this
rhetorical function of foundational texts: Although they approach the period in myriad
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ways, as a set this scholarship consistently highlights the performative nature of the
formation of the American government.
Rather than a set of rules, they maintain that the Constitution (and governance) is
best understood as a rhetorical process. James Boyd White, for instance, famously argues
that law (which he defines as “a set of resources for thought and argument”) comprises
one set among Aristotle’s available “means of persuasion.”197 Not only that, but he also
describes the Constitution as an attempt to start a conversation. He writes: “The United
States Constitution can be regarded as a rhetorical text: one that establishes a set of
speakers, roles, topics, and occasions for speech. So understood, many of its ambiguities
and uncertainties become more comprehensible, for we can see the text as attempting to
establish a conversation of a certain kind and its ambiguities as ways of at once defining
and leaving open the topics of conversation.”198 Describing more than just a metaphor,
White theorizes law as a branch of rhetoric concerned with “constituting culture and
community.”199
It is not just the rhetorical function of the completed Constitution, however, but
also the process of its formation that will prove of central importance to the
conversational turn. From the period between the Revolution and the ratification of the
Constitution a compound of causes led to an increasing legal and philosophical emphasis
on both equality and the individual. By the nineteenth century, rehearsals of these ideals
(together with numerous other forms of cultural survival), hastened a sea change in
197

James Boyd White, “Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life,” The
University of Chicago Law Review 52.3 (Summer 1985): 689.
198

White, 1985, 697.

199

White, 1985, 692, emphasis added.

70

American discourse away from monologic oratory and toward egalitarian conversation
where all citizens could, at least in theory, contribute. While central for explaining the
underlying assumptions that animate the public conversational dynamic, this chapter is
not dedicated to conversation or oratory. Rather, it aims to introduce some of the
conceptual problems (and promises) that arose during this period for which
“conversation” would later be called upon to address.

On the Social Implications of American Political Theory
Political theories are created (and repeated) in response to specific, cultural
circumstances. In The Letters of the Republic, for example, Michael Warner argues that it
is “the Constitution’s printedness that allows it to emanate from no one in particular, and
thus from the people.”200 Recognizing the influence of surrounding circumstances, both
Michael Schudson’s The Good Citizen: A History of Civic Life and Jennifer Mercieca’s
Founding Fictions go beyond the parameters of the Constitutional debates themselves to
exemplify how the larger social milieu can be advantageously probed for clues that
extend, not just into formal questions of law (which I take up in Chapter 5), but into the
necessarily evolving American rhetorical culture. In the same way, political theory—
which links the exigencies of formal and informal structures of government—is itself a
form of “practiced imperfection” (to use Farrell’s term). It responds to specific identities,
accomplishments, and needs. What this means, among other things, is that it can be
critiqued. As Mercieca phrases it, “political theory is not an elite form of discourse that
corresponds to truth, but rather a form of persuasion and an act of human
200
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imagination…as such it can be debated as easily as any other piece of art or other
influential text.”201
The impact of American political theory also does not begin and end with the
Founders. Thoroughly egalitarian in its ability to change, it is always in the hands of
those who wrestle with it and reinforce it for their own eras. This capacity for selfgovernment was in fact a stated goal from the beginning. As Gordon Wood points out in
his seminal book on the period, building a “permanent basis for freedom” was not just a
secondary expectation for the Constitution but the primary “essence of the
Revolution.”202
This is not to suggest that political theories can be argued without restraints. In
the same way that foundational configurations (like any other influential text) do not stay
merely in the realm of ideas, so political theories shape (and limit) reality by making their
way into discernible action. In the case of American politics, the Federalists left a clear
and lasting mark on how campaigns would be waged and politics would be understood in
the United States. Although the Federalist v. Antifederalist debates were suited to the
constraints and circumstances of the time (several of which I outline in this chapter)—
their legacy (e.g., a ratified Constitution and the first ten Amendments of the
Constitution) noticeably fixed “the terms of future discussion.”203 In particular, says
Wood, the triumph of the Federalists “helped to foreclose the development of an
intellectual tradition in which differing ideas of politics would be intimately and
201
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genuinely related to differing social interests.”204 This, too, would have far-reaching
consequences. By taking the political struggle “outside of the context of a contest
between rulers and the people,” the Federalists in effect pitted one individual against
another.205 As Wood writes, “individuals in America” became “the entire society:”
Americans had begun the Revolution assuming that the people were a
homogenous entity in society set against the rulers. But such an assumption belied
American experience, and it only took a few years of independence to convince the best
American minds that the distinctions in society were “various and unavoidable,” so much
so that they could not be embodied in government. Once the people were thought to be
composed of various interests in opposition to one another, all sense of a graduated
organic chain in the social hierarchy became irrelevant, symbolized by the increasing
emphasis on the image of a social contract. The people were not an order organically tied
together by their unity of interests but rather an agglomeration of hostile individuals
coming together for their mutual benefit to construct a society.206
Called in varying degrees to participate in their own governance, the selfsame
individuals were thus cast as political peers and social rivals. The result of the rise of the
individual under the banner of equality was not unity, but social antagonism. Americans
struggled with this dynamic from the start. Indeed, although it is true that the Founding
Fathers all shared the belief that they were creating a government based on the will of the
people, to speak only of their disinterested republican virtue (a self-sacrificial capacity
which was thought to place public good before—and outside of—private interests) belies
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the fact that Americans struggled to reconcile distinctions between political and social
equality from the beginning.
In her study on the move from republican to democratic “fictions” of American
citizenship, Jennifer Mercieca argues that the “logic of the new constitution was different
from the logic of the Revolution,” shifting from a romantic fiction to a tragic one.207 No
longer calling people to actively fight corruption, defend liberty, critique the government,
and work for the common good (as the call for action leading up to the Declaration had),
the new Constitution codified a new type of government that, according to Mercieca,
“had the semblance of republicanism but not the substance.”208 By this she means that a
republican citizenry should be active and, indeed, powerful. Instead, the Constitution
conceived of a citizenry that was inactive: according to Mercieca, the Constitution
delineated a citizenry that “could not be trusted to defend liberty and prevent tyranny.”209
Schudson takes a less critical stance than Mercieca in his treatment of the observable shift
following the Revolution. However, his emphases on practical and theoretical questions
over representation corroborate the same schematic: both Mercieca and Schudson
underscore a basic “reorganization” in the culture between the Revolution and the
ratification of the Constitution.210 The process of this reorganization is often described as
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“an extended conversation.”211 Meanwhile, the product of this protracted conversation
(i.e., the ratified Constitution) is itself conceived of as its own discrete conversation.
Even though evolving, the topics of conversation that are available to a public are
constrained and goaded by terms laid down in the American legal framework.212

On the Parameters of Law and Conversation
This chapter outlines the parameters of conversation that the founding generation
set. This would have lasting impact on American identity and rhetorical culture. Unlike
other studies, which may highlight the dialogic or communicative construct of
nationhood without even mentioning the somewhat constricting role of legal foundations,
this chapter keeps law at the center.213 That is, by necessity, this chapter toggles back and
forth between the open-endedness and fixedness of American political and legal
foundations. However, because reform has primarily occurred through reinterpretation, it
is also necessary to think in terms of layers—which stick—rather than erratic or
wholesale transformations. Jeffrey Tulis explains the dynamic in these terms: “American
political development may be usefully treated as a layered text. Basic structural features
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of the regime have not been substantially altered. Political reform has proceeded through
reinterpretation of the Constitution rather than by replacement, or even significant
amendment, of its structural principles.” 214 Building on the announced method of this
project (i.e., “lumping” as opposed to “splitting”), this chapter specifically traces a legal
and cultural “reorganization” over questions of sovereignty and equality. In particular, I
consider how “We, the People”—with all its political, legal, and rhetorical import—was
both deliberately and extemporaneously fashioned to bridge the contradictory nature of
equality and non-equality in America.
In contrast to nineteenth century rhetorical histories, which highlight the
“concussive” way in which democracy was finally felt by the masses, I argue that
equality was something the colonies and then the new republic struggled with all
along.215 That is, the early American republic did not have a handle on equality and then
lose it. Rather, despite, or rather because of, its relatively egalitarian starting point, the
Revolution aggravated rather than lessened social chaos. Indeed, only out of this
upheaval, and following a two-year period of uniquely public and sophisticated debates
over views of government, would a Constitution be ratified that reverted, at least in part,
to a less equal and more “monarchical notion of using private power to carry out public
ends.”216
This came as a shock to many. The republican Revolution, which had only been
fought a few years before, sought to do away with this very system of politics that placed
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private interests at the center of politics. “The Revolutionaries sought to destroy the
patronage that had permeated áncien regime politics and to create citizens who were
equal, independent, and free from dependencies on grandees and patrons,” writes
Wood.217 What’s more, the goal of the revolution was not simply to destroy one system
of government but also to replace it with a more republican—and more equal—form. The
Founding generation openly sought to “assert the primacy of the public good over all
private interests, indeed, to separate the public from the private and to prevent the
intrusion of private interests into the public realm.”218
And yet, despite these initial aspirations to erect a truly republican government,
the Constitution that was ultimately ratified rejected a number of foundationally
republican ideals: The Constitution was not predicated on a unity of interests. It did not
hinge on public service as a form of virtue. And it did not assume that the thirteen States
could identify (let alone disinterestedly promote) a public, “common” good.219 In its
place, these were some of the very qualities that although in theory central to classical
republicanism, the Constitution notably—and, for reasons I outline in this chapter,
explicably—rejected.
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Three Frames: Foundational Texts
Theorists commonly think of and refer to foundational texts as a set. Farrell refers
to “the shared understandings of a people” that are “expressed in general concepts—in its
historical ideals, its public rhetoric, its foundational texts, it ceremonies and rituals.”220
Richard Hofstadter, author of the influential history on Anti-Intellectualism in American
Life, lumps together the Founding Fathers as a group of thinkers. He describes them as
“sages, scientists, men of broad cultivation, many of them apt in classical learning, who
used their wide reading in history, politics, and law to solve the exigent problems of the
day.”221 Equally common is the tendency to view the Declaration of Independence (1776)
and the U.S. Constitution (1787) as not just foundational, but a conceptual unit. For
example, in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) (a landmark Supreme Court case
which I will take up in a later chapter), Justice Thomas suggests the Framers “captured” a
type of liberty in our Declaration of Independence that they then “sought to protect” in
our Constitution.222
Although there are good reasons for combining the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence (and, as a rehearsal of American ideals, people will no
doubt continue to do so), it’s important to remember that the appeals to authority and
treatments of equality in these two texts are profoundly different. One key difference
between the Declaration and Constitution, for example, is that the Declaration explicitly
relies on natural law, while the Constitution conspicuously does not. Neither the source
for individual rights nor the basis for sovereignty emanate from the same place in the two
220

Thomas Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 239.

221

Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York, Vintage Books, 1962), 145.

222

576 U.S.___2015, Thomas dissenting, 2.

78

documents. (This is the case whether viewed as an expression of political theory or a
basis for law.)
In Democracy and Distrust, constitutional theorist John Hart Ely explains
practical reasons for the Declaration to have relied on natural law and for the Constitution
to have avoided it. He classifies the Declaration of Independence as an “indictment” and,
above all, a “brief,” in which people are “likely, and often well advised, to throw in
arguments of every hue.”223 “People writing briefs for revolutions are obviously unlikely
to have apparent positive law on their side, and are therefore well advised to rely on
natural law.”224 The Constitution, in contrast, “was not a brief, but a frame of
government,” creating positive law that, upon ratification, “virtually everyone in America
accepted…as the document controlling his destiny.”225
Beyond these differences in available arguments, the Constitution was responding
to a different set of exigencies. If the Declaration and Constitution appeared not only
different in source but also in substance, then political distance between the Articles of
Confederation and the ratified federal Constitution was perhaps even more so. This is
because, as Wood points out, “the problem of sovereignty was not solved by the
Declaration of Independence.”226 Immediately following independence the first
imperative was not an “extensive exploration into the problem of politics”—least of all
the complicated question of sovereignty—but rather a more tangible and localized
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concern with “the formation of the state constitutions.”227 Indeed, it was not until a
stronger, federal constitution was proposed to replace the Articles of Confederation that
the question of sovereignty was revisited and, in a rare event, publicly brought to a
head.228 For reasons that I outline in the following section, notions of sovereignty quickly
changed, however, not just in the interim between the colonists’ subjection to a monarchy
and the formation of the new republic, but over the course of the debates over the
Constitution itself.

The Rise of the Individual
Much has been written about the transformation in political thinking from the
period between the American Revolution and the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. There
are good reasons for this. The period, roughly between 1776 and 1787, not only
inaugurated the beginning of American democracy as we understand it today, but it also
marked a dramatic pivot away from classical views of politics and toward a uniquely
American and recognizably modern one. Unlike classical models of government (with
which the Founding Fathers were famously well-acquainted), the emerging representative
democracy openly incorporated private interests into the affairs of government. Equally
significant—and so radical as to be misunderstood even by some of the Founding Fathers
themselves—the new Constitution in effect destroyed classical notions of mixed
government and, along with it, any social basis for the branches of government. By the
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time the Constitution was written, the executive branch did not represent the benefits of
monarchy (rule by the one); the upper house did not represent an aristocracy (rule by the
wise few); and the lower house was not the singular expression for democracy (rule by
the many).

Aristocracy
Monarchy

Democracy

Sovereignty

Figure 3.1: Sovereignty in a Mixed Government

In its place, a new notion of sovereignty emerged out of debates over the
Constitution that drew its force from individuals independent of government. “In all
governments,” argued James Wilson of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, “there
must be a power established from which there is no appeal, and which is therefore
absolute, supreme, and uncontrollable. The only question,” said Wilson, “is where that
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power is lodged?”229 Sovereignty, he argued, is derived solely from the people, “as the
fountain of government.” And whether “the people” distributed that power through the
states or the federal government, “they have not parted with it; they have only dispensed
such portions of power as were conceived necessary for the public welfare.”230
As the Federalists of the 1780s would come to propose, neither the power of state
or federal governments, nor the strengthening of branches within them (in particular
judicial and executive at the expense of legislative) were at odds with the liberty of the
people since the only source out of which any governmental branch derived its power
was a singular, indistinguishable one: the sovereignty of the people. As James Madison
wrote in Federalist 46, “The federal and State government are in fact but different agents
and trustees of the people.”231 Although it was the Antifederalists who worried about the
actual loss of democratic power by the people, it was the Federalists who most
persuasively wielded the egalitarian phrase to suit their aristocratic ends. For example, in
the same January 29, 1788 text, Madison went on to argue that “the adversaries of the
Constitution [the Antifederalists] seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their
reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as
mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to
usurp the authorities of each other.”232 The problem, said Madison, was not that the
proposal to strengthen a federal government would limit citizen action (an issue rhetorical
critic Jennifer Mercieca takes up in Founding Fictions). Nor was it that bolstering one
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imperative (e.g., minority rights) might run roughshod against another imperative (e.g.,
democratic legislation). (These issues I take up in Chapter 5.) Rather, the issue, as
Madison cast it, was the Antifederalists’ purported inability to see just how democratic—
how all encompassing—the authority of individual sovereignty actually was. “These
gentlemen,” wrote Madison, “must here be reminded of their error. They must be told
that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people
alone.”233

Figure 3.2: Individual Sovereignty Replaces the Mixed Government Model

In contrast to the classic mixed regime model, which conceived of government as
interconnected with social qualities reflected in society, in this new model the social
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realm allegedly had little to do with it: if sovereignty was now made up of one thing
only—individuals, each of whom were, at least politically and in principle, equal—then
any additional social orders would be superfluous. In this new model, there was no social
realm at all, or, rather, none that the branches of government could encompass or delimit.
They were too numerous and diffuse.
As Madison famously held in Federalist 10, the possibilities for difference of
opinion and interests were endless and impossible to contain. “As long as the reason of
man continues to be fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be
formed,” he wrote. “As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his selflove, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the
former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.” Far from describing a
homogeneous or disinterested public, Madison assumed self-interest and difference, not
unity, as the necessary starting points for the fortification of a new government. Although
in no way ideal, Madison would admit, experience following the Revolution had shown
that factions (i.e., interested majorities) were unavoidable: “Complaints are everywhere
heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens…that our governments are too
unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the
minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”234
A stronger government was needed, in other words, to control the vices of men
whose interests were no longer privately and publicly discrete, but rather openly
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intertwined.235 No longer could one assume that a majority would act in the interest of the
public good (i.e., in the interest of people’s welfare) or that they would relinquish power
to the minority simply in the name of justice. In light of this, rather than controlling the
existence of factions, which were inevitable, Madison sought to control their effects.
Initially, Madison cast the solution in republican terms. In Federalist 10, he
outlined a way to control factions by enlarging a republic to such an extent that a single,
cohesive majority would be difficult to achieve.236 Highlighting one of the notable ways
in which the new government was “a prodigy,” Madison’s approach, although not
initially well received at the Convention, was ultimately integrated into the new
Constitution, turning the “oracle” Montesquieu’s well-known theory of the necessity of a
small republic on its head.237 However, over the course of the debates leading up to the
reification of the Constitution, this republican justification for the new configuration was
gradually muted. Underscoring the interconnectedness between formal and informal
political structure and calculated and spontaneous rhetorical culture, the Federalists
ultimately abandoned public appeals to the “aristocratic-sounding” scheme, instead
framing their proposals for a new government using their opponents’ decidedly
democratic (i.e., Antifederalist) terms.238
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A Nation Founded on Ideas
Writing in the 1830s, Tocqueville emphasized the interplay between formal and
informal systems of government through symbolism and abstraction. “The government of
the Union rests almost entirely on legal fictions. The Union is an ideal nation that exists
only in the mind, as it were, and whose extent and limits can only be discovered through
an effort of intelligence.”239 This emphasis on fictions is particularly important with
respect to the Constitution, because it explains why the rehearsal and public performance
of foundational ideals is still so important to Americans’ sense of identity today. “The
United States was founded on a set of beliefs,” says the historian Gordon Wood, “and
not, as other nations, on a common ethnicity or common language, or religion.”240
Equally important, the ideals on which the nation was founded were not just
assumed in the American landscape and settled once and for all; rather, they are still
evolving and actively dramatized today (a dynamic which I discuss more fully in
Chapters Four and Five). Consider, for instance, the opening paragraphs of Barack
Obama’s 2013 Presidential Inaugural Address, which I quote at length since they so
clearly exemplify the enduring relevance of what I am discussing in this chapter:
Each time we gather to inaugurate a President we bear witness to the enduring
strength of our Constitution. We affirm the promise of our democracy. We recall that
what binds this nation together is not the colors of our skin or the tenets of our faith or the
origins of our names. What makes us exceptional—what makes us American—is our
allegiance to an idea articulated in a declaration made more than two centuries ago:
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‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’
Today we continue a never-ending journey to bridge the meaning of those words
with the realities of our time. For history tells us that while these truths may be selfevident, they’ve never been self-executing; that while freedom is a gift from God, it must
be secured by His people here on Earth. The patriots of 1776 did not fight to replace the
tyranny of a king with the privileges of a few or the rule of a mob. They gave to us a
republic, a government of, and by, and for the people, entrusting each generation to keep
safe our founding creed. And for more than two hundred years, we have.241
Even a quick unpacking of the language here exemplifies how Americans still
struggle to make the adjustments necessary for the “complex coherence of a society” and
the “reorganization” of history that Michael Schudson finds so essential.242 While the
passage begins with a temporal “each time,” it advances to a less transient foundation of
“more than two hundred years.” The passage does this using the stylistic form of
antithesis in which contrasting ideas are placed next to each other. The scheme works
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both as a line of reasoning and as a stylistic pattern delivering content the audience would
know to expect.243 Thus, “while freedom is a gift,” it must be “secured;” While “all men
are created equal” may be a “self-evident” truth, its impact in practice can hardly be
assumed. “What binds this nation together” is “a never-ending journey” that denies any
capacity for programmed or “self-executing” fulfillment. Indeed, even the solid
underpinning that is suggested by the “enduring strength of our Constitution” and the
passage of two centuries is qualified with what is yet to come (“And for more than two
hundred years, we have.”). By ending this section of the speech in the past perfect tense
(“we have”), the former President’s words call to mind a test. This test (“to keep a
government of, and by, and for the people”) is by necessity both forward and backward
looking, requiring a continual affirmation of the things that held and hold us together.
As a rehearsal of American ideals, this articulation is largely a performative one.
Not only is it publicly spoken, but also, and more importantly, it dramatizes the essential
(and, no doubt, rhetorical) connection between things as they are now and things as they
might be. Indeed, we see this evidenced again in the same passage above: in order for the
“meaning of those words” [in the Declaration of Independence] to match “the realities of
our time,” certain actions are required. Actions the President lists include that we
“affirm,” “bridge,” and “keep safe” the ideals that were first articulated in 1776.
Although the dynamic I am describing here explains, in part, why Americans still
have a need to revisit this critical period of history, the rehearsal of American ideals is
only one part of American public life and, most central to this study, an impetus for the
conversational turn. Formal theories of government, which are rarely rehearsed in public
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speeches, are also just as much at play. For example, if we return the opening preamble
of the Constitution—“We, the People”—and consider not just its rhetorical power but the
practical implications of its departure from the Article of Confederation (which opened
“We, the States”) it becomes clearer why “We, the People” was so disputed.

Shifting Fictions
“‘The question turns, sir,” said Patrick Henry at the opening of the Virginia
Convention, “on that poor little thing—the expression, We, the people, instead of the
states of America.’”244 Although by now the preamble of the Constitution, ‘We, the
People,’ is a source of democratic pride, when it was drafted, the pivot away from ‘We,
the States’ (as it was in the Articles of Confederation) to ‘We, the People’ represented a
loss of liberty. The problem was one of both omission and implication. In contrast to the
Constitution (pre Bill of Rights), a majority of state constitutions enumerated protections
of individual rights. A federal constitution, however, would supersede state laws. This
omission of protected rights threatened to undermine the liberties for which Americans
had just fought.
The problem of implication was that the consolidation of a federal power meant
that, where necessary and in the cases of conflict, the federal power would supplant states
laws. This was a major source of controversy during debates over the constitution and a
recurring theme in the Federalist v. Anti-Federalists debates. “Brutus,” for example,
raised this criticism of the constitution’s relationship to state laws in Anti-Federalist 84:
“For it being a plan of government received and ratified by the whole people, all other
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forms which are in existence at the time of its adoption must yield to it.”245 Although as
a party the Federalists were always in the minority, on the question of consolidating
federal power in a constitution, they unmistakably dominated.246 The Federalists
accomplished this not by changing the formal structure they proposed, but by shifting
their justification for it. That is, they shifted the question of sovereignty from the States to
a more singular, indivisible invention: the People.
“We, the People” (much like “We, the Sates”) is a fiction. “It might be the best
fiction on which to rest government, a fiction that no one wished at this point to
challenge,” writes the historian Edmund Morgan, but it still must be “recognized as a
fiction.”247 To suggest that explanations about who governs are “fictions,” however, is
not to suggest that the narratives we tell about how the few are chosen to represent,
govern, or rule over the many are altogether divorced from reality. In fact, David Hume
would suggest in his theory of consent, all governments rest on fictions. As Morgan
explains in his history of the rise of popular sovereignty, “the success of government
requires the acceptance of fictions…this maxim extends to the most free and most
popular governments, as well as to the most despotic and most military.”248 Fictions are
necessary, in other words, because they help both governors and the governed create,
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revise, amend, and critique stories about the foundations of sovereignty (i.e., how and
why the few are chosen to represent, govern, or rule over the many).
In a representative democracy such as the one created by the Constitution, this
fiction is particularly important, since, even as it is premised on the will of the people, it
“excludes some” but not others “from the decision-making process.”249 In fact, not only
does this configuration hinge on “an elected form of aristocracy,” it also necessitates an
additional level of abstraction. “The people who submitted to a government of their own
supposed creation had to remember that government is always something other than the
actual people who are governed by it, that governors and governed cannot be in fact
identical.”250 Even in seventeenth-century England, where the idea of “sovereignty of the
People” was reintroduced from the Greeks, it was assumed that people would not speak
for themselves, but rather through Parliamentary representation.251 How, then, did the
Federalists go about arguing that the Constitution was an action—not of the States—not
of Representatives—but simply and directly of the People?
In the first stages of America’s founding theories of mixed-government were
assumed. Although later he would be mocked for it, John Adams, for example, was not
initially an outlier in his belief that mixed government was the ideal form of political rule.
After the Revolution, when Americans set out to design their state constitutions, the
question the Framers asked was not whether a mixed government was preferred (that was
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assumed), but rather what proportion would be allotted to each of the government
types.252 In this configuration, which is comprised of the three classical types of
government—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—sovereignty is not only split, but
only exists as “a compound built of three distinct parts.”253

Monarchy

Democracy

Aristocracy

Figure 3.3: Mixed Government as Compound of Three Distinct Parts

One advantage of the mixed model of government is that it has a built-in system
to protect minority groups. As John Patrick Coby puts it, “The reason for choosing the
mixed-regime model of protecting minorities is the perception that society is not a natural
whole, composed of one population, more or less all the same, but is a union of distinct
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communities artificially brought together.”254 The problem that surfaced by the mid
1780s, however, (and one reason why a stronger federal constitution was deemed
necessary) is that initially states were too democratic. By selecting the aristocratic
(senate) and democratic (house of representatives) legislatures in essentially the same
manner, states lost any advantages the two different societal elements were envisioned to
bring: “If the theory of mixed government were to be useful, the two houses could not
embody the same interests, could not contain the same kinds of men with similar
education and social standing,” observed Wood.255 The propensity to fill the two houses
from the same pool of people thus revealed a flaw in state constitutions and the Articles
of Confederation.
As Jefferson sensed in his Notes on Virginia, “Being chosen by the same electors,
at the same time, and out of the same subjects, the choice falls of course on men of the
same description.”256 Jefferson wasn’t the only one to express this concern. Commonly
contrasted as competing voices for the publicly waged Federalists and Antifederalist
debate,257 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson fully agreed on this point: both were
“baffled by the apparent inability of the people to perceive the truly talented.”258
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Having rejected the hereditary imperialism of the Crown, Americans struggled to
pin down qualities that could be reliably identified as distinctively senatorial or
aristocratic. This is not to say they were not aware of distinctions. Quite the contrary, in
some ways they were obsessed with them. “Social distinctions and symbols of status
were highly respected and intensely coveted” by Americans at the time, writes Wood,
perhaps “even more greedily than by the English themselves.”259 Distinctions abounded,
moreover, not just in habit, but in abstract political theories as well, since neither equality
nor republicanism were understood to mean social leveling or lack of difference.260
“Even the most radical republicans” who professed a shared will of the people “admitted
the inevitability of all natural distinctions: weak and strong, wise and foolish—and even
of incidental distinctions: rich and poor, learned and unlearned.”261
The issue for the leaders of the founding generation was thus not whether there
were critical distinctions but rather on what grounds aristocratic and senatorial merits
would be delineated.262 Indeed, what was so revolutionary about this early vision for
republicanism was not that it took Jefferson’s “self-evident truth” that “all men are
created equal” to its broadest and fullest conclusion, but rather that it placed its faith in
what we might call a self-made aristocracy, an eighteenth-century version of the rugged
individualism that would later come to define American culture. This faith in a self-made
aristocracy mixed democratic egalitarianism with a strong commitment to social order. In
the place of preeminence by birth, much of the revolutionary generation believed
259
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aristocratic qualities were to be personally cultivated and evidenced in virtue, selfsacrifice, education, disinterestedness, and talent.
In this restricted context, mobility itself was not viewed as a social irritant. Insofar
as it “represented equality of opportunity and careers open to talent” mobility in fact “lay
at the heart of republicanism.”263 However—and this was key—any movement or change
in social position was predicated on the assumption that there were clearly established
ranks together with clearly defined ways to move about them. Wood writes, “Most
Revolutionary leaders clung tightly to the concept of a ruling elite, presumably based on
merit, but an elite nonetheless…The rising self-made man could be accepted into this
natural aristocracy only if he had assimilated through education or experience, its
attitudes, refinements, and style.”264 There was a “crucial difference,” in other words,
between “orderly and disorderly mobility.” 265

Equal Yet Unequal
The early American republic did not have a handle on equality and then lose it.
Both Federalists and Antifederalists worried about the dynamic between citizens of
different social classes; they worried, too, about competing interests of small states and
large states, majorities and minorities, and between those who would make laws versus
those who would enforce them. At issue were not just the concepts of political liberty and
governmental power, but the practical distinction between the “People” and their
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representatives. As Colene Lind puts it, the question of equal representation—however
defined—“has haunted the American republic since the founding.”266
While more people than ever before would participate in the world’s first, mass
democracy, the effect following the Revolution was not unity but turmoil. Far from
satisfying the craving for political liberty, equality of conditions instead invited
challenges to “all distinctions, whether naturally based or not” and exacerbated social
competition.267 Yet, in this same way, it was through this lack of total equality that
participants saw just how unprecedented the degrees of liberty, equality, and political
representation actually were. That something different was afoot was not just felt in the
early Republic but observed. Even before the Revolution the Colonies were more
egalitarian than their counterparts. “What was different in America was not only that
ordinary people were less poor and less destitute than the poor of England,” observes
Wood, “but also that American aristocracy and the wealthy gentry whom ordinary people
railed against were considerably weaker and less established than the English aristocracy
and gentry.”268 However, despite, or, rather because of this relatively egalitarian starting
point, the Revolution aggravated rather than lessened social chaos.269
“Although the Revolution had placed government almost wholly in the hands of
the people, the people were still suspicious and jealous…In all of the states, from New
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England to South Carolina, the egalitarian atmosphere spread by the Revolution made
‘superiority from incidental circumstances not annexed to merit…galling and
insufferable,’” writes Wood.270 Or, as a Connecticut periodical from 1786 reported:
“Every man wants to be a judge, a justice, a sheriff, a deputy, or something else which
will bring him a little money, or what is better, a little authority.”271 Underscoring the
important link between formal mechanisms and broader rhetorical culture, democratic
foundations do something to the mind that other forms of government do not: they
“awaken and flatter the passion for equality without ever being able to satisfy it to the
full.”272
In fact, says Tocqueville, the desire for equality becomes more “insatiable as the
degree of equality increases.”273 As the social crisis of the 1780s (which set the stage and,
as the Federalists argued, need for the new Constitution) had shown, equality of
conditions was so significant in part because it was not simply an abstract ideal, but
rather a visible element of society that was realized in degrees. Both the social upheaval
of the 1780s and the 1830s are described in terms of visibility. Tocqueville, who wrote
Democracy in America during the 1830s, describes the effect this way: “When conditions
are almost alike, it is not easy for one man to persuade another. Since everyone can see
everyone else at close range, and all have learned the same things together and lead the
same life, they are not naturally inclined to accept one of their member and follow him
blindly. It is unlikely that one man will take on faith what he hears from another man just
270
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like himself or his equal.”274 According to Wood, the decade following the Revolution
produced a similar visible effect: “the most pronounced social effect of the Revolution
was not harmony or stability but the sudden appearance of new men everywhere in
politics and business.”275
Meanwhile, the same individual confidence and relative access to equal
circumstances that would spur Americans on to seek better conditions would also activate
another, equally malleable, social trait to which Tocqueville would refer again and again:
envy (together with a general resentment against superiority). “I found the democratic
sentiment of envy expressed in a thousand different ways,” writes Tocqueville. 276 It
wasn’t just the low salary that the highest-ranking officials would receive;277 or the
Constitutional ban on titles of nobility;278 or the lack of uniforms for public officials that
ensured democratic officials blended in with the multitudes—although these all were
important.279 Following what Montesquieu had observed almost a century before,
Tocqueville observes: “Public officials themselves are well aware that they have been
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granted the right to wield power over others only on the condition that in regard to
manners they descend to the same level as everyone else.”280

“An Entirely New Theory”
While it was Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws that made famous the idea that
laws impart certain habits in the people they govern, it was Tocqueville who, building on
his fellow Frenchman, applied it to the peculiar conditions of the United States.
According to Tocqueville, equality of conditions (a condition that, while never able to be
fully achieved, is marked by the equal access to rights, education, and fortune) is
professed to have a “prodigious influence” on everything: “It creates opinions, engenders
feelings, and modifies everything that it does not produce.”281 Following his famous trip
through the United States in the 1830s, Tocqueville more specifically reported: “I found
in the United States that restlessness of heart which is natural to men when, all conditions
being almost equal, each person sees the chance of rising.”282 This “chance of rising”
would gradually become so entrenched as to become, as Frederick Antczak words it, “a
permanent part of the national identity.”283
But it was also out of this mixture that Tocqueville perceived something else: “I
observed that in the conduct of affairs people often displayed a great mixture of
280
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presumption and ignorance, and from this I concluded that in America as in Europe, men
were subject to the same imperfections and exposed to the same miseries.”284 In one
sense, in other words, the political configuration of the United States was hardly
exceptional. While the distinctly American political agreement would eventually become
the longest surviving national charter and (as Tocqueville called it) the “most perfect” of
all constitutions, as a design for government its flaws were no different from any other: it
espouses a political theory and creates a formal system of government that can never
ensure equality, liberty, or unflawed representation. “Democracy does not do away with
class distinctions,” writes Tocqueville.285 Neither does the Constitution. If we think of the
Constitution as an American political theory—as a product of human imagination and
debate—then this “practiced imperfection” loses its impenetrability and simply becomes
a way to better understand American identities, accomplishments, and needs.
And yet, the fact that the Constitution (still) confronts “individuals” rather than
“peoples,” also means that its strength is “not borrowed,” as other forms of sovereignty
had been, “but drawn from within.”286 This fact alone—however “piecemeal,” “diffuse,”
and “open-ended” in its creation—was “based on an entirely new theory” that “must be
counted as one of the greatest discoveries of contemporary political science.” 287 By
shifting the social organization of politics from rulers and ruled to one autonomous
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individual against another, the new political theory would impact not only what citizens
sought from their government, or how politicians campaigned and related to their
constituents, but, more generally and more fundamentally, how individuals would
publicly engage with one another. That is, beyond shaking the foundations of political
science, this new political theory percolated into everyday attitudes, including how
people thought. “Quick assessments of specific facts, daily study of the shifting passions
of the multitude, momentary chances and the skill to grasp them—these are the things
that decide how affairs are dealt with in democratic societies.”288
If the simultaneous establishment of the world’s first mass democracy and the
codification of downright monarchical understandings of public and private power sound
conflicted, it’s because they are. However, the reasons for this paradoxical quality cannot
be understood as the product of a purely theoretical or practical debate. Both people’s
lived experiences in the years following the Declaration of Independence and the applied
negotiations that emerged out of debates over the Constitution contributed to this
paradoxical character. What makes the piecemeal political theory of the United States so
exceptional is not that it was purely republican, or democratic, or that it actually achieved
equality in either political or social form, but rather that it announced the ambition to do
so and gave Americans the means to attempt it. “The great privilege of the Americans,”
wrote Tocqueville, “is to make errors that can be corrected.”289
Part of the American effort to correct its errors is reflected in the conversational
turn. I detail nineteenth, twentieth, and (to a lesser extent) twenty-first century American
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expressions of this rhetorical endeavor in the subsequent chapters. In view of all this, it
becomes clearer why scholars’ tendency to limit the conversational dynamic to, on the
one hand, “metaphors for good reading or liberal democracy conversation” or, on the
other, an “ersatz” performance, is too narrow for explaining some of the most important
features of this publicly-oriented dynamic.290 Both practical and theoretical influences are
at work in the conversation turn and they do not involve the simple desire, as David
Simpson puts it, “to turn the country into a giant dinner party.”291 From the period
between the Revolution and the ratification of the Constitution a compound of causes led
to an increasing legal and philosophical emphasis on both equality and the individual. By
the nineteenth century, this compound hastened a cultural sea change in American
discourse away from oratory and toward conversation, a subject that I take up in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
MASS CULTURE: THE GOLDEN AGE OF ORATORY AND
THE AGE OF CONVERSATION
“We grudge, and cannot reconcile it to ourselves, that anyone should go about to cozen fortune
without the stamp of learning! We think because we are scholars there shall be no more cakes and
ale! We don’t know how to account for it, that barmaids should gossip, or ladies whisper, or
bullies roar, or fools laugh, or knaves thrive, without having gone through the same course of
select study that we have! This vanity is preposterous, and carries its own punishment with it.
Books are in a world in themselves, it is true; but they are not the only world.”
-William Hazlitt, “On the Conversation of Authors,” 1820

“In America during these same years conversation could never be contained in the salons of one
class…it proliferated through many levels of society in a democratic diversity of forms…the
public seemed especially keen to see the character of important personalities expressed ‘live’ in
the give-and-take of supposedly spontaneous conversation.”
-Peter Gibian, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Culture of Conversation, 2001

On July 13, 1859, New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley sat down for what he
describes as a “nearly two hours’ conversation” with Brigham Young, the President of
the Mormon Church.292 The interview took place in Salt Lake City and included “many
matters of public interest;” it was published verbatim in the Tribune on August 20, 1859.
Daniel Boorstin dubbed it the “first full-fledged modern journalism interview with a
public figure.”293
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At the time, the format was innovative enough that it drew national attention. It
was memorialized in an illustration on the cover of another nineteenth-century
innovation, Harper’s Weekly. (Other monthly magazines that would emerge during this
same period (1850s-1860s) include Putman’s and The Atlantic.)
Issues discussed in the interview included: the Mormon Church’s positions on
church doctrine, Slavery, whether Utah, if admitted to the Union, would be a Slave State,
and polygamy. In his introduction, the newspaperman Greeley explained the exchange as
having begun with “unimportant conversation on general topics.”294 He then requested to
“ask some question bearing directly” on “the doctrines and polity [organization] of the
Mormon Church.295
Already, one can see clear differences emerging between public and artful
conversation in the scenario described by Greeley, including whether it could be called
conversation at all. When conversation is defined as “talk without a purpose,” as Stephen
Miller does in his history of the art of conversation, an interview is clearly excluded.296
“An interview is not a conversation,” Miller emphatically states, since conversationalists
are enjoyed for “the pleasure they give, not the information they provide.”297 However,
Miller does allow for conversation to be “purposeful in the sense that those present are
trying to clarify an idea.”298 When, for example, on the topic of slavery Horace Greeley
asks, “Am I to infer that Utah, if admitted as a member of the Federal Union, will be a
294
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Slave State?” Brigham Young clarifies, “No; she will be a Free State…Utah is not
adapted to Slave Labor.”299 In this sense, the nineteenth-century invention of the
newspaper interview offers something altogether distinctive from a mere delivery of
information. Serving as an exemplary for much of the experiments in conversation that
would be famously developed in nineteenth-century United States, the Greeley-Young
interview captures the dynamic of compression, cultural mediation, cultural reform, and
discovery that would be so typical of the period.
This chapter outlines some of the cultural topographies that animated public
conversation in nineteenth-century United States. It is divided into three parts. In the first
section, I focus on society and politics, highlighting the ways in which conversation was
adapted with the help of government and in response to sweeping societal changes. In
section two, I give special attention to the newspaper and its contributions to the reading
public as explained, in part, by the transmission and ritual views of communication.
Section three works to unite some of the conceptual and methodological problems that
have kept women’s contributions in the nineteenth century isolated from rhetoric “in
general.” Taken together, I aim to show how the public conversational dynamic became
so entrenched in the nineteenth century as to become a permanent part of American
rhetorical culture.

I. On the Expanding Arenas for Conversation
The idea of a national conversation was developed in the nineteenth-century and
collectively embraced as a matter of common good made possible by technological
expansion. Although the ambition to engage in a collective conversation was not limited
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to the United States, it was arguably best achieved here. If, as Lawrence Stone argues,
“societies are profoundly affected by the way people think of themselves,” there could be
no doubt that Americans were fixated on becoming more equal and that conversation was
considered a means to get there.300 Following the promises laid down in the founding
documents of the Republic, conversation was adapted to make the cornerstone of
government more “sincere”—and further reaching. Daniel Walker Howe stresses how
much these establishing ideals would reverberate across all levels of mid nineteenthcentury society, saying: “The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all men had
an unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness. In practice, Americans defined this
pursuit not only in economic and political terms but also in moral and spiritual ones, and
in terms of manners and lifestyle.”301
In 1824, John Quincy Adams became the first president to refer to the American
government as a democracy in an inaugural address.302 Within the span of a few decades
(roughly 1820s to 1850s) public schools were created; literacy rates swelled; the Lyceum
and the public lecture movement emerged;303 refined and crude speaking styles mixed;304
access to cheap print materials multiplied;305 wide reading in the classics (which, despite
its abundant and far-reaching benefits, was arguably inconvenient by design)
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plummeted;306 and virtually “all coherent efforts to exclude people of ‘middling culture’
from public debate” were undermined.307 Women, meanwhile, no longer barred from the
public speaking platform, gradually stepped out of the drawing room and onto the
rostrum.308
New arenas for verbal exchanges—not just among, but between communities—
also dotted the landscape. “In every sizable city, dozens of business establishments
beckoned customers with the promise of conversation, a meal, a cup of coffee or pint of
rum, lodging, books, magazines—and newspapers,” writes Charles Steffen.309 Boarding
houses, reading rooms, medical offices, literary societies, steamboats, train cars,
conversation clubs, and informal civic societies all invited spontaneous, unstructured
talk.310 From elite salons to working-class saloons, Americans everywhere developed
what Peter Gibian describes as “a fascination with new venues for conversational
exchange that might test the boundaries of public and private life.”311 Echoing this
invitation for new conversational arenas, the historian Katherine Greer refers to the mid-
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nineteenth-century America as “a world full of parlors” in which new ways of showing
oneself in both private and public forms could be developed.312
Equally important, and intertwined with the rise of a reading and conversant
public, organized opportunities for live speech multiplied during this same period.
According to Tom Wright (and in contrast to Walter Ong’s account of print-based
cultures), orality during the nineteenth century could best be described as “resurgent”
rather than “residual.” 313 New textual forms of the “talking mind” expressed in print
were “called in to reinforce, not replace, the spoken word,” says Wright.314 For example,
the same circuit riders that preached salvation laid the groundwork for the reform
movements that would define the era. The period of religious revival known as the
Second Great Awakening, which had its heyday from 1820 to 1840, subsisted on camp
meetings and “circuit riders” skilled in generating emotional responses through live talk.
Both literacy and church membership soared. The message preached was also more
democratic than previous denominations: unlike the Puritans’ and Calvinists’ belief in
predestination, the Methodists and Baptists sermonized that all races and people were
eligible for salvation, regardless of circumstance at birth. Like the first Great Awakening,
one of the side effects of the revivalist movement was an expansion of political
consciousness within the lower reaches of society.315
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Although it was designed to benefit all and offend no one, the Lyceum movement
of adult education (which lasted roughly as long as the revival period), generated a
similar fervor. “It has been discovered,” marveled one Boston reporter “that the two
objects of entertainment and improvement may be united in one pursuit.”316 Considered
by many to be a ritual of citizenship, the public lecture circuit originated by the Lyceum
emphasized useful knowledge. Expertise and experiences were compressed and
dramatized by noted preachers, scholars, explorers, humorists, and scientists—almost all
white men—together with runaway slaves, Native Americans, and, on occasion,
women.317
After the Lyceum movement of adult education gradually morphed into a more
overt form of popular entertainment in the mid nineteenth century, the performances of
talk, although less frequent, became even more organized and more lucrative. Peter
Cherches refers to the “star courses” of the mid-century as a form of early network
broadcasting.318 The Chautauqua movement, meanwhile, integrated not just Lyceumstyle popular lectures into its curriculum, but also question-and answer sessions (now a
staple of public talks) and attendant performances of “conversations.”319
Not all of the dialogic exchanges of the period were this structured. Volatile
modes of expression were far from uniform, both in character and in purpose. To give
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one example, although commonly referred to as a national characteristic, the ethic of selfimprovement—the driving force of the Lyceum movement—was not uniformly
embraced. In fact, the aspiration for self-development was attacked from above and
below. Where Providence lyceum-goers in 1842 earnestly debated the question, “Who
are recognized in the Constitution of the United States by the expression, ‘the people,’”
others openly mocked the “peripatetic gentry” who roamed the country “with superficial
essays written out of encyclopedias.”320 Daniel Walker Howe’s description of the 1840s
minstrel shows, which lampooned the “pretentious” free Negro, dramatized contempt for
a range of stations, not just the newly free: “the learned professions and learning in
general, the newly rich, European high culture, abolitionism, evangelical reform, and
women’s rights” were all the objects of scorn.321
Unlike the ideal model of conversation in a harmonious, static, and “polite
society,” in this nineteenth-century dynamic “a host of singular speakers” were usually
“very much aware of inequalities.”322 In fact, according to Gibian, “what the mid-century
outpouring of dialogic speech suggests, most basically, is that in this period the cultural
vision on any issue could not be summed up in a single voice.”323 Carolyn Porter
highlights this view: “Women, Afro- Americans, and working people all participated in
the national conversation,” she writes.324 Indeed, in the same way that the “age of
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reading” was not limited to a single class, the “age of conversation” was not limited to a
singular aim or a class; it multiplied and expanded in unexpected directions.
“Not all mid-century talk took the form of parlor pretension, and not all midcentury talk groups were simply insulated bastions for a threatened social elite or
conservative fortresses defending against the rise of new discourses or new ideas,”
reminds Gibian.325 In the place of unmitigated parlor pretension, there was a response to
the very fragile common ground of the period, perhaps, he suggests, best typified in the
fictive “breakfast-table essays” of Oliver Wendell Holmes. In contrast to the French
salons’ “art of turning things aside,” Holmes’ essays (which appeared as a running
column in the Atlantic Monthly beginning with its first issue in 1857) dramatized, rather
than eschewed interruptions, thereby highlighting each “changing of the voice.”326
Reflecting the anxiety of the times, Holmes’ fictional essays at once hail and question
whether conversational pleasure and its purported unifying bonds can withstand the
problems of the day.
Although these layers and networks all contributed to a so-called “national
conversation,” they are more often critiqued for what they did not do (i.e., replace the
benefits of a classical education and encourage true conversation or reasoned debate) than
for what they did do (i.e., expand the number of participants and create a basis for
common rituals).327 This signals a main difference between American contributions to
conversational theories and practices and everything that preceded it.
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Conventionally, programmatic approaches to conversation are said to flourish
when political oratory has failed. Frank Lovett highlights this adaptive quality of
conversation in what he calls the “politics of the second best.”328 (When considering the
Renaissance courtier, for example, Lovett notes, that, “given the choice between trying to
make one’s master a better person” (through the indirect art of conversation) “and not
having a master at all…surely one would not opt for the former unless the latter was
unavailable. Castiglione’s program must always therefore represent something of a
‘politics of the second best,’ so to speak—a pragmatic response to tragically diminished
opportunities for civic participation.”329)
However, in the case of the United States, conversation was not developed as a
replacement for oratory but in conjunction with it. What Barnett Baskerville identifies as
“the Golden Age of Oratory” (1820s-1850s) and what Peter Gibian crowns “the Age of
Conversation” (1830s-1850s) existed side-by-side.330 “Just as oratory was peaking as a
mass phenomenon,” writes Gibian, “the more private art of conversation—a speech form
related to oratory but in some ways its complement—was enjoying a rebirth of its own,
subtly expanding the range of the voluble native tongue as it too became a popular craze
and national obsession.”331 However, in contrast to the twentieth century (which would
solidify the merging of oratory and conversation into public conversational rhetoric as the
dominant paradigm for all of rhetoric), styles in antebellum American rhetoric were not
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automatically subsumed under the banner of the “conversational style” or “frame.” In
formal address, the conversational style was still an exception rather than the rule.
While someone like Frederick Douglass (who, among other things, was venerated
as perhaps “the only African American to become a national lyceum celebrity”) was
praised for his “wit,” “naturalness,” “conversational style,” and seemingly “impromptu”
delivery, his speeches and lectures flourished in tandem with oratory that could only be
described as its opposite (in which Douglass was also notably adept).332 The “orotund,”
“majestic,” “grand style” of speakers such as Daniel Webster and Edward Everett was a
kind that would last for hours and be arranged for days. 333 These speeches were written
with great care and treated as works of art. Brimming with references to literature,
history, and a heroic past, they were chiefly written to “inspire veneration for American
heroes and institutions, to celebrate American values and virtues…and to herald a
glorious national future.”334
On the face of it, the two styles of oratory and conversation that flourished during
this period could not be more different. However, when viewed as a unit it is clear they
oscillate back and forth between the aims of individual decision and shared
understanding. If Wendy Sharer is right to suggest that historians of rhetoric have unduly
privileged oratory as a site of individual action to the exclusion of more diffuse,
collective ones, then it may help explain why the conversational turn, a slow-moving,
cumulative influence, has been so overlooked by historians of rhetoric, despite its
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reliance on the individual and its recognized use and popularity as a public dynamic.335
Margaret Fuller’s varied explorations of conversation (which I detail later in this chapter)
illustrate how proliferation and varieties of conversational iterations can actually work to
impede scholarship, which tends to isolate, rather than expand upon, topics. Recognizing
this tendency, David Simpson calls for “a renewal of attention to the general…by
showing the historicality of our compulsive attention to particularities.”336 This chapter
addresses this methodological problem by casting a wide net of nineteenth century
“conversational” experiments (both real and ersatz) in the United States.

On the Methods and Roles of Public Conversation
The early to mid nineteenth-century was a period when, for the first time in the
United States, a diversity of ideas and goods were exchanged on a national scale. In some
ways, this is precisely what the founding generation had anticipated. However
contradictory, discrete, or (as the Federalist argument for sovereignty would have it)
individual in its practice, the maintenance of the ideals espoused in the Constitution and
the Declaration were never solely a matter of personal preference or private concern. In
democratic and republican politics, individual cultivation is always a public issue. George
Washington’s Farewell Address of 1796 had already drawn a parallel between “the
construction of individual character and the construction of the commonwealth.”
Washington emphasized a coherence of purpose among individual happiness, nation335
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building, civic education, and a rising above regional and factional differences. He urged
Congress to consider citizenship—both individual and collective—as a necessary
ingredient for the republic, saying, “It is of infinite moment that you should properly
estimate the immense value of your national union to your collective and individual
happiness.”337
In keeping with the entirely new theory of democratic republicanism that debates
over the Constitution had generated, the idea that individual cultivation was just as much
a public issue as a private one became apparent almost as soon as the implications of
“We, the people” were introduced.338 When a nation is founded on a will of the people
that exists prior to and independent of government, then a question that immediately
follows is how “public will” will be formed, consolidated, and, finally, rendered visible.
This is a question that came into view in the nineteenth century and still persists today.
Although it was not until the twentieth century that its implications were fully felt,
the beginnings of what some have dubbed a “national conversation” began in earnest the
century before.339 For reasons that I show in this chapter, this reliance on conversation
would prove both a problem and a cure in the quest to inform and identify a unified “will
of the people.” Moreover, while I am reluctant to use the term “national conversation” at
all, its usage need not suggest a cohesive or resolved transformation. Rather, taking up
what Dorothy C. Broaddus describes as a “schizophrenic model of America,” I aim to
show how, through a series of conversational situations and strategies, conversation was
337
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adopted in the service of competing (and at times even contradictory) ends.340 As I
showed earlier in this study (Chapter Two), these competing ends or “poles” of
conversation would exist even if the subject of this study were not “public” conversation
but rather something like artful conversation or philosophical dialogues.
However, its publicness does give it a unique character. In her tremendous history
on the French salons, Benedetta Craveri suggests that while the ideal of conversation as a
form of transcendence goes back to “the very origins of Western civilization,” its public
prominence as an openly sought after ideal typically arises when political oratory and
eloquence have failed.341 Although Randall (2018) takes the opposite tack in his recent
study, arguing that conversation supplanted rather than reinforced oratory, the
outcomes—changed characteristics of conversation in light of changed roles—are
essentially the same. Although classically defined for its lack of utilitarian motives,
conversation may be publically called upon in times when advantage is precisely the
objective. Even before considering particular iterations of conversation, the dynamic may
thus already be altered. The difference here is primarily one of expectation. For example,
as a dynamic adapted to make the founding documents more “sincere,” one can hardly
expect that conversation, tailored in this scenario to educate, reform, and unite the
citizenry, would live up to the highest ideals of human experience. In the same way, as a
strategy for rhetorical advantage, one could expect to find as many uses (and misuses) in
conversation than may have existed in oratory. The conversational dynamic, in other
340
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words, is neither as unobjectionable nor as ineffective as contemporary commentaries
have made it out to be.
And yet the dynamic continues to be studied as if it has no role other than artful
conversation or deliberative reasoning and thus can simply be brought to scale. This is
problematic, both for our understanding of the dynamic and for any public conversational
practices that may yet flourish. As suggested in conversational handbooks and theories,
expecting too much from conversation actually may destroy whatever promise there is for
conversation. A too stubborn desire to say something clever, a fear of giving offense,
holding on to one topic and not letting it go, dreary earnestness, defensiveness, overpreparedness, too much asperity, an excess preoccupation with commerce, telling people
what to think, and making a toil of pleasure are just few of the many ways the “magnetic
experiment” of conversation can fail: in its truest form, conversation (not unlike a joke) is
a high-risk, high-reward endeavor.342 In his study on style and vision in nineteenthcentury American literature, Lawrence Buell suggests conversation had a “special
mystique” precisely because of its spontaneous nature: “As the least studied form of
expression, it approached most closely the ideal of continuous inspiration.”343
Conversation’s reliance on “perpetual discovery” and “improvisation” suggests
two reasons why, as an art, there are so many ways conversation can fail and why,
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despite its “universal availability” and ubiquity, conversation is so hard to do well.344
Transcendentalist Amos Bronson Alcott (who publicly announced his aim to master the
genre) was one of many devotees to observe, “there is nothing rarer than great
conversation.”345 This emphasis on improvisation is further complicated when
conversation is formalized in public programming and attempted on a large scale.
Obviously, a “professional conversation,” which emerged somewhat rapaciously in the
nineteenth-century United States, “is naturally apt to be more patterned than those in
which there is no coordinator.”346 In other words, to the extent that a conversation is
prepared, managed, and publicly administered, the versatile and unfettered nature of the
medium (which theorists consistently identify as two of conversation’s signature
qualities) are already compromised.
Too often scholars have taken this fact and attempted to catch conversation in the
act of failing. That is, in their efforts to “place” conversation in a category once and for
all, they fail to see to what situations publicly adapted models of conversation are
responding. Kenneth Burke’s Philosophy of Literary Form offers an apt example. If one
were to catch someone reading a book on success and say, “Aha! But you’re not actually
doing what the book says; you’re merely reading it,” that would be to miss the symbolism
laden in that action:
The reading of a book on the attaining of success is in itself the symbolic attaining
of the success. It is while they read that these readers are “succeeding.” I’ll wager that,
344
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in by far the great majority of cases, such readers make no serious attempt to apply the
book’s recipes. The lure of the book resides in the fact that the reader, while reading it, is
then living in the aura of success. What he wants is easy success; and he gets it in
symbolic form by the mere reading itself. To attempt applying such stuff in real life
would be very difficult, full of many disillusioning difficulties.347
Nineteenth-century studies of American iterations of conversation (most of which
would be technically characterized as “ersatz,” to use Stephen Miller’s term) are often
prematurely “split” from artful models of conversation. While useful for bolstering the
definition of “true” conversation (which the nineteenth-century practices worked
tirelessly to blur), this approach fails to account for what people were really doing with
language, regardless of classification. “You can’t properly put Marie Corelli and
Shakespeare apart until you have first put them together,” writes Burke. “First genus,
then differentia. The strategy in common is the genus. The range or scale or spectrum of
particularlizations is the differentia.”348 Following Burke’s insight, this study (and this
chapter in particular) builds on, extends, and elaborates the conversational categories and
performances that nineteenth-century studies and histories have already identified.
Michael Sproule hints at this need to build upon histories in what he calls “the Big
Problem” in American rhetorical history.349 According to Sproule, there is still a need
among theoreticians, teachers, and historians alike to better understand “the still murky
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linkages between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.”350 The Big Problem for our
understanding of rhetorical history, in other words, stems from too much “splitting” and
not enough “lumping.” In view of all this, the disjointedness of styles that was visibly
introduced in the nineteenth century (and still remains with us today) must be understood
as an overall trend in the history of rhetoric rather than a series of wholly unrelated
expressions.
Kenneth Cmiel usefully explains how Americans’ tendency to interchange
different styles in a single rhetorical situation developed in the nineteenth century. As
part of his superb contribution to the early movement in the 1980s and 1990s to fill in the
“black hole” of this period of rhetorical history, Cmiel details how “middling styles
encouraged people to shift back and forth across linguistic registers.”351 More
specifically, in his chapter on “Democratic Idiom” he depicts the sometimes jarring mix
of styles Americans used side-by-side: “Speakers might shift from the formal to the
folksy as the situation demanded or they might merge refined and unrefined behavior in a
single moment.”352
Although Cmiel’s study does not focus on conversation directly, he is keenly
aware of the interrelationship between style and the expectations for speaker and
audience. “Increased education, combined with democratic sentiment, smashed
neoclassical canons of speaker and audience,” he writes. “No longer could refined
arbiters presume deference; no longer would the elite set the tone. In a democratic
350
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culture, all would contribute.”353 This principle of participation would complicate the
thesis advanced by numerous historians, that “rhetoric in general” reflects a “prized way
of life.”354 While Baskerville is correct to say oratory is “more than a study of influence,”
this principle of participation (even if it were only to stay at the level of an ideal) enlarges
the pool of potential orators to such an extent that it renders the speaker practically
indistinguishable from citizen. In nineteenth century United States, what this meant is not
that the orator—distinguished for reflecting (and advancing) a prized way of life—did not
exist, but rather that he existed alongside another, equally forceful, ideal: that he was but
one among many (i.e., that “all would contribute”).
For a myriad reasons, the contours of which I begin to outline in this chapter,
various forms of conversation were taken up—formally and informally, in print and faceto-face, between friends and among strangers, in small neighborhood microcosms and at
massive, public gatherings in antebellum United States. Although the practice of these
staged conversational gatherings remains an American staple today (and, indeed, a
central component of mass entertainment throughout much of the globe), scholars of
rhetoric have given surprisingly little attention to exploring their nineteenth century
democratic beginnings or to understanding its appeal beyond the blanket concepts of
education, entertainment, and conversation’s commodification as a “salable package.”355
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II. Two Theories: The Transmission and Ritual Views of Communication
Enduring appeals to conversation symbolize an effort to reconcile what James
Carey has identified as two positions—the “transmission view of communication” and
“the ritual view of communication”—that are continually goaded by the mass democratic
experiment we call the United States. These views are especially prominent in relation to
the newspaper, although they can be seen elsewhere. The transmission view of
communication is “defined by terms such as ‘imparting,’ ‘sending,’ ‘transmitting,’ or
‘giving information to others.’ It is formed from the metaphor of geography or
transportation,” writes Carey.356 Nineteenth century advances in transportation figured
heavily in this view. Indeed, what historians call the “transportation revolution”—which
“telescoped” centuries of gradual changes into a single generation—dramatically reduced
shipping costs, opened up new markets, and, as David Walker Howe puts it, essentially
overthrew “the tyranny of distance.”357 Although it was the Great Migration westward
that created new markets to reach in the first place, it was new technologies that made it
possible. According to Walker Howe, “during the thirty-three years that began in 1815,
there would be greater strides in improving communication than had taken place in all
previous centuries. This revolution, with its attendant political and economic
consequences, would be a driving force in the history of the era.”358
The first commercially successful steamboat (1807) allowed vessels to travel
upstream and against the current. The completion of the Erie Canal (1825) and
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subsequent canals and waterways facilitated the shipment of goods from ports of entry
inland. And the National Road (1811), the first federally funded road that was only ever
partially completed, connected Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana,
and Illinois. However, it was above all the invention of the telegraph (1844) that eclipsed
the tyranny of distance, in essence ending “the identity” but not destroying “the
metaphor” of transportation and communication: “Although messages might be centrally
produced and controlled, through monopolization of writing or the rapid production of
print,” before the invention of the telegraph, “these messages, carried in the hands of a
messenger or between the binding of a book, still had to be distributed.”359
Nineteenth-century advances in transportation and manufacturing impacted the
social realm too. In addition to improving daily living—purchasing basic household items
like clothing and furniture suddenly became possible for most Americans—it also meant
that people were no longer doing business only with people they knew.360 Not unlike the
European Renaissance (and its attendant social disruptions) discussed in Chapter Two,
the market, transportation, and communication revolutions of nineteenth-century America
brought together strangers in ways previously unknown.361 As Adam Tuchinksy puts the
slow reordering of social relationships leading up to the Civil War period: “Capital and
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labor, once wedded to one another in an intimate and nearly familial condition, were now
linked by the indifference and anonymity of cash, contract, and commodity.”362
It was not simply advances in distribution methods and the indifference of
commodity that changed social dynamics, but also a reduction in the costs of materials
themselves. As early as the 1820s the United States had more newspapers and newspaper
readers than any other country. According to the most comprehensive book on the
subject, Frank Luther Molt’s American Journalism: A History of Newspapers Through
250 Years, 1690-1940, there were three times as many newspapers in the United States in
1833 as England or France. By 1860 this proportion was even greater.363 It was not just
newspapers, however, that defined the American cultural landscape of this period, but
print material more generally. By the 1840s the United States boasted the largest literate
public of any nation in world history.364
The effects of a reading public were visible across the social spectrum. “Many
farmers and mechanics found time to read; even some factory operatives did,” writes
Walker Howe. “It helped that people spent more time indoors, where whale oil and gas
lamps shed more light than candles had. The mass production of eyeglasses, beginning in
the 1830s, certainly helped. Those riding the newly built trains loved to read. Families
often read aloud to each other, sitting around the fireplaces, so even family members who
could not read for themselves gained exposure to the printed word.”365 First-hand
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accounts of the period also bear this out. In his 1826 Phi Beta Kappa Address at Harvard,
for example, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story characterized the age as one in which
learning radiated “from all directions,” and particularly from the middle class of society.
“One of the most striking characteristics of our age, which has worked deepest in all the
changes of its fortunes and pursuits, is the general diffusion of knowledge. This is
emphatically the age of reading.”366
Impacting not just who had access to reading materials but also the expectations
with which readers would approach them, the proliferation of newspapers and other
prints materials did not simply expand audience reach but actually stimulated new
attitudes and habits. Technological developments such as the steam-powered cylinder
rotary press dramatically increased the output of print materials, transforming American
publishing and making possible the mass production of disposable (i.e., daily)
newspapers. The subscription delivery method, which posed a much higher barrier for
popular use, was replaced with the daily newspaper, which became conspicuous—
literally—as a physical presence in cities. Newspapers were everywhere in antebellum
America. A Philadelphia Public Ledger column of March 25, 1836 reported: “These
papers are to be found in every street, lane, and alley; in every hotel, tavern, countinghouse, shop, etc. Almost every porter and drag-man, while not engaged in his occupation,
may be seen with a paper in his hands.”367
The abundance of actual, physical newspapers could not be overestimated in its
influence. “This constituted a great societal change,” says the communication scholar and
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media historian Michael Schudson. “The dragman with a newspaper in his hands was a
far more important social and political unit than he had been in the days when his
information came down to him from the mercantile and educated classes.”368 The
consequences of this immediate access were at least two-fold. Not only did this
correspond with a period of democratization and longer-term campaigns for reform (just
as newspapers were also enlisted to oppose these reforms), it also impacted the
immediate expectations of newspaper readers.
Where previously readers approached printed material as a “precious objects,”
they soon began to regard them as “more ephemeral.”369 Reading became broader and
more diffuse. The shift from scarcity to abundance, from sacred texts to penny papers
reduced the intensity with which readers approached reading material and “encouraged
reading as a diversion.”370 Spectacle as entertainment featured prominently in the
nineteenth century. Whether in live performances or print, producers and audiences alike
relied on what theater historian Amy Hughes identifies as the relational qualities of scale,
intensity, and excess as way to gauge and influence viewing habits. “Sensational scenes
appeared not only on stage but also in other media. Books, newspapers, and illustrations
frequently harnessed the scale, intensity, and excess of spectacle. These assorted texts
and objects promoted viewing habits—tactics of seeing—that influenced how Americans
consumed and experienced the world,” writes Hughes.371 Certainly this theatrical quality
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seeped into newspapers. Schudson argues, for example, that newspapers, like everything
else, adjusted their content as a result of changing societal demands: “newspapers for the
uneducated dragman and porters must necessarily be different from those prepared for the
rich merchants. They had to be more direct and more sensational. They required the spice
of wit, or (as in the case of the police reports) the cayenne of a rather brutal comedy.”372
The changes in nineteenth-century audience expectations that Hughes and
Schudson describe are more in keeping with Carey’s “ritual view of communication”
than a blanket appeal to democratic education first might suggest. “Under a ritual view,”
writes Carey, “news is not information but drama. It does not describe the world but
portrays an arena of dramatic forces and action.”373 In contrast to the transmission view
of communication, which “dominates” American culture, the ritual view is only “a minor
thread in our national thought.”374 Both views are important to this study, however,
because together they offer a range in which the conversational turn might be expressed.
“If the archetypal case of communication under a transmission view is the extension of
messages across geography for the purpose of control, the archetypal case under a ritual
view is the sacred ceremony that draws persons together in fellowship and
commonality.”375
Put simply, any general search for markers of “public opinion” or “public will”
will always exceed the transmission view of communication. Something beyond
transmission is needed to account for the social backdrop in which public opinion is
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shaped. Together the ritual view of communication and the transmission view of
communication, although separately insufficient for explaining the conversational turn,
highlight why the demands of mid-nineteenth century communication exceeded the
boundaries of either deliberative rhetoric or artful conversation.

Cultural Mediation and the Newspaper
In his famous study, Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann points to some of the
challenges presented by the American information system, and in particular the
newspaper. Among of difficulties of democracy, he was astonished by how little progress
(or even attention) political scientists gave to the question of how the will of a public
would form before (and after) the proliferation of the newspaper. He writes: “The idea
that men have to go forth to study the world in order to govern it, has played a very minor
part in political thought. It could figure very little, because the machinery for reporting
the world in any way useful to government made comparatively little progress from the
time of Aristotle to the age in which the premises of democracy were established.”376
After freedom of the press was introduced in the First Amendment as an instrument for
democratic government, the question of public will was not solved, but rather obscured.
On one hand, freedom of the press guaranteed civil liberties, which are of “fundamental
importance” to a democracy since men are not likely to discover truth if they cannot
speak it. 377 On the other, freedom of the press did not—because it could not— provide a
means to decipher or secure truth.
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An undue burden to secure this truth was thus placed on the newspapers, says
Lippman, since the detection and transmission of public opinion rested on the assumption
that “the press should do spontaneously for us what primitive democracy imagined each
of us could do spontaneously for himself.”378 In other words, having the civic freedom to
print or speak openly was not, in itself, a guarantee that citizens could assemble a true
picture of the world. The civil liberty of a free press, while fundamental, could not satisfy
the question of how truth about distant or complex matters is discovered in the first place.
According to Lippmann, the unwarranted confidence in truth without effort
mistakenly assumes “either that truth is spontaneous, or that the means of securing truth
exist when there is no external interference.” This directness, however, is not possible for
abstract concepts like “political fictions” and “imagined communities.”379 “When you are
dealing with an invisible environment,” he writes, “the assumption is false. The truth
about distant or complex matters is not self-evident, and the machinery for assembling
information is technical and expensive.”380 Although to make his point Lippmann
overstates how easily the ancients uncovered truth (for more on this, see, for example,
Carolyn “Should We Name the Tools?”), his emphasis on Americans’ insistence that
news be free (or the closest thing to it) still resonates today. “Nobody thinks for a
moment he ought to pay for his newspaper. He expects the fountain of truth to bubble,
but he enters into no contract, legal or moral, involving any risk, cost, or trouble to
himself.”381
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Just as Lippmann is concerned with the search, discovery, and dissemination of
intellectual capital necessary to depict a “true picture” of the world, Americans of the
nineteenth century encountered both this and an analogous cultural dilemma: “How was
this continental nation to be held together, to function effectively, to avoid declension
into faction or tyranny or chaos? How were we, to use a phrase of that day, ‘to cement the
union?’”382 This was a time, in other words, when the societal and political demands of
the union pulled in opposite directions. On the one hand, there was the desire to educate
voting citizens to be able to reason, discern, and construct a “true picture” of the outer
world. At the same time, the cultural need for unity placed an emphasis on shared
experience and commonality.
Anticipating the challenge of educating democratic audiences that scholars would
endlessly explore,383 George Washington was already aware of the need called for formal
and informal means of bolstering “public opinion.” In his 1796 Farewell Address, he
urged the promotion of “the general diffusion of knowledge” saying, “in proportion as the
structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion
should be enlightened.”384 Americans certainly took this charge to promote the general
diffusion of knowledge seriously, both as a matter of individual interest and collective
will. In contrast to the public sphere Habermas conceived as independent from
government, a key means for disseminating knowledge (i.e., mail) was integral to it.
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Article I Section 8 of the Constitution gave Congress the power to establish Post Offices
and post roads, while the U.S. Postal Service Act of 1792, which was signed by George
Washington, created the United States Postal Department and offered substantial
subsidies for newspapers. At the time, newspapers comprised the bulk of mail deliveries.
However, the legislation also presented unanticipated consequences. “While the
authors of the act wanted to encourage the development of the press,” writes the historian
Charles Steffen, “they could not have foreseen how this exemption would transform
newspaper offices from private businesses into public arenas.” 385 In addition to reduced
prices for newspapers deliveries, the Postal Service Act allowed editors to exchange their
own newspapers at no cost.
The combination of these two subsidies had a profound effect on the influence
and reach of the newspaper industry. People flocked to newspaper offices to have a peek
at the flood of newspapers arriving daily from across the country. A central newspaper
office from Washington, D.C., the Daily National Intelligencer, was receiving close to
one hundred papers a day.386 “Our universal relish for newspaper reading” is so
insatiable, remarked a Boston Daily Advertiser columnist in 1814, “that it has given rise
to a general and habitual form of salutation on the meeting of friends and strangers:
What’s the news?”387 The newspaper, with all its strengths and limitations, created the
means for a national conversation hovering somewhere between a metaphor and a
practice.
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III. Bringing Women’s Rhetoric into the Realm of Rhetoric In General
Like the newspaper, rhetoric in general took on a greater and greater mixture of
roles. However, most feminist histories have not taken this into account. This has added
another murky layer to the conversational turn. As discussed in an earlier chapter
(Chapter 2), in the classical period, to speak of “rhetoric” was primarily (though not
exclusively) to speak of oratory and its three species: judicial, deliberative, and
epideictic. However, over time, as conversation and print began to dominate, the meaning
of rhetoric also changed. Recent histories of women’s rhetorical theories and practices
(many of which are still being recovered) have contributed to our understanding of the
transition to a more conversationally oriented rhetoric. 388 However, in contrast to this
study, which highlights the extent to which the dynamic of conversation became the
preferred model in all of rhetoric, these histories tend to approach conversation as mode
developed for women qua women, or, alternatively, as a resourceful (though not
necessarily ideal) method of conciliatory resistance for the bold few who dared to engage
promiscuous audiences.389 Of course, there are good reasons to emphasize the separation
between men and women. Of all practices, rhetoric is notorious for having excluded
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women as a matter of theory, education, and practice. In the United States, women were
barred from the public speaking platform until the 1830s; at the federal level they were
also denied the most fundamental part of democracy—the vote—until nearly a century
after that. Nevertheless, to speak of women’s contributions as belonging only to women
overlooks the fact that they weren’t just creating their own tradition but actively shaping
rhetoric in general.
More to the point, while useful for filling in the gaps, overly gendered treatments
of the era have tended to obscure both the conversational dynamic and women’s
contributions to it. Although feminist histories have made considerable inroads into
rectifying the almost total negligence of women’s contributions to rhetorical theory in the
canon, they have done so largely by relying on two separate lines of inquiry: women’s
rhetoric (conversation) vs. rhetoric in general (oratory).390 Jane Donawerth, for example,
importantly argues that women in the United States and England developed theories of
rhetoric centered on conversation, rather than public speaking. She defines conversation
as encompassing “small-group communication, from any private, informal verbal
communication, to artful dialogue used in informal leisure and social activities.”391
According to Donawerth, only after the rise of conversation as a model for composition
pedagogy did this women’s tradition disappear.392 However, in making this argument
about “the rise and fall” of a women’s tradition and confining it neatly within one setting
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(i.e., apart from oratory and apart from men), she misses the important influence of
conversation, not just on composition pedagogy, but on rhetoric in general. Indeed, in the
final sentence of her book, Donawerth concludes: “While there is not a direct link from
the women’s tradition of rhetoric to these examples of contemporary composition
pedagogy, nevertheless, we can yet learn something about our own teaching practices
from a tradition that taught women how to enter the conversation.”393
The point I wish to make here does not turn on whether or not any one historian
gets the forecast right, but rather how, taken together, these histories might influence our
broad view of conversation’s role in public life. I submit that the consistent segregation
of the two modes suggests the gap between oratory and conversation was widening (or at
last remaining steady) when in fact the two genres were closing in on each other. “In a
sense,” says Christina Zwarg, “American feminist critics no less than conventional critics
have depended upon two traditions to make their case: one masculine and self-obsessed
and one feminine, subversive, and polyphonic.”394 This effort “to keep certain intellectual
and cultural projects worlds apart” has come at the expense of our understanding of
hybrid genres, of which the public conversational dynamic is certainly one. I would also
argue that this over-reliance on two traditions blinds us to the lasting impact of hybrid
thinkers, such as Margaret Fuller, who gain their force not from choosing to be “either
public or private” but from deliberating mixing perspectives in a manner that extends
beyond the public/private divide and into a realm that is neither wholly individual nor
wholly collective.
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In her study on delivery in the nineteenth century, Lindal Buchanan theorizes this
as an unrecognized category—collaboration—that pervades the rhetorical products of this
era. She defines collaboration as “a cooperative endeavor involving two or more people
that results in a rhetorical product, performance, or event.”395 Although what Buchanan is
describing is specifically related to the collaborative efforts that make delivery possible in
antebellum women rhetors, her definition applies to the broader conversational
experiments of the period.
If we think back to the Greeley-Young interview, it becomes clearer how the
format depends on mutual cooperation (which is not to say agreement). Greeley traveled
to a far-flung Western territory—Utah was not even a state at the time—to shed light on
questions of public concern. By doing so, he also provided Young with an opportunity to
clarify, explain, and defend the doctrine of the Latter-Day Saints. What resulted from the
exchange depended as much on Young as it did on Greeley. A colleague of Greeley’s at
the New York Tribune, Maragret Fuller, spent her life’s work developing and theorizing
these promises of conversation, which is where we now turn.

The Conversational Ranges of Margaret Fuller
Fuller’s explorations of conversation were so varied that, although pioneering
independently and as a collective, they exceeded the boundaries of any single iteration—
male or female—public or private—written or spoken—monologic or dialogic—literal
or metaphorical. Straddling both sides of the debate over the fundamental goals of
conversation (engaged chiefly between Fuller, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ralph Waldo
395
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Emerson, William Hazlitt, and Bronson Alcott), Fuller divided her explorations of
conversation “between an anti-interruptive oral practice oriented to the development of a
single voice” and her “ground-breaking work in written dialogue that was crucially
founded upon multivocality and interruption.”396 Robert Hudspeth describes her as
“virtually at the head” of the urban frame of reference of conversation. Although she
began her career as a “bookish young writer,” she “matured into a sophisticated analyst
of her contemporary world,” using conversation as a frame of self in “involvement with
and reaction to others.” 397
For five years, Fuller was a professional conversationalist. At the Boston
Conversations for Women (1839-1844), local reform elites paid a significant amount (ten
dollars) to participate in a thirteen-class format that was designed to help women “see
their own conversation not as decorative but as critical and consequential.”398 About 30
persons usually attended each session. Although most of the conversations were
exclusively for women, some of the meetings were mixed: altogether more than 100
people, most of them women, participated in the conversations.399 In a letter to Sophia
Ripley, Fuller articulated why she thought conversation, both as an art and an impetus for
action, was appropriate for her audience of elite, urban women: she wanted to “ascertain
what pursuits are best suited” to women in “our time and state of society, and how we
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may make best use of our means for building up the life of thought upon the life of
action.”400 As a type of pedagogy akin to the Socratic method, the conversations were
meant to be a “drawing out” of the pupil by a combination of induction and response.401
For Fuller, “reform came not through sudden conversions to absolute moral truths—the
perfectionist method of both evangelical and abolitionists—but through introspection,
self-criticism, and ‘conversation’ directed at interjecting a new rigor and creativity into
women’s culture.” 402 If Lawrence Buell is correct, Fuller succeeded in her pursuit. He
identifies Fuller’s Conversations for Women as one of three instances of Transcendental
conversation that had the most impact.403
During this period Fuller was also an editor for America’s first avant-garde
intellectual journal, The Dial, which was modeled on conversation as a philosophical
ideal. The Boston-based journal, which served as an incubator for both Fuller and Ralph
Waldo Emerson’s public careers, “eschewed academic affiliation, disregarded
commercial demands, promoted experimental writing, offended middle-brow tastes, and
critically engaged the major reform ideas of its time.”404 In an 1839 letter to Margaret
Fuller, Amos Bronson Alcott conveyed his vision for putting American intellectual
conversation on the map by equating it to making a private conversation public: “before
long a journal will be circulating the thoughts which are now talked about in private
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circles.”405 However, not unlike the rhetoric of the French salons’ retreat from the
“tyranny of popular tastes,” the exclusive sensibilities of the magazine were almost
immediately criticized for championing an “older, antidemocratic ideal of aristocratic
enlightenment.”406 The journal, despite its reform agenda and historic and cultural
significance, soon dimmed in a “cultural vacuum.”407 Charles Capper put it this way,
“never before had an American periodical enveloped itself in a mist so inwardly turned
yet democratically open-air.”408
Correspondence between Fuller and Emerson reveals during her editorship at the
Dial that she “wished to be more catholic, more open-minded and democratic than she
was, not less.” As Ann Douglas reports the exchange, “she told Emerson at one point
that when he had criticized her for welcoming ‘talent’ and not holding out for ‘genius,’
she had been flattered.”409 Following the Boston Conversations for Women and her
editorship at the Dial, Fuller would continue to adapt her experiments with conversation,
moving to New York to join what would become the most widely read and most widely
circulated periodical in the country, the New-York Tribune. From December 1844 to
August 1846 Fuller served as the literary editor of the Tribune and the paper’s only
female staffer. Working at a much faster pace than she ever had in New England, she
wrote more than 250 pieces for the Tribune, most of which she signed with a star (*).
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Unlike the Dial, the Tribune was not only historically and culturally important, but also a
widely popular penny paper written for the middle-class. Scholars refer to the Tribune as
a “unique institution” with a “mass audience” on its way to becoming “the preeminent
site for robust middle-class public discourse.” The “high-toned penny press” was
international in its reach and known for publishing the “leading minds of the age,” writes
Adam Tuchinsky in his intellectual history of the periodical.410 (Karl Marx, to give one
example, was retained as an international correspondent for the Tribune for ten years.)
Founded during the confluence of the manufacturing, transportation, and
communication revolutions, the Tribune “was part of the surge of penny papers that made
an extensive variety of printed material available to ordinary readers.” However, like later
opinion magazines it also “distilled for a general public many of the progressive reform
ideas of the time.”411 In this new opportunity, Fuller again advocated yet again for
journalism as another type of conversation. “Journalism both satisfied and deflected
Fuller’s need for personal communication,” says Douglas. “Its relative informality was
congenial to her; she believed it to be in style and tone very close to ‘conversation.’”412
As Fuller described it, “newspaper writing is next door to conversation and should be
conducted on the same principles.”413 Indeed, the only thing that stopped Fuller from
further developing adaptations of conversation was her untimely death following an
overseas assignment in Rome as America’s first female international war correspondent.
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“Fuller’s ‘conversational’ approach to journalism actually feeds her transnational
imagination,” writes Leslie Eckel, “for it encourages the productive juxtaposition of
ostensibly diverging viewpoints and generates a drive to seek common ground, whether
linguistic or political.”414

Conclusion
Much like the present, nineteenth-century United States contained a “rich variety
of competing subcultures, no one of which was more representatively ‘American’ than
the others,” suggests Richard Teichgraeber. 415 Toggling between them was not easy; nor
did it come naturally. Writing about Ralph Waldo Emerson’s optimistic reference to the
“sublime thoughts” and “penny wisdom” that “all men” had, Teichgraeber notes that the
quest to collate a shared culture in the United States has always been a tenuous one: “The
concept of a shared national culture was…every bit as elusive during the antebellum
period as it is now—and not just because of the political and economic differences that
divided North and South.” 416
Historians concerned not only with language and literature, but also war and
politics bear out Teichgraeber’s assessment. Rejecting the terms “Jacksonian” and the
“Age of Jackson” as too limited for the era, in his sweeping history of the period between
1815-1848, the historian David Walker Howe stresses that this “was not a time of
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consensus.”417 The period leading up to the mid nineteenth century was instead a time of
“diverse, deep, and durable” changes whose “consequences certainly rivaled, and
probably exceeded in importance, those of the revolutionary ‘information highway’ of
our own time.”418 The response to these changes was an appeal to conversation as a
model for rhetoric “in general.” By the middle half of the nineteenth century the question
was not whether public American discourse was turning more conversational, but rather
in what sense, and, most importantly, to what end. America’s “golden age” of
conversation emerged at a time when the principles of democracy, equality, and
individualism were all being examined. Whereas popular books on conversation describe
conversation as “anti-rhetorical” and contrast the genre with winning an argument (i.e.,
“a weapon of war”), the antebellum American experience suggests public iterations of
conversation were not so far removed from rivalry—or antagonism. Conversation was
increasingly displayed as a response to recurring social conditions that necessitated
compression, discovery, cultural mediation, and cultural reform.
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CHAPTER 5
STYLE: ON THE DIFFERENTIA BETWEEN
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONVERSATION
The modern audience wants the speaker to talk just as directly as he would in a chat, and in the
same general manner that he would employ in speaking to one of them in conversation.
-Dale Carnegie, Public Speaking, (1926)

In the interstices of sentences and the intersections between speech and behavior, voters find data
they consider decisive.
-Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age, (1988)

The twentieth-century rhetorical history of the United States can be read, at
bottom, as an unresolved controversy over the conversational dynamic. On the one hand,
the integration of personal experience, the democratic arbitration of complex and
technical material, and increased audience engagement were all purported benefits of the
developing dynamic. On the other hand, these were also some of the underlying sources
of it faults. Having been brought out of the realm of ideas, where it mostly stayed in the
nineteenth century, the conversational dynamic was enlisted more and more in the service
of influence. The conversational ideal was integrated into the realm of policy and, for
better and worse, percolated through the very core of American attitudes—not only about
how ideas were best expressed, but also in tangible practices ranging from the appropriate
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size of governmental power to the public’s expectations about what they were entitled to
know.419 This was the era when the demand for public conversational styles cemented.420
The president became the symbol of politics and—whether speaking on technical
subjects in a “fireside chat” (Franklin Roosevelt), drawing close to citizens through
“unprecedented” self-disclosure on television (Ronald Reagan), or maximizing a
shoestring campaign budget with an unconventional appearance on the Arsenio Hall
Show (Bill Clinton)—presidents and presidential candidates found new ways to reach
voters, while helping to shape the conversational dynamic into what Robert Branham and
W. Barnett Pearce call the “hallmark” of public address.421 Although some researchers
argue that it wasn’t until President Reagan that “scholars have had to explain the
effectiveness of the public use of what is ordinarily regarded as private conversational
style,” if we put the conversational turn in a broader historical context it becomes clear
that inversion of public and private styles was the product of something deeper—and
more subtle—than any single medium or individual style.422
John Fiske explains this evolution of culture as something akin to modest
redistributions compounded and disrupted over time: “Structural changes at the level of
the system itself, in whatever domain—that of law, of politics, of industry, of the
family—occur only after the system has been eroded and weakened by the tactics of
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everyday life.”423 As I began to show in the previous chapter, by the late nineteenth
century a sustained curiosity in conversation had begun to infiltrate (and irritate)
paradigmatic American models for all of rhetoric. Peter Gibian suggests, for example,
that in Henry James’s novel The Bostonians (1885), “the divided nation’s struggle over
shifting notions of public and private life” was defined, “most fundamentally, as a
struggle between two modes of speech:” public oratory and private conversation.424
As Gibian describes it, at the time of James’s writing, conversation in the private
sphere was playing out the power dynamics of the public sphere. In the two primary
characters of The Bostonians, “we see how every conversation about the redistribution of
power in American social life also enacts a small-scale redistribution of power; here teatable chats, lovers’ dialogues, drawing room discussions, and the communal talk of
women’s societies are revealed as force-fields in which the grand battles of national
politics are being waged.”425 Although it would take years to fully materialize, changes
such as those unfolding in drawing room discussions evidence some of the discomfort
felt when language use starts to shift from a more immediate, functional level to a
broader, structural one.
One way to illustrate how these features of the public conversational dynamic are
borne out in American public life is by looking at how audiences react when the style is
roundly rejected. Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s first and only public remarks on the
“Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference In the 2016 Presidential Election”
are an apt example of this. In his 10-minute prepared statement on May 29, 2019, which
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followed a widely talked about two-year special inquiry into the Russian interference and
potential conspiracy with the Trump Campaign, Mueller engaged in none of the
maneuvers that have come to define our “conversational” culture. He took no questions
following the statement. He made no attempts to rephrase or simplify his findings. And,
perhaps most importantly, he rejected the notion that a testimony before Congress would
compel him to share or make public anything that he had not already said. In other words,
there would be no new revelations through “conversations” about the investigation: “the
report is my testimony,” said Mueller.426 “Any testimony from this office would not go
beyond our report. It contains our findings and analysis and the reasons for the decisions
we made. We chose those words carefully and the work speaks for itself.”427
Although Mueller’s report and statement are both largely written in “plain style,”
which has dominated popular American speech since the end of the nineteenth century,
they nevertheless bare a notable departure from the kind of nonchalant, freewheeling
delivery audiences have come to expect. The public’s reactions to this absence were
noteworthy and, given the context, rather surprising. One would think, for example, that
given the polarized political climate, a measured if not uncomfortable delivery—
Mueller’s voice actually quivers—would come as a welcome reprieve from the stream of
histrionics that comes out of both political parties right now. Instead, the unconventional
(i.e., non-conversational) statement was described by the New York Times’ Editorial
Board as “considered and temperate, its delivery passionless, if not robotic.”428
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What is more, despite the brevity of the public statement and the mostly short,
declarative sentences in which it was delivered, the Editorial Board of a leading
American newspaper felt the need to “decode” Mueller’s announcement. (Here, one
wonders if the length (448 pages) and style of the report set the tone for this need to
“decode.” Though generally clear, the report veered in key moment into deliberate
obliqueness, such as when Mueller intimated that they believed the president committed a
crime without accusing him of one ("If we had confidence that the president clearly did
not commit a crime, we would have said so.")) 429 Whatever their reason, the Editorial
Board made it clear that Mr. Mueller needed a translator to turn legalese into plain
language, saying: “If you tuned out for a moment—and who could blame you—you
might have missed the import of messages encoded in Mr. Mueller’s cautious
language.”430 The article then spells out the some of the key findings, translated in a
conversational style, so that readers can finally let out a collective sigh of relief. Consider
this excerpt from the editorial:
After briefly reviewing his mandate, as laid out by Deputy Attorney
General Rod Rosenstein, Mr. Mueller announced that his team was
“formally closing the special counsel’s office,” that he was leaving the
Justice Department and that “beyond these few remarks, it is important
that the office’s written work speak for itself.”
Translation: I’m done with this political circus. To understand my
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findings, read my report. Please don’t ask me to testify.431
Although verbal style is often overlooked in contemporary rhetoric, I suggest it is
especially important now, in part because it provides a uniquely stable unit of
measurement. Unlike corporal gestures (whose capacity is one element that differentiates
speech from writing) or later advances in audio/visual machinery (which make observing
a rhetorical performance in absentia possible), language remains a constant in which style
is performed—regardless of medium. Highlighting this centrality of verbal style in
composition, Chris Holcomb and Jimmie Killingsworth point out that “in written rather
than spoken texts, style is the moment of performance, the moment when what we say is
realized through language and communicated to our readers.”432
Because the public conversational style that surfaced as a dominant form of public
communication in the twentieth century is more emblematic of a larger cultural system
than any singular trait, we stand to gain much from comparing examples across
mediums. Rather than focusing on technology as the organizing factor, in other words,
the particularity of style may actually help us broaden our understanding of the
assortment of iterations that animate the conversational turn. By looking at the different
materials of public conversation as indicative of something larger and broader than “just”
a technological medium (e.g. television) or “just” the ability of the speaker, we can begin
to articulate some of the deeper cultural implications that are bound up in the differences
between public and private conversational styles.
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The rhetorical tradition has paved the way for this approach (some of which I
sketched in Chapter 2). Using twentieth and twenty-first century examples as a way to
ground my claims, I conclude this study by performing three rhetorical analyses that
highlight and explain the centrality of the conversational turn in American public life.
The first analysis, “Dinner with Cupid,” introduces two degrees of style—one narrow, the
other broad—and serves as a microcosm of the broader conversational dynamic. It
illustrates how, even within the context of impromptu conversation, participants and
viewers instinctively know there is no such thing as raw (or blank) linguistic material and
how, knowing this, they use that material to signal, read, and make judgments about each
other (whether correctly or not). The second analysis features a space midway between
formal (e.g., governmental) and informal (e.g., mass media) influences. Using early
editorial debates over the direction of National Geographic Society and its magazine, I
show how, as a matter of editorial policy, the integration of conversational style and
metaphor served to help launch National Geographic Society into its influential role as
“the most widely read source of general scientific information in America.”433 In the third
and final analysis, I turn to a landmark Supreme Court case, Obergefell v. Hodges, as a
way to illustrate just how profoundly entrenched the controversial dynamic is in the
United States. In particular, I argue that the Constitution animates some of the structural
foundations and influences of the conversational dynamic by placing a sovereign
individual with rights in tension with a public majority—without settling on an answer of
how this tension should be resolved.
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Taken together, these three analyses reveal patterns that help to explain key
differences between the modern, public conversational dynamic and earlier forms of
rhetoric. These include:

The Use of Spectacle as Insight
The conversational dynamic creates opportunities for spectacle, which are thought to
reveal valuable sources of information. The spectacle may take the primary form of
entertainment or consumer item, but it also is thought to disclose character, expertise,
inner motivations, and things “as they really are.” The conversational dynamic
choreographs opportunities for (apparent or actual) impromptu interactions, which
provide the basis for this spectacle.
Illustration: “Dinner with Cupid”

The Practical Development of Conversation as an Arbiter of Information
In contrast to philosophical conversation (which is premised on a “clash of ideas”
discovered or brought to light in the to and fro of conversation), the public conversational
dynamic is used to frame complicated, technical information in a simpler, brighter, and
more appealing manner. The extent to which the dynamic is employed as an arbiter of
information as opposed to a generator of ideas makes it more or less conversational in
the traditional sense.
Illustration: National Geographic Magazine

149

Anticipated Lack of Participation
The public conversational dynamic invites engagement from people who will never
actually enter into the discussion. However, some engagement is usually expected, and
the conversation can change course as a result. The extent to which audiences do or do
not participate or change the course of the discussion makes the dynamic more or less
“conversational.”
Illustration: Obergefell v Hodges (2015)

ANALYSIS 1:
“Dinner with Cupid”
Understanding Verbal and Cultural Styles
On July 26, 2019, the Boston Globe’s Sunday Magazine blind date column,
“Dinner with Cupid,” ran an article entitled “Blind date: ‘I’m uncommonly ambitious for
an academic.’” The premise of the popular column is simple, and the invitation for future
readers to participate is included at the bottom of every column: “Go on a blind date.
We’ll pick up the tab. Fill out in application at bostonglobe.com/cupid. Follow us on
Twitter at @dinnerwithcupid.”434 Left unstated, but obvious to readers and participants, is
the agreement to describe the details of the date, which are then published in the Globe’s
Sunday Magazine. In the July 26 column, contributing editor Melissa Schorr compiled
the details from a blind date between J.R. Scott, 23, a PhD student at MIT and Hannah
McDonnell, 22, a rising law student at Northeastern. (Following the format of the
column, in this analysis I refer to participants by their first name rather than last.)
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Other than headings, which arrange and guide the flow of the column, the content
consists entirely of J.R. and Hannah’s answers. Although written after the fact, these
serve as direct quotes. Many of the answers only present the exchange in a loose form;
some of categories are presented as unformatted bullet points (“Last thing he read:
Churchill: Walking with Destiny”) (no italics in original) or consist of a smattering of
ideas joined by an ellipsis (“He was dressed very professionally and he was tan…from
California.”)435 In addition to a print version, the Globe Magazine column is published
once a week in digital version of The Boston Globe. Like all Globe articles, the digital
version accepts reader comments. At the time of this writing, “Blind date: ‘I’m
uncommonly ambitious for an academic,” had 138 comments. I include all these features
in my analysis that follows, which I use to ground my claim that the rhetorical tradition is
the proper place to base a new theory of public conversation.
“Dinner with Cupid” describes itself a “one part social experiment, one part
schadenfreude for the smug married crowd, and one part journalistic attempt to document
that fundamental aspect of the human condition—the quest for love—often left
unexamined in the news section.”436 Embedded into this social experiment is a cultural
assumption that places conversation in general and style in particular at its center. Here is
how it happens. Both participants and readers look for what Erving Goffman describes as
the “dramatic realization” that makes an individual’s activity (or “performance”)
perceptible before others. “While in the presence of others, the individual typically
infuses his activity with signs which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory
435
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facts that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure. For if the individual’s activity is
to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express
during the interaction what he wishes to convey.”437 In the example of the Boston
Magazine column, a conversation over dinner between two relatively “equally-matched”
strangers is believed to disclose enough information during the interaction that
participants and readers are able to draw broader conclusions about a person’s character,
compatibility, and even long-term romantic potential.438 Based on their date, J.R. deduced
that Hannah “had an optimistic outlook on life” (which he appreciated), but that they
“would be better suited as friends than romantic partners.” Hannah found J.R. “very
intelligent” and “really enjoyed getting to know him;” however, she, too, thought they
would be “just friends.”
Although dinner participants have tone, expression, body language, and other
non-verbal cues to go on, readers of the column are left to rely on strictly verbal cues
(beyond a headshot) to judge the “performance of self” that Goffman famously theorizes.
As Holcomb and Killingsworth, point out, one difference between performances in
writing as opposed to in person is that they shift the burden of disclosure: “in written or
printed text, where writers lack access to the communicative resources of oral delivery,
style must shoulder much of the interactional load.”439 They seemed to have little trouble
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with this limitation (or, more precisely, readers seemed to have little trouble crafting
judgments based on verbal cues that were given to them.)
Here are some conclusions, drawn from readers’ comments, about J.R.’s
“dramatic realization” as described in “Blind date: ‘I’m uncommonly ambitious for an
academic.”
•

“I wonder what his guy friends are like and if they razz him for his
Brahmin 1700’s demeanor.” (yogasong44)

•

“It sounded more like a business meeting than a date.” (newsyoucanuse);

•

“I don’t think I’d have lasted five minutes listening to this guy.”
(theblackprince1)

•

The poor kid. I feel bad for him. He thinks he has it all together.”
(fordpem)

•

“Someone swallowed a thesaurus…...run, Hannah, run….” (Not-MyDogs-Name)

•

“He must be a real hoot at cocktail parties.” (OrrScores)

•

“If he used that kind of language through the whole dinner, she is being
exceptionally kind.” (Goldsky)

•

“I think he’s looking for an academic equal that he can have this banter
with on the regular.” (babyinthecorner)

•

“I have a Ph.D. and never spoke like that.” (michaelrb)

What struck readers so much about J.R.’s verbal style? More importantly, how,
based on the few conversational snippets J.R. Scott and Hannah McDonnell volunteered
about the date and each other, can Globe readers seem so sure about what this “data”
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reveals? To answer these questions one must begin with a view of style that “lumps”
rather than “splits” verbal forms with other cultural elements. Holcomb and
Killingsworth explain one feature of this method in their chapter in The Centrality of
Style. They identify verbal forms and cultural elements as two types of style “—one
narrow, the other broad”—which, although arbitrarily divided in most of the current
scholarship on style, were historically theorized together.440 “The narrow version,” write
Holcomb and Killingsworth, “identifies style with verbal style and considers a writer’s
choices at the level of word, phrase, and clause, although more recently it has come
increasingly to include features beyond the sentence, including point of view, discourse
structure, and genre.”441 The second view of style “defines style more broadly as ‘ways of
doing’ and takes within its purview virtually any artifact or practice that has
communicative potential: fashion, music, electronic and digital media, deportment, food,
and so on.”442
Even though these two versions “rarely overlap” in contemporary scholarship, in
cultural practices (such as “Dinner with Cupid”) they are instinctively applied. For
example, if the application of the “narrow version” of style means, as Holcomb and
Killingsworth suggest, paying attention to J.R. and Hannah’s language independently of
other considerations, then Globe readers, whether consciously or unconsciously, were
keen to do so. Among the specific words and phrases they singled out their comments
include: “prattle;” “anachronistic;” “We sat in the ‘plein air’ area of the restaurant;” “I
440
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now understand why statisticians use Poisson processes to model traffic flows;” “I
mentioned the oft-quoted Joe Namath remark…” “We arranged for cars to pick us up;” “I
have an anachronistic tendency toward formality;” and “I’m uncommonly ambitious for
an academic, and looking for someone who will challenge me to achieve great things, yet
support me unconditionally along the way.”
Although according to both respondents the date went well (Hannah rated it an
“A,” and J.R. gave it an “A-“), and although each said gracious things about the other
(Hannah said, “He is very intelligent. He is at MIT, and knows a lot about finance and
economics,” while J.R noted: “I appreciated that she had an optimistic outlook on life”),
neither Hannah, nor J.R., nor Globe readers seemed to think the couple had any hope for
a future together. What went “wrong” at the restaurant? Perhaps it was not so much J.R.’s
“verbosity” (as one Globe commentator referred it) but rather his verbal style that created
the impression of J.R. being so culturally out-of-sync.
Sometimes what is signaled (or, to use Goffman’s phrase, “performed”) is
deliberate. For example, when J.R. explains his initial interest in “Dinner with Cupid,” he
gratuitously reveals some of his reading habits: “Cupid piqued my interest—to my
knowledge, The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times don’t have comparable
blind-dating columns.” While it is unclear what the original connection among The Wall
Street Journal, the Financial Times and “Dinner with Cupid” was thought to be, the
answer works as a “sign-vehicle”—something Goffman describes as a carrier for
conveying information that permits others to know “in advance what he will expect of
them and what they may expect of him.”443 In this case, the two newspapers, who have
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been called by news reporters as “the manliest of all” the periodicals, signal his view of
himself as an aspiring financier and align with the expectation of how he wished to be
approached.444 The most recent book he read (Churchill: Walking with Destiny) is long
(1,105 pages), but also newly released (2018), suggesting his habits are active. Hannah,
meanwhile, included a quirky hobby (juggling) in a description of herself, perhaps as a
way to interject lightheartedness into her list of interests, which were led by politics and
business. (Although juggling was never mentioned, readers revealingly noticed this detail
and wished to bring it back in the comments, responding: “Why didn’t juggling come up
in conversation? Opportunity lost.”)
Other elements of stylistic material may be subtler, however, and may not be
consciously selected at all. For instance, Jeanne Fahnestock outlines the numerous
historical layers of the English language and their difference in word derivations—all of
which, whether consciously selected or not, denote entirely different potentials for
conveying social meanings. Contemporary English has a wealth of synonyms stemming
from the combined contact and influence of Germanic, Greek, Latin, French, Celtic,
Dutch, Spanish, African, Native American, and Scandinavian languages, among many
others.445 As Fahnestock tells it, “English picked up words, as it picked up goods and
knowledge, from virtually every culture on the globe.”446
What is most relevant to the “Dinner with Cupid” column is not simply the
number of variations and origins that are available to an English speaker (and writer), but
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rather their entrenched associations with levels of formality, sincerity, and modes of
address. For instance, the three largest lexicons in the English language stem from Old
English (OE), French, and Latin and Greek. These different groupings all signal
distinctive levels of conceptual and relational distance. “The informal spoken language is
filled with words derived from Germanic, Scandinavian, and sometimes French,” says
Fahnestock; “the formal written language has proportionately more Latin and Greek
words, a distribution that has marked consequences for the vocabulary of persuasion.”447
OE, which is predominantly Germanic in its origin, comprises the majority of core words
in the English language.448 As a result of being the simplest, the oldest, and the widest in
use, passages that are dominated by words from the OE core are typically associated with
familiarity and truthfulness.449 “This effect occurs because core words, the oldest in the
language, are also the oldest in the experience of native speakers; they are the first heard,
the first spoken, the first read, the first written. They are associated with simple messages,
and often with immediate, familial, and physical contexts,” writes Fahnestock.450
In contrast, Latin and Greek are associated with formal, written language.
Although two-thirds of words in Modern English are borrowed “directly from Latin, of
from other Latin-derived vernacular, especially French, Spanish, and Italian,” they are
not the most frequently used.451 Instead, they can be found in the formal settings of
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academic writing, medicine, and law. Similarly, whereas words derived from French (a
vernacular offshoot of Latin) are sometimes used to elevate spoken language, they are
above all associated with elegance and order (compare, for example, the French-derived
privilege with the OE right). 452
The difference in word origin and their frequency of use noticeably impacted the
“Dinner with Cupid” participants’ persuasive power, if not with each other (all readers
know is that the participants both decided to be “just be friends”), then certainly with
their readers. Consider, for example, the difference in how Hannah and J.R. describe each
other:
•

Hannah: “He is very intelligent. He is at MIT, and knows a lot about finance and
economics.”

•

J.R. “Hannah is an ebullient and amiable person.”
Hannah could have used the word “smart” (which has the more familiar, Old

English/Germanic core) but instead chose the synonym “intelligent” (Latin in origin with
more formal and learned connotations). Although the difference in formality is notable,
her choice is also fitting. The Latin core “intelligent” is in keeping with J.R.’s signal of
how he wishes to be approached, a dynamic Fahnestock (and others, including Kenneth
Burke and Michel Foucault) theorize as “bids for alignment.” Highlighting the
“fundamental interactive dimension of all language…attitudes and bids for alignment are
encoded in every language choice, and the rhetor’s presence and relation with an
audience are the unerasable ground of all discourse.”453 J.R. makes it clear that he wishes
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to be approached, to use his language, as an “uncommonly ambitious academic.” What is
particularly illustrative about the “Dinner with Cupid” column, however, is that the
speaker—regardless of who the speaker is or what the speaker says— stands in relation to
multiple audiences at the same time. What is worth paying attention to here is that it
reveals one of the core differences between artful conversation and the public
conversational dynamic: in the case of the public dynamic, the audience never consists of
just the participants in the conversation.454 If we return to Hannah’s verbal style, it
becomes clearer that the depiction of her date is appropriate not only for J.R., but also
(and perhaps primarily) Globe readers. The use of the word “intelligent,” for example,
takes J.R. into account, but it also fits into the broader context of what she is describing to
readers of the column (his academic competency generally followed by details that
supports this specifically (“He is at MIT, and knows a lot about finance and
economics.”)). Not only that but, by referring to J.R. with the pronoun “he,” she distances
herself from her date and further aligns herself with the audience of readers.455 Taken
together, her description (which is built around colloquial language (i.e., “knows a lot
about”)) invites readers in by sounding conversational.
By contrast, J.R.’s combination of words, “ebullient” (Latin core) and “amiable”
(French core) sound as if they belong on the written page (especially the word ebullient)
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and, despite their friendly denotation, seem somewhat detached from what he is
describing. Indeed, referring to Hannah by her first name here (“Hannah is an ebullient
and amiable person”), J.R. actually stresses his impressions of her rather than the
impressions that she gives off.456 The focus, in other words, remains on him and his
descriptions rather than on Hannah or Globe readers. This is not to suggest, however, that
referring to Hannah by a pronoun (she) or describing her with other adjectives (say,
“sunny” and “friendly,” both OE core words) would have been an outright improvement.
Because “there is no such thing as ‘raw’ subject matter,” there is also no such thing as an
“absolute” improvement by change in style. 457 Citing the law of compensation, Holcomb
and Killingsworth advise that “with every change something is lost and something is
gained.”458 For example, the words “ebullient” and “amiable” are more precise in their
descriptive power and, as such, have the potential to generate a more vivid picture in
readers’ minds than the more common, perhaps bordering on generic, adjectives “sunny
and friendly.” Indeed, the amount of responses J.R.’s verbal style provoked suggests his
more erudite word choices are in fact what left the greatest impression. What is more,
referring to Hannah by her first name could also be interpreted as a sign of respect, and a
balance between an overly formal option (Ms. McDonnell) and a less formal, readeroriented “she.”
This kind of stylistic analysis, though revealing, may seem disproportionately
detailed for a dating column. We know, for example, that in 2018 Globe readers spent, on
average, a total of two minutes visiting the site (this includes time engaged on all news
456
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articles, not just the Boston Magazine feature).459 If for no other reason than practical
constraints, we can safely assume from this that readers are not dissecting pronouns and
word origins—at least not consciously. What happened, then, at the broader level of
style? It may be impossible to pinpoint the moment in which Globe readers extended
their analysis from the narrow or verbal style to the broad or cultural style, since the
differences between the two versions are arbitrarily created. Verbal style is a type of
cultural style and cultural style includes verbal style. 460 However, beyond the theory
advanced by sociolinguist Penelope Eckert and described by Holcomb and Killingsworth
in the pedagogical frame, what we have in “Dinner with Cupid” is evidence that
participants and readers instinctively paid attention to both.
Readers (who had no information other than the column to go on) pieced together
a combination of word choice, word origin, deportment, facts, interpretations of
expressed attitudes, and a single visual cue to make broader judgments about the
participants’ upbringing, experiences, and views of the world. Without any specific
encouragement or prompting to do so, readers judged J.R. as “a sesquipedalian,” “a
snooozzzzz,” “insufferable,” “pretentious,” “insecure,” “obnoxious,” “competitive,”
“impressive,” “a real Black and Decker,” “pompous,” “rather full of himself,” “insecure,”
“a riot,” “probably nice,” “perfectly decent,” “a sweet guy,” and someone who “must
have been…challenging” and “precocious” as child. Hannah occupied much less
attention in the readers’ comments. In contrast to J.R.’s culturally “transgressive” style,
her speech followed cultural norms of informality and conversational commentary (He’s
459
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still a Patriots fan (thank God) although he’s from California); readers awarded it
accordingly. They spoke of her as “wonderful,” “kind,” “gracious,” “wise,” “sensitive,”
“a lovely person,” and someone who appeared to have “excellent manners.”
If there was one overarching critique of J.R., it was that he sounded unnatural,
which also acted as a data point for readers. Indeed, the idea that the greatest art conceals
its art goes all the way back to the Greeks. Following his observation that propriety is “a
matter of contraction or expansion,” Aristotle writes that, “authors should compose
without being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially, but naturally. (The latter
is persuasive, the former the opposite; for if [artifice is obvious] people become resentful,
as at someone plotting against them, just as they are at those adulterating wines.)461
Comments from “Dinner with Cupid” (which cast J.R.’s verbal style as artificial) serve as
an example of this resentful reaction to artifice, not least because J.R.’s verbal style was
all readers had to go on:
•

“OK, JR, we get it, you have a good vocabulary—now get over yourself!”
(user_1572434)

•

“Be wary of those who try to impress with faulty phrases like this: “We sat in the
‘plein air’ area of the restaurant.”” (thot)

•

“I'm actually thinking of using this column with the interns I supervise, as a great
example of verbosity vs. clean prose. J.R., you don't need two adjectives for
something; settle on one. And you don't need to pile it on, i.e. your anachronistic
tendency toward formality.” (BeeJayDee)
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•

“ ‘We arranged for cars to pick us up’= called an Uber for the rest of us
plebeians.” (ramsen51)
Feedback can turn into its own conversation and, as Susan Herbst describes

contemporary public speech, “media now wreak havoc with the text.”462 In this way, the
performance that Goffman describes as taking place “during the interaction” may not be
contained as it once was. While the stakes are obviously much lower in a dating column
than other modes of speech (presidential speech, for example, is now “endlessly” sliced
into sound bites and reconstructed and recirculated in “ways that are beyond the control
of the president”), the potential for disruptive, multi-vocal redirection is a constant
feature of digital rhetoric, which—depending on how you view it—makes the medium
more or less conversational.463
In the July 2019 “Dinner with Cupid” column readers seemed just as willing to
interact with others’ interpretations as they did with the original text, thereby starting
their own “conversation” or perhaps merely changing the subject. Of course, the structure
in digital forums is different from face-to-face conversations. In person conversations are
conventionally organized around turn taking and what Stephen Levinson calls “adjacency
pairs” (e.g. question/answer; greeting/greeting; joke/laughter).464 In digital contexts
(which commonly function as a hybrid form of written and oral communication), this
dynamic between timing and opportunity is more difficult to exploit, however. As Chris
Holcomb points out in the context of humor, when everyone can talk at the same time but
462
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no one knows when a message will be read, the evaluative information conveyed by
something such as laughter may only arrive in a piecemeal fashion, if at all. To offset
what is lost in face-to-face interactions, participants enlist written features, such as
typography and space, to “to mimic features of oral discourse.” 465 For example, in the
“Dinner with Cupid” comments, SwishyTail728 wrote:
•

“LOL! Some of the comments are HILARIOUS! Just because he writes this way
doesn’t mean he actually speaks that way during conversations. I will admit, the
first thought that popped into my head was a sarcastic, “Aren’t you a romantic
devil?”
The use of all caps and exclamation points in “LOL!” and “HILARIOUS!”

suggests vocal features of a rise in pitch and an increase in stress. However, it also
indicates additional social and cultural information. Statistically, the person who wrote
this is likely to be older, since, according to a 2015 Facebook data, only 1.9 percent of
Facebook users still used the acronym LOL. The median age of people using LOL is also
older than any of the three laughter types the social media platform identified (emoji,
haha, and hehe).466
Suggestive of style’s implication in the entirety of the rhetorical enterprise,
readers anticipated cues of what snippets of J.R’s verbal style might mean for future,
imagined scenarios:
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•

“I think JR should put pen to paper in the form of fiction with the main character
being himself spouting on in his most entertaining fashion. I find him hilarious.”
(work2live)

•

“This young man is a riot. Anachronistic, no doubt. He must have been a
challenging, precocious child. With a proper 21st century mentor, he’ll overcome
his bow-tied infatuation with words, so as not to expose the cognitive deficiencies
of his dinner guests, and embrace the more whimsical modalities of colloquial
banter…and perhaps get laid.” (Spacevegan1)
Numerous Globe respondents used his conversational skills as a proxy for his

amorous style and weighed in on subjects that are not typically made explicit in the
column or its commentary. (“If he’s formal at dinner he’ll be formal in the bedroom”
(Potlemac).) Others reveled in the comic potential for his affected style to contrast with
erotic abandon. As one reader admitted, “I wish they hit it off and enjoyed wild sex—so
we could read JR’s academic account” (telex108). Having invested so much in their
detailed critiques of J.R.’s verbal style, commenters interestingly seemed more, not less,
concerned with his overall romantic fortunes.
Clearly, Globe readers had no trouble linking verbal style with broader social and
cultural dynamics. As a cultural habit, that is what we do.467 In fact, the “Dinner with
Cupid” example may be particularly illustrative precisely because it is not a polished
piece of prose, but rather an abridged format that is structured around spontaneity (e.g.,
readers’ comments) and lack of foreknowledge (e.g., a blind date). Yet, despite the
ubiquity of this practice the scholarship devoted to understanding the default mode of
467
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rhetorical conversation is remarkably scattershot. The consequence of this arbitrariness is
that it creates not so much a gap in rhetorical studies as a giant blind spot. Despite
championing style as the organizing factor for the twenty-first century, and despite
identifying conversation—not oratory—as the model for all of rhetoric, scholars in
rhetoric, composition, and communication studies have demonstrated a noticeable
reluctance, if not outright aversion, in formally associating rhetoric and conversation.468
This study joins a limited, but growing, number of scholars who have reintegrated the
canon of style as a means for judging and understanding modern communication.

ANALYSIS 2:
National Geographic Magazine (Washington DC, 1888)
How a scientific journal took on the role of “conversationalist” and evolved into an
unofficial arbiter of science, foreign policy, and popular imagination.
Founded in 1888 as a scholarly, scientific journal, National Geographic would
eventually become a leading American source for popular knowledge about scientific
research and the global exploration. Maps historian Susan Schulten deems it “one of the
most ubiquitous sources of information and images about the world in American
culture.”469 Phillip Pauly, a historian of science, refers to it as “the most widely read
source of general scientific information in America.”470 And anthropologist Catherine
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Lutz and sociologist Jane Collins call the magazine “one of the most culturally valued
and potent media vehicles shaping American understandings of…the world outside the
United States.”471 Exemplifying its broad reach and central place in twentieth-century
popular imagination, academic articles about National Geographic are more often found
under the rubric of American Studies and history rather than the more obvious suspects of
geography, physical science, or even photography (for which the publication would
become perhaps most famous). By the 1980s, six U.S. Presidents had contributed to the
magazine: Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover,
Dwight Eisenhower, and Lyndon Johnson.472 One of the most famous moments of the
Cold War, the “Kitchen Debate,” is also recounted in the pages of National Geographic
by then Vice President Richard Nixon. Here is an excerpt from the boisterous exchange
in Moscow:
Khrushchev: On politics, we will never agree with you. For instance, Mikoyan
likes very peppery soup. I do not. But this does not mean that we do not get along.
Nixon: You can learn from us, and we can learn from you. There must be a free
exchange. Let the people choose the kind of house, the kind of soup, the kind of ideas
that they want.
Although at first glance this appears to be a relatively simple instance of cultural
diplomacy (where the clash between Communism and Capitalism is somehow mediated
through an analogous like or dislike of peppery soup), a closer look suggests it is heat and
intensity that is actually driving the dialogue forward. While it is true that the impromptu
471
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interchange between Vice President Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev took
place in front of an American model kitchen at an American cultural exhibition at the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it is also true that the interlocutors were leaders of the same
two Super Powers at the center of what William Faulkner identified as the single question
of the time: When will I be blown up?473
National Geographic provides a window into the “masculine” elements—the
heat, the competition, the intensity—that may course through conversation. Too often
these dynamics have been excluded from discussions of twentieth century mass media, in
part because of the dominance of the useful, if incomplete, framework of “cool” (i.e.,
feminine and intimate) and “hot” (i.e., masculine and concentrated) mediums. It is not
necessary, however, to completely do away with a contrast in mediums in order to
appreciate that conversation can flourish within both. Indeed, both Marshall McLuhan’s
famously theorized “cool” medium of television and “hot” medium of radio were adapted
to conversational style, despite being categorized as opposites. The “Kitchen Debate,”
which appears in a 36-page story by Nixon published in the December 1959 issue of
National Geographic, is one example of this crossover.
“Cool” media, according to McLuhan, involves a “total situation” that is marked
by high participation (e.g., leaving much for the audience to fill in or complete).474
Television is the most obvious twentieth-century example. “Hot” media, in contrast, is
noted for its intensity and thereby lower participation. It involves users with its high
definition of a single human sense (for instance, radio/listening), yet it keeps them
473

William Faulkner, Nobel Prize Banquet Speech, Stockholm, December 10, 1950.

474

Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extension of Man (Cambridge: MIT University Press,
1964), 23.

168

“detached, as if at arms length.”475 In Eloquence in an Electronic Age, Kathleen Hall
Jamieson incorporates this framework to explain the shift from the “flame of oratory” to
“the fireside chat.” She writes, “where once we expected messages laced with
impassioned appeals, now we respond positively to a cooler, more conversational art;
where once audiences expected to be conquered by an art bent on battle, today’s
television viewer expects instead an intimate rhetoric of conciliation.”476

Intensifying Contemporary Views of Conversation
In its fullest form, conversation is equipped to unite the heat of one medium with
the intimacy of another.477 Indeed, it is not incidental that conversation was historically
associated with sex, seduction, and play.478 In the context of National Geographic, this
backdrop works to show how some of the (“masculine”) qualities that made the magazine
and membership organization so successful are, while perhaps not typical of the
twentieth-century, hardly unique to the genre of conversation. “Mass culture,” write Lutz
and Collins, “is associated with the feminine because—in stereotype—it is
sentimentalized, it is merely consumed, and it requires less intellect…and high culture
with the masculine for the opposite reasons.” 479 By contrast, “the Geographic’s gender
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associations are masculine, both because of its content (adventure, science) and its
cultural power and position.” 480
In his study on the legendary race toward the North Pole (for which the National
Geographic Society was a major sponsor), historian of science Michael Robinson
suggests, for instance, that constructions of “manliness” were central to explorers’
fundraising and media successes. “Different forms of rhetoric—scientific, manly, and
moral—functioned as explorers’ most powerful tools because stories, more than
specimens of scientific observations, constituted the real currency of Arctic
exploration.”481 Frederick Cook (who claimed to have arrived at the North Pole in April
1908) and Robert Peary (who claimed to have arrived at the North Pole in April 1909)
“built their personas on a model of manliness that had little to do with science,” writes
Robinson.482 How did this appeal to conversation and masculinity work within the
broader context of the magazine? In the following section I will explain the role of both.

Stylistic Value in National Geographic
There are primarily two explanations for National Geographic’s launch to fame in
the early twentieth century. One is geo-political. The other is rhetorical. Historians stress
that the Spanish-American War (1898) vaulted America’s role in international politics,
and, along with it, spurred Americans’ newfound interest in geography; however, as the
magazine tells its own history, it is was also a hard-fought editorial decision advocating a
480
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deliberate change in writing style that expanded the scope and reach of the magazine.483
Writing for National Geographic, Beth Foster suggests that the first and most important
step in its transformation was “the use of first-person narrative and straightforward,
simple writing.”484 The swapping of stories and use of narratives is something on which
“everyday conversation thrives,” says Neal Norrick.485 In the case of the Geographic, it
was also a method by which to spur public interest in expeditions.486 The changes in style
were not merely a dressing, however. Making the journal more conversational also meant
redefining (and expanding) what “scientific research,” “geography,” and experiences of
the world entailed. As Pauly puts how the first term was framed in the Geographic,
“scientific research…was not an esoteric activity that the public should appreciate but
could never fully understand. It was romantic exploration of the unknown, and the
adventure was at least as important as the information gathered.”487
The editors sought to “diffuse” geographic research to a wider audience by
focusing on geography as “description” and making the reading experience more “bright
and interesting.”488 In the words of its long-time editor, Gilbert H. Grosvenor, the
magazine and its accompanying membership society intended to “transform the Society’s
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Magazine from one of cold geographic fact…into a vehicle for carrying the living,
breathing, human-interest truth about this great world of ours.”489 While this and other
editorial choices diminished the society’s status among professionals, they also bolstered
its reputation with the general public as “an arbiter of science.”490
The National Geographic’s considered response to this role of arbiter was to
embrace the role of a conversationalist under the theme “THE WORLD AND ALL
THAT IS IN IT.” By this I mean not only that the magazine sought to present an
informal, “bright” and “interesting” tone, although it did aim for that, but also that it
deliberately widened its scope of available topics. Conversation, more than systematic
argument, was suited to deliver a “direct” and “lively” equivalent to the cabinet of
curiosities, a modern form of which the National Geographic aspired to embody.491
“People wanted immediate experience of the world,” writes Philip Pauly in his early
history of National Geographic, “not the systematic lessons professionals sought to
provide.”492 As conversation manuals repeatedly stressed, the flexibility to flit from topic
to topic (i.e., to follow where a conversation led rather than to drill down on a single
topic) is central to conversation. This is in part because of its spontaneous nature. Since
the need for “at least apparent” spontaneity in conversation is so fundamental to the
genre, the need to avoid excessively focused, pedantic, or technical topics became a
recurrent theme in polite conversation.493 In the case of National Geographic this
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embrace of THE WORLD AND ALL THAT IS IN IT meant consciously moving in “the
opposite direction” from the narrow scope in which it was founded.494 Where the Society
was originally “part of the effort to develop an independent subject matter for
geography,” Grosvenor and his staff sought to enlarge it. As Pauly describes it, “by
including mammoth skulls, wild animals, and primitive tribes in addition to geography,
Grosvenor was extending the life of the old rubric of natural history into a time when it
was rapidly being parceled up among various specialties.”495
What is more, although the conflict over editorial and membership policy caused
a rift between those who welcomed its expansion and those seeking to enhance its status
as a professional journal of geography (when asked to join the editorial board in 1901, for
example, William Morris Davis responded with a note saying: “Declined: couldn’t
approve general policy of popularization at the expense of science.”), what was not
controversial at the time was the magazine’s close ties to governmental policy.496 As
early as 1900, National Geographic was already functioning as an unofficial “organ of
science and politics” by enlisting a combination of illustrations, maps, and text “to
inform, to entertain, and to defend the nation’s new interventionist posture.”497
Susan Schulten is one of many who would note the magazine’s remarkable
achievement at being able to use “geographic knowledge as a tool for nationalism,” while
at the same time also managing to “marry the imperatives of science with popular
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interest.”498 Overt in its association to governmental interests, the 1900 editorial board
included government officials from the Treasury Department, Department of State,
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey,
Bureau of American Ethnology, and U.S. Geological Survey. “During and after the war,”
writes Schulten, “the community of scientists and government workers at the Society
seamlessly joined their professional identities—whether as surveyors, hydrographers,
statisticians, or diplomats—to the national interest,” writes Schulten. “There is no
evidence that the conflicts at the Society in these years reflected dissent over the nation’s
controversial mission abroad, and in fact the Geographic immediately became a place
where the federal government’s goals could be safely articulated.”499 An excerpt from a
January 1900 article entitled “The Phillipine Islands and their Environment” by American
diplomat John Barrett is illustrative of these early moves away from “cold geographic
fact” and toward geography as “description” openly paired with American commercial
and international interests:
“I contend that Manila occupies a position of immeasurable opportunity in
comparison with the other great ports or cities of the Asian and Australian coast line.
That you may obtain a concrete idea of what I mean, let me picture how Manila stands
with reference to neighboring points. Let us draw a circle on a radius of two thousand
miles, with Manila as the center. As we swing it around we find that this charmed circle
takes in such distantly separated points as Yokohama, Vladivostok, and Tientsin on the
north and Port Darwin, in Australia, and Batavia, in Java, on the south. It reaches east to
498
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include Guam and the Carolines and west to include Bangkok, in Siam, and Rangoon, in
Burma. A similar circle drawn around any other port does not include so many important
points. I would not imply that Manila will ever take the place of Hong Kong, Shanghai,
or Singapore, or even equal them in the race for commercial or political supremacy,
because they already have a wonderful start: but there is abundant reason why Manila
should become a great trade center to divide their business, and at least be the chief point
through which American shall carry on her growing transactions with Asia’s millions.”500
Unlike an example that will soon follow (Obergefell v. Hodges), here the purpose
of this passage is not to reveal the inner thoughts and feelings of the diplomat’s
acquaintance with Siam. However, it is meant to be personal in a different sense. The
physical descriptions of distance (“a radius of two thousand miles with Manila as the
center”) and place (“as we swing it around we find that this charmed circle…takes
in…north…south…east…west”) are meant to give the audience an eyewitness account
and an immediate sense of the world (“that you may obtain a concrete idea of what I
mean”). By design, writes Pauly about the Geographic, “editorial stress was placed upon
having ‘accurate eyewitness, firsthand accounts’ expressed in ‘writing that sought to
make pictures in the reader’s mind.’”501 Subtle devices such as the use of the present
tense (“let us draw”) and clear orientation of the landscape (“let me picture how Manila
stands with reference to neighboring points…”) work to “set things ‘before the eyes’ with
language (as Aristotle calls it) or to “make pictures in the reader’s mind” (as the editors
put it).
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However, this was not the only form of involvement the text (or the magazine)
was meant to suggest. As both a membership club and a magazine, the Geographic’s
contributions to research were meant to give readers and members a sense of
“participation in science.”502 “However remote members might be from determining the
policy, they could feel that they contributed to the advancement of knowledge while
being educated and entertained.”503 One can see how readers might feel included in
something important when reading the diplomat’s current recommendation on the
Philippines—a place that, before planes were invented, very few people had actually
visited and—until National Geographic photographers started coming back with pictures,
few had ever seen.
In contrast to philosophical conversation (which is premised on a “clash of ideas”
discovered or brought to light in the to and fro of conversation), the public conversational
dynamic may be used to frame complicated, technical information in a simpler, brighter,
and more appealing manner. In some instances, however, the dynamism may not happen
between interlocutors (real or staged) but rather between material and audience. Even
though National Geographic never took on a dialogic structure, its editors decided that
they would appeal, as a matter of principle, to the conversational dynamic as a way to
create a more intimate experience of the world.
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ANALYSIS 3:
Obergefell v Hodges (2015)
On the structural foundations and influences of the conversational dynamic

The public conversational dynamic is animated in part by an eighteenth-century
Constitution that places a sovereign individual endowed with rights in tension with—and
separate from—a public majority without settling on an answer of how this tension
should be resolved. This dynamic, though part of the genius of the Constitution, still
causes controversy today. What is more, although the spirit of laws designed to protect
minorities from “the tyranny of the majority” (as Tocqueville famously put it in
Democracy in America) is in principle understood, its implementation is notoriously
complicated.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a prime example of this;
it is one of the most important and litigated sections of the Constitution. It states: “No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny any person with its jurisdiction the equal
protection of laws.” Composed in 1868, soon after the Civil War, the Fourteenth
Amendment was purposely designed to invite broad interpretation. “We know from its
history that it was meant particularly to combat inequality toward blacks. We also know,
however—and would rightly presume it even if we didn’t—that the decision to use
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general language, not tied to race, was a conscious one,” writes John Hart Ely, one of the
most-cited legal scholars in American history.504
Ely argues that the Fourteenth Amendment “contains provisions that are difficult
to read responsibly as anything other than quite broad invitations to import into the
constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in the language of
the amendment of the debates that led up to it.”505 In other words, strict interpretivism is
not only undesirable here, but impossible. To this complexity, an additional layer must be
included here, since it sets up the problem of Ely’s seminal book on constitutional
interpretation, as well as a key controversy in the conversational dynamic: Judicial
review—which puts a “stop” to conversations about law—is inconsistent with democratic
theory.506 Ely explains the dilemma in this way: “When a court invalidates an act of the
political branches on constitutional grounds…it is overruling their judgment, and
normally doing so in a way that is not subject to ‘correction’ by the ordinary lawmaking
process. Thus, the central function, and at the same time the central problem, of judicial
review: a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant
way is telling the people’s elected representatives that they cannot govern as they like.”507
This lack of democrat accountability, together with the Court’s final say on the
Constitution, is why Justices habitually censure each other for “shutting down the
conversation.” In Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the landmark 5-4 Supreme Court ruling
504
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that made same-sex marriage a constitutional right, Chief Justice Roberts writes in his
dissent, for example, that the majority decision “seizes for itself a question the
Constitution leaves to the people, at a time when people are engaged in a vibrant debate
on that question.”508 By “closing debate,” argues Roberts, proponents of same-sex
marriage have “lost” and “lost forever” the “opportunity to win the true acceptance that
comes from persuading their fellow citizens of the justice of their cause. And they lose
this just when the winds of change were freshening at their backs.”509
The problem, however, is that this same recourse to constitutional law (i.e., this
ability to end the conversation) is also how constitutional rights are protected—regardless
of legislation. In Democracy in America, for instance, Tocqueville calls “the power
granted to American courts to pronounce on the unconstitutionality of laws…one of the
most powerful barriers ever erected against the tyranny of political assemblies.”510
Justices still maintain this view. Indeed, the Opinion of the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges
refers to this principle, saying, “An individual can invoke a right to constitutional
protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the
broader public refuses to act.”511
Citing West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), a case having to do
with the mandatory salute to the flag in public schools, the majority in Obergfell v
Hodges held that “the idea of the Constitution ‘was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
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officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.’ This is why
‘fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.’”512 The controversy does not end with this, however, since fundamental rights,
whatever they may be, are not “raw” materials (or even “self-evident” as the Declaration
of Independence famously held).
In effect, this means that fundamental rights may be just as likely to appear at the
center of judicial clashes on “ending the conversation” as any other portion of judicial
review. In cases where Justices are compelled to bridge the distance between eighteenthcentury ideals animating the Constitution and emerging twenty and twenty-first century
challenges, this is more likely still. Right to Privacy, to give one example, did not become
a part of Constitutional law until a late-nineteenth century Harvard Law Review article
(1890) by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis when they defined it as “the right to be left
alone.” Soon after, it began to play an active part of numerous twentieth century Supreme
Court rulings, including Roe v. Wade (1972). In an era of increasing surveillance and
digital decadence, privacy is again receiving attention, even though the Constitution that
underwrites the “right to privacy” remains basically unchanged.513
This inevitable distance between old and new amplifies the rhetorical challenges
for Justices, since it draws more attention to judicial review at a time when, certainly on
paper, the nation was becoming more democratic.514 Justice Jackson pointed to this
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dilemma in 1943 when, writing for the 7-2 majority in West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette, he held that “the task of translating majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,
conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth-century, into
concrete restraints on officials dealing with problems of the twentieth-century, is one to
disturb confidence.”515 The cultural transformations between the eighteenth and twentieth
centuries were profound, argued Jackson. Constitutional “principles grew in soil which
also produced a philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that his liberty
was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints, and that the government
should be entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision over men’s
affairs.”516
By the 1940s, following the transformative influence of the Great Depression and
at the height of the Second World War, the judicial landscape had changed dramatically.
The government’s role had exponentially increased, making judicial precedent that much
more difficult to uphold. “We must transport these rights to a soil in which the laissezfaire concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least to economic affairs,
and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and
through expanded and strengthened government controls. These changed conditions often
deprive precedents of reliability and cast us more than we would choose upon our own
judgment.”517 The decision, in other words, to overturn legislation as unconstitutional in
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order to protect individual rights has the potential to be every bit as contentious as the
more democratic process of drafting legislation through Congress or States.518
When the Constitution and Bill of Rights were drafted, democratic decisionmaking and individual rights were placed on parallel footing without a conclusive way to
resolve the tension between them. This tension persists today and is vividly demonstrated
in Obergefell v. Hodges, a landmark Supreme Court ruling for which conversation is
neither an overt legal topic nor a deliberately chosen symbol. This is precisely why it is
such a fitting illustration; highlighting just how varied and extensive the reach of the
conversational dynamic has become, the conversational influences in Obergefell v.
Hodges are multiple, contradictory, and, although central to the decision, almost always
implicit.

Audience: On the Choice to Amplify Interior Motivations
In one variety of “conversation,” the emphasis on individual rights and personal
experience drags the self—as a private self—into public spaces, thus encouraging a type
of private, interior-focused style.519 Intentions, yearnings, personal experience, and
individual expressions of identity are central to this dynamic. It is in this variation, for
example, that we find language which steps outside of law and into the realm of inner
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motivation and “the human condition.”520 This is where the Court states, “Marriage
responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one
there.” 521 The language is striking here, not only because it seems so out of step with a
traditional legal brief, but also for the nonmaterial way in which it sets up a contrast
between a married person and a “lonely person.” As Justice Thomas notes in his dissent,
the Opinion also “suggests that marriage confers ‘nobility’ on individuals. I am unsure
what this means. People may choose to marry or not to marry. The decision to do so does
not make one person more ‘noble’ than another. And the suggestion that Americans who
choose not to marry are inferior to those who decide to enter such relationships is
specious.”522
Of course, what Justice Thomas fails to mention is that the plaintiffs in Obergefell
v. Hodges were actually not free to marry. That is precisely why their case was before the
Court. Thus the controversy is two-fold: 1) on the one hand, the Opinion idealizes
marriage, personal motives, and interior dynamics; 2) on the other hand, it does this even
when it has stronger, more relevant legal arguments at its disposal. What the petitioners
seek, and what the Court can (and indeed does) deliver, is legal standing: Petitioner
James Obergefell wants to be shown as the surviving spouse on his husband’s death
certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse want to share equal parental rights with all
three of their adopted children. And Ijipe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura want to move to a
different state without having their lawful marriage stripped from them. 523 None of this
520
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really has to do with “call[ing] out to find no one there.” Whether or not marriage confers
“nobility” or responds (or does not respond) to existential loneliness is hardly the
question.
What matters (at least in principle) in Obergefell v Hodges is that there are more
than one thousand provisions of federal law for which a valid marriage is a significant
status.524 In a case revolving around due process and equal protection under the law, one
would think this is where the analysis would logically fall.525 However, instead of
concentrating on the clearest legal argument—that “States have contributed to the
fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution at center of so
many facets of the legal and social order”—the Opinion buries this argument in appeals
to personal longings.526
Because the Constitution itself “says nothing about marriage,” each of the
Justices, regardless of where one fell on the issue, was confronted with the task of
“translating majestic generalities” into “concrete restraints” and rights. 527 The majority
responded to this by ratcheting up the emotional intensity of the case in order to illustrate
the “urgency of the petitioners’ cause from their perspectives.”528 More tellingly, they
identified the central purpose of marriage not as a social issue, or even legal one made
more important by new provisions in state and federal law, but rather as a personal—even
existential—one. Rather than focus on the denial of tangible benefits, the majority
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opinion chose to situate the Court alongside expressions of personal identity and interior
yearnings. Although an apt example of an intense preoccupation with the individual and
dramatization through rhetorical style, the Opinion of the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges
is perhaps best understood as a signal of this interest in a private self rather than a
superior example of its performance.

Conversational Writing Style as Legal Strategy
A second variety of the conversation dynamic in Obergefell v. Hodges is
expressed not in the idea of intimacy, but rather in the informal, unfiltered style we have
come to associate with modern speech. This is especially noteworthy in the dissents of
Obergefell v. Hodges given the style’s contrast to their formal, judicial positions. The
legal theme of “judicial restraint” pervades the dissents in this ruling. Justice Roberts
writes, for example, that “allowing unelected federal judges to select which
unenumerated fundamental rights rank as ‘fundamental’—and to strike down state laws
on the basis of that determination—raises obvious concerns about the judicial role.”529 He
notes that in order to avoid the Court’s previous “error of converting personal preferences
into constitutional mandates, our modern substantive due process cases have stressed the
need for ‘judicial self-restraint.’”530 Justice Scalia goes even further in his dissent. He
effectively questions whether this “error of converting personal preference into
constitutional mandates” is so egregious as to undercut the very system of American
government, writing that a system that “makes the People subordinate to a committee of
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nine elected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy.”531 However, the style in
which Scalia writes his disagreement not only gratuitously draws attention to himself, but
more often than not eschews restraint.
Indeed, in the same way that presidential rhetoric has become more
conversational over time, the language of the Court has also shifted, becoming, as Erwin
Chemerinsky perceives it, less refined than before: “My impression—and I present it as
just that, a subjective sense—is that language is less eloquent and more sarcastic than
before.”532 In particular, Chemerinsky cites “a great change in that Justices are far more
willing to use a ‘poison pen’ and be very sarcastic.”533 This is evidenced throughout the
Obergefell v Hodges decision. For example, just after Justice Scalia complains about the
“pretentious” style in which the Opinion of the Court is couched, he let loose on his own
style for contrasting effect: “Rights, we are told, can ‘rise…from a better understanding
of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.’
(Huh? How can a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives
[whatever that means] define [whatever that means] and urgent liberty [never mind], give
birth to a right?”534
Although Scalia claims that he wants the Justices to refrain from inserting
themselves into the ruling, he does this very thing—and to considerable rhetorical
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effect—with his irreverent, parenthetical style. His repeated use of mocking interjections
(“Huh?,” “whatever that means,” “never mind”) amplifies his position as an “unelected
lawyer” and deliberately draws attention to his personal prejudices. Scalia breaks down
the Court to illustrate how they are “hardly a cross-section of America.”535 The Court,
says Scalia, “consists of only nine men and women, all of them successful lawyers who
studied at Harvard or Yale. Four of the nine are natives of New York City. Eight of them
grew up in east- and west-coast States.”536 Scalia’s use of energeia reduces the distance
from an august Supreme Court in the abstract to a handful of knowable, if successful,
judges. Mirroring the language of conversation, which frequently includes fragments and
incomplete sentences, Scalia observes: “Not a single Southwesterner or even, to tell the
truth, a genuine Westerner (California does not count.)”537 By playing with America’s
quintessential regional disputes in the service of his own argument (that “the strikingly
unrepresentative character of the body voting on today’s social upheaval would be
irrelevant if they were functioning as judges”), Scalia bolsters his own position while
simultaneously concealing this effort.
Although portions of his dissent read as though they were written off-the-cuff,
they are in fact a stylistic choice deliberately developed over time. Certainly, Scalia’s
characteristic use of informal idioms (“I would hide my head in a bag.” “Ask the nearest
hippie.” “What say?”) should not be confused with sloppiness or carelessness.538 Rather,
they perform a central role in Scalia’s attitude toward legal writing, which he explains in
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the collection of speeches and writings that were published after his death in 2016: “there
is a writing genius…which consists primarily, I think, of the ability to place oneself in the
shoe’s of one’s audience; to assume only what they assume; to anticipate what they
anticipate; to explain what they need explained; to think what they must be thinking; to
feel what they must be feeling.”539 The audience-centered principle that Scalia espouses
here can of course be traced across the rhetorical tradition. What is noteworthy is not the
idea that one should feel what audiences are feeling or thinking what audiences are
thinking. Rather, it is that modern audiences—even the brightest legal minds, to whom
the ruling is primarily addressed—increasingly expect the same thing: to be addressed, as
Dale Carnegie would say, “just as directly as he would in a chat, and in the same general
manner that he would employ in speaking to one of them in conversation.”540
Legal scholar Laura Krugman Ray readily admits that “attorneys may enjoy, but
do not need” the conversational style and vivid “imagery to understand judicial
analyses.”541 However, she suspects (as, it seems to me, we all should) that there is the
“hope” of engaging “interested amateurs as well as legal professionals among readers of
the Court.”542 This may be why you find Justice Roberts referring to scenarios such as
this one: “If you had asked a person on the street how marriage was defined, no one
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would have ever said, ‘Marriage is the union of a man and a women, where the woman is
subject to coverture.’”543
Although the tone throughout Roberts and Scalia’s dissents are noticeably
different (with Roberts’s being more respectful and Scalia’s more biting), the appeal to an
audience’s individual reactions and thoughts is present throughout. For example, Roberts
concludes his dissent by changing his orientation (or “footing”) to be even more closely
aligned with the audience, saying, “If you are among the many Americans—of whatever
sexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate
today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity
for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new
benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it. I respectfully
dissent.” 544 This use of “you” is a classic marker of the conversational style. As Jeanne
Fahnestock notes, “the second person pronoun produces direct address when the rhetor
deliberately acknowledges the presence of listeners or readers by calling on them or even
making some demand on them. In conversation, such direct address can be immediately
compelling; in writing, it is a less-pressing invitation, but it is still one of the markers of a
more oral and often informal style.”545 In addition, the marked repetition of “celebrate,”
straddles the uses of anaphora. As a standard feature of oratory the use of anaphora
elevates the passage. However, the scheme of repetition also works in a second sense that
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Holcomb and Killingsworth identify as being “at home in more colloquial or
conversational writing,” as a way to “ratchet the emotional intensity up a notch.”546
Roberts’s use of the second pronoun in if you are among follows this pattern of
calling on readers and making some demand of them. However, it does so in a way that
not only bolsters his own argument but also simultaneously attempts to build common
ground with an audience who disagrees with him. (This style in Supreme Court briefs is
distinctive enough to have caught the attention of legal scholars. For example, writing
about Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, Krugman Ray describes her writing as
“remarkably conversational. She employs a range of rhetorical strategies to speak directly
to the reader, suggesting that her enterprise is less indoctrination than a more congenial
mode of persuasion. Leavening her legal prose with colloquial diction, she engages the
reader in something approaching an informational, if one-sided, chat.”547) For Roberts,
the effect is not only to engage the reader (although it does that) but also to reinforce his
judicial analyses. In the same move, the Chief Justice differentiates his capacity to feel
what his audience is feeling without confusing it with or collapsing it into his legal
position. Thus he ends with: But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do
with it.
Scalia, by contrast, underscores his personal disinterestedness in the topic not by
seeking to build common ground, as Roberts attempts to do, but by insulating himself and
further entrenching his own thoughts and feeling about the case. Rather than call on the
audience, in other words, Scalia doubly interjects himself as first a judge (which informs
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his ruling) and secondly as a disinterested citizen (which informs both his personal
feelings about the topic and his indictment of the Court). Directly after providing a
justification for writing his own dissent (he wants to “call attention to the Court’s threat
to American democracy”), Scalia opens with an overview of himself in relation to the
topic: “The substance of today’s decrees is not of immense personal importance to me.
The law can recognize as marriage whatever sexual attachment and living arrangements it
wishes, and can afford them favorable civil consequences, from tax treatment to rights of
inheritance…So it is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage. It
is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me. Today’s decree says
that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of
nine lawyers on the Supreme Court.”548
From here, Scalia goes on to idealize democratic discussion and debate much in
the same way that the Opinion of the Court idealizes marriage. I will discuss this
elevation of debate and the third controversy of the conversational dynamic next.
However, before doing so it is important to remember that the conversational style—even
when viewed explicitly as a style—signifies more than just a way of talking or a way of
writing. As Holcomb and Killingsworth point out, “every style of speaking has effects on
matters other than language.”549 For example, style, as part of a larger social dynamic,
becomes a vehicle of performance in which quintessential political questions of “power
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and advantage are negotiated, distributed, and struggled over in society,” says
Brummett.550
Style is not limited to particular effects either, since “the purpose to which each
style is put can vary;” in the same manner, audiences do not passively receive but
actually “co-create” its meaning. 551 Accordingly, and despite their appeal, “rigid
conventions” of stylistic performance are often only that: conventions “masquerade[ing]
as rules.”552 As we have seen in the variety of conversational styles demonstrated by
Scalia, Roberts, and Kagan, even though they all make use of the conversational style in
their judicial analyses, and even though all of their opinions are informed by a
Constitution that famously draws out the individual, their reasons for doing so are not
identical and the “footing” they seek to establish with their audience is not the same.

Conversation as the Connective Tissue of Liberal Decision
In a third variety of the conversational dynamic, public discussion and rational
debate are idealized. What makes this component of Obergefell v. Hodges controversial
is not the objective of democratic debate as such—both the majority and the minority
appeal to it—but rather a question that the Constitution introduces without settling on an
answer: at what point individual rights are deemed fundamental, and thus removed from
democratic decision. 553 In Obergefell v Hodges, the Opinion of the Court contends that
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the right to marry, regardless of sexual orientation, is indeed fundamental. As such, “it is
of no moment whether advocates of same-sex marriage now enjoy or lack momentum in
the democratic process.” 554 The minority argues the opposite. They contend that where
the public was in the process of democratic decision-making mattered very much, not just
in regards to the ruling itself but for future implications about the public’s reception of
same-sex marriage. Justice Roberts, for example, believed “there will be consequences to
shutting down the political process on an issue of such profound public importance.
Closing debate tends to close minds. People denied a voice are less likely to accept the
ruling of a court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort of thing courts usually
decide.”555
What is more, the minority argued that it was not just that the decision closed
debate, but that it did so at an inopportune time. “Until the federal courts intervened,”
writes Justice Alito, “the American people were engaged in a debate about whether their
State should recognize same-sex marriage.”556 Justice Scalia concurred, saying, “Until
the courts put a stop to it,” the “public debate over same-sex marriage” was in the process
of displaying “American democracy at is best.”557 Unlike other forms of democracy,
which can be rude, uncivil, petty, and shortsighted, here individuals “on both sides” of
the argument were said to have “passionately but respectfully” persuaded their “fellow
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citizens” through reasoned and respectful debate.558 Justice Roberts, meanwhile, held that
“supporters of same-sex marriage” in particular had achieved “considerable success
persuading their fellow citizens—through the democratic process—to adopt their
view.”559 This process, according to Roberts, ended with the Court’s landmark decision,
“stealing the issue from the people” at a time when “the winds of change were freshening
at their backs.”560 In support of this claim, he cites “a carefully reasoned decision” from
the Court of Appeals, which recognized the “democratic ‘momentum’ in favor of
‘expand[ing] the definition of marriage to include gay couples.”561
Regardless of how one views the Justices various interpretations on the relevance
(or lack of relevance) of the “democratic momentum,” the Court’s general agreement on
its presence is especially useful to our understanding of the conversational dynamic. This
is because the question of how this momentum was accomplished ultimately sheds light
on the relationship between the dynamic and the public sphere. In their introduction to
Mediated Politics, W. Lance Bennett and Robert Entman argue for a broad definition of
the public sphere. They argue that it “is comprised of any and all locations, physical or
virtual, where ideas and feelings relevant to politics are transmitted and exchanged
openly.”562 The ruling of Obergefell v Hodges helps to flesh out this view, particularly
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given the Justices shared expectation that American democracy engages in open debates
about the “content of law.”563
How much of a role did “conversation” play in the “deep transformations” and
“fundamental societal changes” that led shifts in thought about something as religiously
and politically entrenched as same-sex marriage?564 Political theorists have pointed to the
ideal of discussion and debate in public life for as long as democracy has been a political
system. What makes the Obergefell v. Hodges case so useful and distinctive to this study
is that it unofficially (and unwittingly) captures a “dynamic” that is fundamental and
diffuse. In contrast to formal campaigns for conversation (e.g., President Bill Clinton’s
late 1990s initiative to have a “national conversation about race”), Obergefell makes no
mention of conversation as an end in itself. Instead of envisioning conversation as an
unmoving metaphor for understanding, the 2015 Supreme Court ruling accentuates the
role conversation plays as a connective tissue among “any and all locations, physical or
virtual, where ideas and feelings relevant to politics are transmitted and exchanged
openly.”
Between 1996, when Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
(which “defined marriage for all federal-law purposes as ‘only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife”) and 2003, when Massachusetts became the
first state to legalize same-sex marriage, a combination of “private and public dialogue”
contributed to shifting attitudes about same-sex marriage.565 Justice Kennedy, who wrote
the majority opinion, cites “case law,” “District Court decisions,” “history and tradition,”
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“new and widespread discussion,” “grassroots campaigns,” “studies and other writings,”
“extensive discussion of the issue in both governmental and private sectors,” “years of
litigation, legislation, referenda, and the discussion that attended these public acts,”
changes in “societal understandings,” “substantial cultural and political developments,”
“deep transformations,” “perspectives that began in please and protests,” and “ongoing
dialogue” as some of the dynamics that contributed to this shift.566 Justice Thomas adds
“newspaper editorials,” “journals,” “public speeches,” “sermons,” and “letters,” to the
discussion, while Justice Roberts cites the “battlefields of the Civil War,” “Constitutional
Amendments,” and a “dictionary” as materials in his argument.567 As a collective, the
Court cites copious amounts of foundational theorists and documents, including Cicero,
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Alexis de Tocqueville, the Magna Carta,
and the Declaration of Independence, to name a few.
The materials of the “discussion” in other words, come from all sides. Although
on their own these elements might not appear to offer much in the way of disclosure,
together they underscore how and why “the bullheaded belief that democracy is nothing
more than the periodic election of government by majority rule is crumbling.”568 Indeed,
as Montesquieu long suspected, the very work of the Court emphasizes how much the
Constitution (as a founding idea) and law (as a force that has direct bearing on
individuals) not only follow citizen attitudes but also drive them. A recent report of
approximately one million respondents published in Psychological and Cognitive
Sciences highlights this point. The 2019 study suggests that, while antigay bias has been
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waning for some time, “following local same-sex marriage legalization antigay bias
decreased at roughly double the rate.”569 Because of the staggered manner in which samesex marriage legislation in the United States was passed, the authors held they were better
able to delineate how “government legislation can inform attitudes even on religiously
and politically entrenched positions.”570 Justice Roberts, who was adamant in his belief
that changes to the definition of marriage belonged in the hands of democratically elected
legislators—not federally appointed judges—still recognized the deliberative processes
taking place outside (and perhaps inside) the Court. The “democratic momentum” was
truly shifting people’s perspectives “here and abroad” said Roberts: “This deliberative
process is making people take seriously questions that they may not have ever regarded
as questions before.”571
If Obergefell v Hodges can be read as an implicit controversy over the role of
conversation in official governmental settings, then we may be left to wonder about how
this dynamic might play out in unstructured ones. Although as far as I am aware there are
no sustained studies (outside of this one) on the long-term logic animating the
conversational turn, there are nevertheless numerous analyses and histories that document
the unofficial relationship between the media, public life, and “conversation” in twentieth
century United States. Rather than seeking to duplicate these scholars’ efforts or argue
against them, this chapter has sought to build on them.
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Conclusion
The public conversational dynamic responds to different exigencies than earlier
forms of rhetoric or artful conversation. Patterns that distinguish the modern, public
conversational dynamic from earlier forms of rhetoric or artful conversation include its
orientation (spectacle); it style (appealing to conversational markers, even when written
or spoken in monologic form); and its expectations (in most scenarios, some will
contribute, but not all). In the case of spectacle, what is important is that interaction is
expected to go beyond itself by disclosing things like character, expertise, inner
motivations, or things “as they really are.” In the case of style, the dynamism may not
happen between interlocutors (real or staged) but rather between material and audience.
(Even when delivered in a monologic structure, writers and speakers may appeal to the
conversational dynamic as a way to frame complicated, controversial, or technical
information in an easier or more palatable manner.) Perhaps most important (and
misunderstood) about the conversational dynamic is its expectation of lack. The public
conversational dynamic invites engagement from people who will never actually enter
into the discussion. However, some engagement is usually expected and achieved, and
the conversation can change courses as a result. The extent to which audiences do or do
not participate or change the course of the discussion makes the dynamic more or less
“conversational.”
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EPILOGUE
Rhetoric “in general” will continue to adapt to the cultural, social, and political
realities that organize people’s lives, whether it is achieved in ways that we recognize or
not. Although this study was very much inspired by present conditions in the United
States and does include modest contributions to rhetorical theory and criticism, I consider
it above all to be a claim about the history of rhetoric and cultural survival.
The conversational turn has been under-theorized. This has led not only to blind
spots in our understanding of the past, but miscalculations of what the dynamic means to
the present. The sociologist and historian Richard Sennett has aptly framed the problem
this way: when critics speak of revolutions, they “often suggest to the imagination of
their readers that beforehand there was one society, that during the revolution society
stopped, and that afterward a new cycle began. This is a view of human history based on
the lifecycle of a moth.”572 The result, according to Sennett, is not simply a disconnect
between periods, but also a failure to identify current dilemmas. “The error,” he writes,
“is more than that of failing to see how one condition of life blurs into another; it is a
failure to understand both the reality of cultural survival and the problems this legacy,
like any inheritance, creates in a new generation.”573
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If the conversational style and metaphor are as revolutionary and pervasive as
modern assessments of American rhetoric would have us believe, then our pedagogies
and critiques of rhetoric should treat it as such. We can no longer be satisfied with
catching someone in a performance that is not “pure” conversation or “pure”
argumentation and calling it a day. Indeed, if my brief assessment of nineteenth-century
American culture offers anything inventive, I hope it the suggestion that hybrid forms of
public conversation were actively sought and encouraged for their perceived corrective
qualities that “pure” conversation and “pure” argumentation were, for any number of
reasons, unable to provide. In Chapter Four, I identified these attributes as compression,
cultural mediation, cultural reform, and attempts at discovery that were so typical of the
period.
Although some of the dilemmas that animated these nineteenth-century goals
have surely morphed or been replaced, one practical application from which university
classrooms would surely benefit is a reintegration of the view that an ability to “speak as
others” is considered important for rhetorical training.574 Much attention has been given
to the uncomfortable emphasis on the self and interiority that contemporary discourse
encourages—and in which conversationalism is indubitably associated. However, even
this part of the dynamic has not been fully exhausted in its inventiveness or its persuasive
power. (Just today, I encountered a piece of cultural criticism that referred to an author’s
“conversational-voice” not as breezy, funny, or erudite, but as altogether “dam-
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breaking.”575) Equally important, although the multivocality of public conversation will
never reach full participation, the chaos it invites brings us into much closer alignment
with typical rhetorical conditions than any unhindered oration or sequential argument
(including this one) might suggest. There are still so many ways contemporary rhetoric
could go. Whether or not conversation will soon be replaced as the ideal rhetorical frame
remains an open question (and not one in which I have a particular investment).
However, the plasticity of the conversational dynamic cannot be overstated.
For instance, in this study, I have suggested that the Constitution animates some
of the structural foundations and influences of the conversational dynamic by placing a
sovereign individual with rights in tension with a public majority—without settling on an
answer of how this tension should be resolved. This lack of resolution places a strain on
American rhetorical culture, even today. However, it is just as much a site for opportunity
and invention as it is for constrictions. Colene Lind, whose work on the Common Style
served as part of the backdrop for this inquiry, is perceptive in her ability to bring this
dilemma in American politics back to the individual, saying: “the ultimate sin of
citizenship is cynicism, which closes its adherents to the possibilities of persuasive
change.”576 The same can be said for conversation. Although the dynamic I outlined in
the previous chapters is a cumulative rhetorical style and metaphor that, while borrowing
oratory and conversation, is really neither, it still has much to draw from earlier arts—not
least with respect to their trust in an open future. Both rhetoric and democracy require it.
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Given his insight into the ways in which equality of conditions engenders and
modifies everything that it does not produce, it should come as little surprise that it was
Tocqueville who identified this belief in an open future as one of the fundamental
challenges of democracy (and for the historians living in it). “[H]istorians living in
democratic times not only deny certain citizens the power to act on the fate of the people
but also deny peoples themselves the ability to shape their own destiny, thereby making
them subject to either inflexible providence of blind fatality.”577 In their view, he writes,
“the destiny of every nation is irrevocably fixed by its position, origin, antecedents, and
nature, and nothing it does can change that.”578 The conversational dynamic rejects this
doctrine of fatality. As rhetoricians, it is our duty to reject this ossification, too. “One
should be careful not to obscure this idea,” Tocqueville writes, “because the goal is to
exalt men’s souls, not to complete the task of laying them low.”579
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